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Climate change and the continuing changes that accompany it require society and 
its broader institutions to evolve continuously. Today’s continual atmospheric 
damage requires a commitment to ecological considerations that show consistent 
and meaningful carbon reductions. The success of global carbon mitigation depends 
entirely on the capabilities of individual governing bodies agreeing and delivering 
upon their climate ambitions. However, delivering impactful progress on emissions 
is a considerable challenge.  Although there has been significant research as to what 
climate mitigation goals should encompass, the policy path and resulting 
incremental changes needed to achieve them require additional scholarly attention.  
This thesis analyses the role of institutions as they adapt to support societies 
addressing climate change. Adopting a historical institutional approach provides a 
pathway for understanding the coordination of information, individuals, institutional 
adjustments, and their role in the carbon policy process. By focusing on the impact 
of ecological modernisation ideas, this work addresses the ambiguity that lies 
between contradicting approaches to climate governance and instead, analyses the 
incremental changes needed to support societies as they address climate change. 
Systemically gathering policy tools from 1992-2012, this research empirically 
examines the nature, ambition, and achievements of mitigation policy in the EU and 
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"I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions, but laws and 
institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that 
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new 
truths discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of 
circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We 
might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as 
civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors." 













Chapter 1. Introduction  
Climate change plays a significant role in increasing the earth’s average surface 
temperature, fostering the phenomenon known as global warming. When at one time 
scientists were uncertain about the direct cause of climate change, today most agree 
the main cause of climate change is due to humans further expanding the 
"greenhouse effect", or the warming process that results from the atmosphere 
trapping in the heat that radiates from Earth towards space (Lockwood, 2009). 
Certain gases contribute towards heat getting trapped within the atmosphere. Some 
of these are naturally occurring, like water vapour, but others such as carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane, nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are produced as a 
result of human activity (Lockwood, 2009). Thereby, controlling these gases can 
help to control the effects of global warming. The process of controlling the impacts 
of climate change by reducing the usage of these gases is known as carbon 
mitigation.  
 
Carbon mitigation requires transitioning away from the consumption of fossil fuels, 
whose usage contributes mainly towards the amount of carbon present in the 
atmosphere (IPCC, 2014). Carbon policies are the specific actions and policy 
measures that nations must undertake in order to move towards a low-carbon future. 
As current industrial processes rely heavily on oil and coal, many countries, most 
specifically the US, have been reluctant to commit to these specific policies as they 
see climate mitigation as potentially limiting the opportunity for economic 
development. However, the EU has championed emissions reductions while still 
producing economic growth. Although the US has shown interest in committing, 
today’s atmospheric damage requires immediate action.  Countries must 
institutionally adjust to climate change in a manner that supports a societal transition 




This thesis seeks to analyse the role of institutions within climate mitigation 
governance. The crux of this research piece is understanding effective strategies for 
sustainable development, and how the ideas that are the centrepiece of them impact 
carbon policy success.  By comparing the EU and the US, it seeks to show how 
different ideas impact institutional change and thus, climate mitigation policy 
outcomes. This work adopts a historical institutional approach to analyse 
specifically how sustainable development impact institutional change.  Supported 
by a comparative analysis of policy tools from 1992-2012, this research empirically 
examines the effect that ideas have had on the nature, ambition, and achievements 
of mitigation policies in the EU and US.  
 
1.1 Research background  
Climate change policy was born directly out of the environment policy agenda area 
of sustainable development.  Addressing climate change is therefore, an 
internationally recognised component of maintaining the stability between 
environment, economy, and broader civilian society (IPCC, 2014; Edenhofer, 2014; 
O’Neill et al, 2014; Lafferty, W.M. and Eckerberg, K., 2013; Neumeyer, 2012). The 
centrality of international climate mitigation policy today focuses on reducing CO2.  
This is not because the other gases are not important; the reduction of CFCs for 
example, has long been a concern of scientists, and has been an area of international 
climate mitigation policy success. The Montreal Protocol, for instance, adopted in 
1987 now is expected to return the ozone layer to a healthy level by the year 2037 
(IPCC, 2014). However, the area of CO2 reductions, or CO2 policy, has not 
experienced as great of success as the area of CFCs, despite it being an absolutely 
crucial aspect of international climate mitigation success.  
 
Today, international climate agreements focus on moving countries towards a low 
carbon future, one that is powered mainly by renewable energy. This is due to the 
fact that the burning of fossil fuels, specifically both coal and oil, increase the 
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concentration of CO2 present in the world’s atmosphere. This happens because the 
coal or oil burning process combines carbon with oxygen in the air to make CO2. In 
addition, but to a much lesser extent, the clearing of land for agriculture, industry, 
and other human activities ha also increased concentrations of greenhouse gases 
present in the atmosphere (IPCC, 2014). If current fossil-fuel consumption trends 
continue, the average surface temperatures of the earth could rise by as much as 6.4 
degrees by 2100 (Stocker et al, 2014). Even under most the most optimistic scenario, 
temperatures will still rise by 1.1-2.9 degrees before this century’s end (Stocker et 
al, 2014). Climate mitigation success therefore depends on the commitments of 
industrialized heavy emitters to move away from the usage of fossil fuels (IPCC, 
2014). 
 
Addressing the consequences is an extensive process as nearly all current methods 
of economic consumption and production rely primary on activities that produce 
carbon. These emissions are generally produced across six main categories 
including: electricity and heat production; industry and agriculture; transport; 
buildings; and energy (IPCC, 2014). Therefore, reducing CO2 requires 
fundamentally creating change in production and consumption in each of these 
sectors.   
 
To help foster global action on the issue, the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) originally developed an international treaty in 1997 
which aimed to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference within the climate 
system,” (Article 2, Secretariat, 2002). This binding treaty, the Kyoto Protocol (KP), 
requires signatory nations to adhere to certain emissions reduction levels within a 
specific time-period and a given base line for comparison.  The KP recognizes that 
developed countries are primarily responsible for the current high levels of 
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greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere1, and as such, places a heavier burden 
on these developed nations to commit to reductions under the principle of "common 
but differentiated responsibilities," (Protocol, 1997). It was (and remains) 
imperative that all large industrialized nations take part in officially committing to 
CO2 reductions, specifically the top five largest emitters: China, the US, the EU, 
India, and Russia. Out of these five, the EU and the US both pledged to assume 
leadership in the realm of climate change, yet today they have ended up in very 
different places. 
 
Today, quantitative reductions show that the US has achieved a decline in its 
emissions recently, yet its fluctuation in progress over the past years call into 
question the true authenticity of its ambitions (Friedlingstein et al, 2014, pp. 709-
715).  In 2013, the US greenhouse gas emissions totalled 6,673 million metric tons 
(14.7 trillion pounds) of CO2 equivalents. This number represented a six per cent 
increase since 1990 levels; however, the US has seen a nine per cent decrease since 
2005 (EPA, 2015). However, it could be argued that emissions reductions decreased 
during this period due to the economic recession, which resulted in decreased energy 
consumption during the time period 2007-2010 (Willow and Wylie, 2014. pp. 222-
236).  The US’s capabilities of delivering upon their climate ambition become even 
more ambiguous when looking at the EU’s 24.9% in reductions as of 2013, which 
show a constant decline in emissions, without many fluctuations, since the initial 




                                               
1 GHG emissions responsibilities are carried by developed nations as a result of more than 150 
years of industrial activity; developed countries are seen as not heavily contributing current levels 
of carbon dioxide present in the atmosphere as they have not yet industrialised. 
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Figure 1: Annual European Union Greenhouse Gas Inventory, 1990-2013  
 
 
Source: European Environment Agency, 2016 
 
Although the EU is far from a perfect actor in climate mitigation success, today it 
has achieved considerable merit in the realms of climate mitigation success (Wurzel, 
Liefferink, and Connelly, 2016).  Specifically, the EU is known for creating the 
world’s largest emission trading scheme, the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS), whilst the US has yet to significantly show their capacity to 
increase carbon productivity. In terms of ambition, the EU has recently pledged to 
reduce its emissions by 40% by 2020, while the US only outlined its first ambition 
to support the global climate regime in the Paris Agreement this December 
(UNFCCC, 2015a). It has announced “an economy-wide target of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 26-28% below its 2005 level in 2025,” (UNFCCC, 
2015b). This Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) of the US shows 
that the government intends to begin to take action on CO2 reductions; however, 
there is major uncertainty behind this commitment.  
 
Instead of leadership, the US has been mainly labelled a “laggard” in climate 
mitigation policies (Kelly, 2015, pp. 685-687). This refers most usually to the lack 
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of official commitment to climate mitigation goals.  It is therefore difficult to assess 
what the true nature of change has been in the US, especially when considering that 
it is still part of a “longer range, collective effort to transition to a low-carbon global 
economy as soon as possible,” (UNFCCC, 2015b).  It is therefore, critically 
important for the success of global climate regimes, and current emissions 
reductions efforts, to understand the how the EU has been able to create a convincing 
case for climate mitigation, and what particular instances, or ideas, have donated 
towards the US failing to create such a convincing notion.  
 
The EU’s ambition and success in climate policy provides a useful comparison for 
any large industrialized nation new to the climate challenge, and most specifically 
perhaps, the US.  Although the two political systems differ institutionally and 
constitutionally 2  they still share important features, especially in terms of the 
variables that impact CO2 most significantly: complex, multilevel, high-
consumption, liberal democracies with significant impact on global change in 
emissions levels and the economic potential to address it.  Both actors struggle with 
maintaining a balance between centralization and decentralization, and ensuring 
their structures retain legitimacy amongst their civilians (Schmidt, 2004, pp. 975-
997).  In addition, both political systems also struggle with retaining economic 
power, yet are faced with international pressure to reduce their carbon footprints.  
 
Comparing the policy paths then from the first pledges of leadership to see how and 
why the EU and the US have ended up in such different places is empirically useful 
for analysing the incremental changes that institutions can undertake as they move 
society towards a low-carbon future. At the same time, this comparison is equally 
valuable for its theoretical contributions. The policy approaches that the EU and US 
have undertaken thus far are largely representative of the debate within climate 
                                               
2 The US is a sovereign federal state while the EU is a supranational organization 
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governance itself. What is the appropriate role of governance, and specifically 
governmental institutions, within CO2 reductions?  What types of actions are needed 
to spur change? The EU and US have both tried to achieve the same policy goal, yet 
have been drastically different in their approaches. The comparison of the EU and 
the US within this thesis will analyse the effectiveness of the contrasting approaches 
to emissions reductions.  
 
1.1.1 Ecological modernisation as a mitigation strategy   
The approaches of the EU and the US towards climate mitigation goals have been 
similar, yet different. Both areas have outwardly embraced the challenge of climate 
change, yet have attempted to address the issue in a manner that does not require the 
dismantling of their industrialist economies. Instead, both have declared their 
support for sustainable development, economic growth that contains both 
environmental and social considerations, as a means of mitigating the risks that stem 
from climate change. The specific idea of how to approach climate mitigation 
policies with an end goal of creating economic value for the environment can be 
described as “ecological modernisation” (Eckersley, 2004, p. 80). Ecological 
modernisation as a term refers to the transformative process of engraining 
environmental externalities within the traditional path of development (Eckersley, 
2004; Mol, 1996; Christoff, 1996; Hajer, 1995; Mol and Spaargaren, 1993). 
Ecological modernisation can be described as a constructive approach for dealing 
with environmental problems, where the central role for solving these issues is 
“internalizing externalities (Mol and Spaargaren, 1993, pp. 431-459). This is based 
on a market-driven approach to sustainability, which focuses on creating a value for 
the environment, or including environmental costs as part of economic production 
processes.  
 
In general, this theory refers to a more intricate aspect of development studies, and 
focuses specifically on the economic adjustments that institutions can take to benefit 
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from environmental management. Both Hajer (1995) and Harvey (1996) link 
ecological modernisation and sustainable development together  in a manner where 
sustainable development acts as the “central story line” of the policy discourse of 
ecological modernisation (Gibbs, 2006, p.4) However, ecological modernisation 
acts as a stronger analytical tool when compared to sustainable development in that 
it “has a much sharper focus than does sustainable development on exactly what 
needs to be done with the capitalist political economy, especially within the confines 
of the developed nation state”, (Dryzek, 1997, p. 143). 
 
The strategy of ecological modernisation is usually seen as a “win-win”, or a way 
that environmental considerations can be imposed upon economies in a manner that 
both reduces environmental degradation, yet also allows for economic growth 
(Jänicke 1985, 1983). It is worth noting that some theorists argue that true 
environmental, social, and economic balance cannot be achieved within the current 
constructions of economy and environment that are seen in mainly capitalist 
societies (Mol and Spaargaren, 1993). Instead, some schools of thought call for a 
drastic reconstruction of technology, economy, and the environment, in a manner 
where growth is limited. However, ecological modernisation should not be viewed 
in this manner, but should be seen as rather a political strategy for creating 
“systematic eco-innovation and diffusion,” (Jänicke, 2008, p. 9).   
 
The most basic and fundamental assumption of ecological modernisation centres on 
the re-adaptation of industrial development and economic growth (Hajer, 1995). 
Taking an ecological modernist approach implies taking the notion that economic 
and ecological considerations can be positively aligned. Here, the productive use of 
natural resources and environmental aspects (like air, water, soil, trees) can be a 
source of future growth and development in the same way that labour and capital 
productivity are traditional sources of development (Hajer, 1995).  Here, growth 
would mainly result from increases in energy and resource efficiency, as well as the 
technological and process innovations that result from the need for increased 
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environmental management, sustainable supply chain management, and clean 
energy resource technologies. Innovation, or eco-innovation more aptly put, would 
not only reduce the amount of carbon that results from the decreased direct 
dependence on fossil fuels in the energy system, but also indirectly from increased 
efficiency in industrial processing.  
  
There are different understandings of the scope of ecological modernisation, which 
this thesis specifically seeks to address. Theorists within this space are largely 
divided as to what the appropriate role of government and policy-making is in 
supporting the path of ecological modernisation. On one side, theorists question 
whether ecological modernisation simply concerns techno-industrial progress, 
therefore requiring only a limited role for government in terms of solutions; the 
opposing school of thought argues that shifting towards an ecologically-engrained 
economy also requires an adjustment of cultural values, therefore requiring a larger 
role for government to help incentivize a shift in public values, attitudes, and 
lifestyle changes. At the centre of these disputes is whether ecological 
modernisation as a development strategy relies mainly on government, or markets 
and entrepreneurship, or civil society, or some sort of multi-level 
governance combining all three of the above.  Therefore, the two divisions in 
ecological modernisation can be used to describe the two different strategies that the 
EU and the US use to approach carbon policy.  
 
The literature to date usually describes the EU’s approach to climate change 
mitigation policies as using strong ecological modernisation. This is described as 
the following: ecological, institutional, communicative, democratic, international, 
and unitary.  (Christoff, 1996, p.490). In reality, what this translates into is the idea 
that climate change requires an overarching commitment, or a “top-down” strategy. 
This approach is based on the fundamental knowledge that addressing climate 
change requires a cross-institutional commitment to distribute the costs of the 
challenge evenly, and to form a uniform value for the environment that is 
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represented cohesively and consistently amongst all societal institutions.  The basis 
of strong ecological modernisation ideas centres around the point that climate 
change requires a shared responsibility, but with considerable input from the variety 
of stakeholders it impacts, thereby becoming “democratic”, (Christoff, 1996, p.490).  
The international and ecological aspects of strong ecological modernisation are 
important. This means that the EU’s approach towards carbon policy begins with an 
approach that is informed by ecological science, and that institutions using this 
approach generally rely on external, international agencies to help inform the policy 
process. When discussing climate change in the EU, this infers that climate policy 
is informed by data collected at the UN-level, the UNFCCC, as opposed to data that 
would be collected on a domestic level.  
 
Table 1: Weak and Strong Ecological Modernisation 
Weak Ecological Modernisation Strong Ecological Modernisation 
Technological solutions to 
environmental problems 
Broad changes to institutional structure 
of society  
Technocratic/corporatist styles of 
policy making made by elite decision-
makers 
Open, democratic decision making 
with participation and involvement 
Concerned with the domestic 
dimensions of the environment and 
development 
Concerned with the international 
dimensions of the environment and 
development 
Economically informed Ecologically informed 
Driven by local and regional levels of 
government 
Driven by federal/supranational levels 
of government  
“Bottom-up” “Top-down”  




The US’s strategy of managing climate change can be described as using a weak 
ecological modernist approach. This idea is described as using a “technocorporatist” 
approach, which relies on technology and corporations to produce the changes that 
are needed to spur institutional adaptation (Eckersley, 2004, p.80). Rather than 
seeing climate change as a challenge that requires environmental commands being 
set at a top-down level, the US generally can be described as viewing climate change 
as a “bottom-up” approach where the notion of the free-market will naturally drive 
a gradual and economic-based approached to climate mitigation policy. The strong 
approach sees institutional coordination and communication as the crux to 
mitigating climate challenges, yet the weak approach generally supports the notion 
that technology will create the solutions to climate change (Gibbs, 1998, pp. 1-15).  
In the instance policy-makers require information, the bottom-up notion would use 
domestically collected data, as opposed to the information used at the UNFCCC, to 
inform decision-making. Weak ecological modernisation tends to look at climate 
change as an environmental problem, yet is most informed by economic impacts (as 
opposed to ecological).  This would mean that rather than looking at the 
environmental impacts associated with policy decisions, policy-makers instead are 
more likely to rely on economic impact analysis to make decisions. At the base of 
these differences is a fundamental division as to whether climate change is a societal 
problem as opposed to an environmental problem. I believe that climate change is a 
societal problem, not only an environmental challenge that requires drastically 
reconstructing the relationship between environment, economy, and energy.  
 
When acting as an analytical framework, the concept of ecological modernisation 
can be used in two ways.  First, it can be used as a theoretical concept to analyse the 
changes needed to support society deemed necessary to solve an environmental 
problem, which in this instance is CO2 reductions. Second, ecological modernisation 
can be as an analytical tool for redirecting environmental policymaking.  As with 
sustainable development, this theory can be used to qualitatively assess the degree 
to which both governing areas have been able to make progress on environmental 
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challenges, and can highlight which changes have been effective (Mol and 
Spaargaren, 1993). The concept can be used overall to examine the differences in 
policy tools and policy outcomes that each divergent approach has caused.  
 
1.1.2 Analysing the impact of ecological modernist ideas   
In political science there is a lack of attention between the connection of climate 
mitigation goals and what the development path of policy must encompass in order 
to achieve them.   Although many scholars have described and explained differences 
in climate mitigation policies, fewer scholars have explained or analysed differences 
in mitigation policy outcomes. Changes in policy outcomes are quantitative and 
therefore easy to measure. Still, these changes can be hard to analyse as factors 
beyond the influence of policy-makers, like recessions and new technology 
developments, often result in emissions reductions.  Yet, the differences in the 
climate mitigation policy outcomes in the EU and the US go beyond quantitative 
validation, and can perhaps be better captured by qualitatively analysing the 
differences in the climate mitigation policy outcomes. Specifically, in comparing 
the policy paths that the EU and the US took when seeking to move towards a low-
carbon future.  
 
The literature thus far has compared these two areas, yet the importance of ideas in 
relation to critical junctures has not been sufficiently developed. Although both the 
EU and the US have pledged commitment towards CO2 reductions, the two have 
approached the goals with very different ideas as to how these goals should be 
obtained (Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013; Harrison and Sundstrom, 2007; Schreurs 
and Tiberghien, 2007).  Both the EU and the US have expressed a desire to take a 
market-based approach to climate change policies, one that includes both 
technology deployment and environmental market management (Clinton and Gore, 
1993; COM, 1992).  Although they both expressed this same desire in 1992, at the 
first conference on climate change, today, they both stand in significantly different 
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places. How is that today the EU is hailed a climate leader and the US still has failed 
to show significant progress on carbon emissions reductions?  I believe that the 
argument to this is much larger than previously researched. I believe it is not only 
the influence of negative interest groups on the policy process in the US, but that 
the larger ideological understanding of climate change in the US requires a drastic 
reconstruction of current environmental values in the US. Addressing climate 
change today requires a policy strategy that contributes in a meaningful manner 
towards global reductions efforts, specifically in way that results in the furthered 
success of global emissions reductions efforts (IPCC, 2014; IPCC, 2007; Stern, 
2007).  The idea that a nation uses must be one that spurs the consideration of climate 
change into broader economic activities (Bulkeley and Newell, 2015). This idea 
must be strong, as opposed to weak, ecological modernisation.  
 
Ideas are critically important to climate mitigation policy because of how they 
specifically influence the policy choices that actors make. An individual’s ideology 
or personal set of values influences how that person considers broader policy 
decisions. Ideas are important within policy as they act as “institutional blueprints 
during periods of uncertainty, as weapons in distributional struggles, and as 
cognitive locks,” (Blyth, 2001, p. 2). Investigating the core ideas that hold actors 
during times of change shows how, “ideas fundamentally alter people’s conception 
of their own self-interests,” and how they “impact how actors choose to structure 
their policy-goals and decisions,” (Blyth, 2001, p 3). Specifically, ideas impact the 
ways in which policy actors perceive both their interests and the environment in 
which they mobilize them. In this way, ideas do not contradict the influence of 
interests on the policy process, but instead, act as a foundation from which interests 
derive.   
 
Ideas are said to influence how a policy-maker is able to make judgements based 
upon facts (Blyth, 2001). For climate change, it is important to understand how pre-
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existing notions in regards to the environment might influence policy-decisions 
relating to carbon emissions reductions. Climate change is a policy area where one 
can measure success; ambitious policy produces greater quantities of emissions 
reductions whereas ineffective policy produces no reductions. Therefore, climate 
change is a policy area where one is able to judge and compare effectiveness in a 
measured aspect. Therefore, one can say that there are some approaches to climate 
change that are better than others. Within my thesis, I argue that the ideas with which 
European actors approach climate change is a more effective lens for actors to adopt 
when compared to the set of ideas with which American actors approach climate 
change policies. The crux of my thesis is that there is no longer sufficient time to 
wait for the American’s technology centric approach to carbon policy to produce 
effective results; instead, the world’s second greatest emitter must begin to adopt an 
institutional approach towards climate change, one that shifts the US towards a more 
sustainable path of development immediately.  Without adjusting the broader 
economic values of society in a manner that reflects a consideration for the 
environment, I hypothesize that carbon policy will continue to compete with policies 
that produce economic growth in the US. When taking this historical institutionalist 
perspective, analysing ideas during critical junctures and the incremental changes 
made after the junctures can help to provide a stronger understanding of how actors 
and agencies are influenced by the broader ideological background in both the EU 
and the US.  
 
Although ideas impact the decisions that policy-makers make on a daily basis, they 
seem to do so even more during times of uncertainty. For climate change, these 
critical junctures can be considered the Conference of the Party (COP) meetings. 
These are the official international conventions held by the United Nations in order 
to monitor progress on carbon emissions reductions. During these critical junctures, 
“there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the 
policy outcome,” (Capoccia and Keleman, 2007, p. 348).   These moments allow 
ideas to spur “a series of trigger events that set the processes of institutional, or 
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policy, change in motion,” (Hogan and Doyle, p. 885). I hypothesize that it is critical 
for governing bodies to engage with the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) in a manner that allows them to make accurate deductions as to the 
appropriate next steps for carbon abatement. I further hypothesize that the manner 
in which the EU has engaged with both the UNFCCC and IPCC has been more 
effective when compared to the US’s approach. An effective carbon strategy should 
require monitoring, reporting, and revising a nations progress on climate change.  
 
The concept of ecological modernisation as an idea can be used as part of a broader 
theoretical concept to analyse the changes needed for ingraining climate 
considerations in the broader economic activity of a governing body.  These changes 
are deemed necessary for an institution to undergo in order for an ecological concept 
to turn into policy, and thereby, and can be used to evaluate the progress of a 
governing body on a path to a low-carbon future. Building on Eckersley’s (2004) 
theory of ecological change and Hall’s (1993) theories on paradigms and policy 
change, I argue that institutions must change at five different levels in response to 
international monitoring to show they are pursuing ecological modernisation or 
shifting towards an environmentally-valued society.  This equates to changes within 
the following dimensions:  
1. Change in policy ambition 
2. Change in policy tools 
3. Change in policy goals  
4. Change in policy paradigm or the hierarchy of policy goals  
5. Change in the role of the state  
 
Eckersley’s work outlines how countries must adapt to address ecological issues, 
and uses weak and strong ecological modernisation to describe how countries may 
try to approach the above-listed levels of change. However, I use this concept to 
examine how these divergent notions impact institutional change; furthermore, I 
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hypothesize that weak ecological modernisation does not in fact produce the levels 
of change needed to achieve a mitigation paradigm shift.  Comparing the changes 
made in the EU to the US helps to better understand the nature of adaptive capacity 
needed for successful climate mitigation policies in general.  
 
The two different approaches are important to understand their effectiveness in 
producing the changes needed to support societies as they adjust to climate change. 
Although it is evident from quantitative reductions that the EU has achieved 
successful reductions, it is currently uncertain how and to what degree institutional 
change has occurred in the US.  As the US has recently expressed the decision to 
support long-term mitigation goals, it is important to understand the degree to which 
existing norms of climate change policy stand to influence future climate policy-
choices.   
 
1.2 Main argument of the research  
The central hypothesis of this thesis is that achieving CO2 reductions requires an 
institutional approach to carbon policy, as seen in the EU, yet currently not exhibited 
by the US.  Although the discussions on climate change first began as an 
environmental issue, it should be noted that climate mitigation policies today require 
strongly coordinated, multi-tiered governance. CO2 reductions, although not 
requiring a drastic reconstruction of economy and environment, do require a 
fundamental shift in values across society.  Economy and environment must be 
reconciled in a manner where the public, policy-makers, and the private-sector alike 
commit to valuing the environment.  Doing so is a drastic change, one that requires 
strong institutional support and extensive coordination of information. This thesis 
mainly centres on the hypothesis that the EU has been able to use the idea of strong 
ecological modernisation to create successful carbon policy. This can be seen when 
comparing the effectiveness of the EU’s institutional, economy-wide approach to 
climate mitigation against the US’s technology and corporate centric approach to 




Although other areas of climate mitigation policy, like CFCs, have experienced 
success from a solely environmental perspective, I argue here that the complexity of 
carbon policy requires new institutions that are heavily economic in nature, and that 
are able to coordinate and disseminate the massive amount of information that is 
related to CO2 reductions. I dispute the notion that CO2 reductions can be achieved 
without new agencies, and that the US’s current   market approach to CO2 reductions 
will be enough to signal the paradigm shift that is needed for effective carbon 
mitigation policy. I question the ability of the US in achieving lasting reductions 
with its current carbon mitigation approach.  
 
This research therefore looks at the impact of two different ecological ideas of how 
to approach CO2 reductions. Within this thesis I argue that different development 
strategies, and the ideas that form the basis of them, are responsible for the different 
carbon policy outcomes that are currently seen in the EU and US.  Centring on the 
notion of ecological modernisation as a strategy for emissions reductions, this thesis 
examines how and why the EU compared to the US has been able to achieve 
successful carbon policy outcomes. Rather than focusing on the impact of interests 
in the policy-process (Brulle, 2014; Baumgartner and Jones, 2010; Keleman and 
Vogel, 2010; Van Asselt, Harro, and Brewer, 2010; Woll, 2004), this research 
focuses on ideas to provide an innovative perspective on how environmental norms 
influence the formation and outcomes of successful climate mitigation policies.  It 
focuses on carbon policy, from the period 1992-2012, to compare how divergent 
approaches to CO2 reductions have influenced the choice, implementation, and 
outcomes of carbon policy tools in both the EU and the US. 
 
Within this research I focus on mitigation policy outcomes and more specifically, 
on the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) as an example of a 
successful mitigation policy outcome. I do this for two main reasons: first, one of 
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the critical goals of global climate mitigation policies at this time is to create a social 
cost for carbon, or a tool that creates economic value for the reduction of CO2 (Helm 
et al, 2003, pp. 438-450). Secondly, this tool can be used to broadly signal the EU’s 
ability to embody a new notion, which is that the environment deserves economic 
value.  As no such tool exists in the US at a federal level, I therefore assume that the 
US has not fully embodied a fundamental shift in regards to climate norms.   
 
The effectiveness of the EU’s ecological ideas can most be seen in the incremental 
changes that they have caused within domestic institutions.  I argue that strong 
ecological ideas were brought into the policy arena at key international junctures, 
which then led the EU towards the revision of its domestic institutions. I focus on 
the impact of these ideas at four specific moments in time, which I argue were 
critical for the institutionalisation of strong ecological ideas: the 1992 first official 
UNFCCC meeting; the Kyoto Protocol in 1997; the Marrakesh Accords in 2001; 
and Copenhagen in 2009. I use a comparative design to examine the EU and US 
from 1992-2012 to holistically examine the degree of institutional change that 
occurred in the first twenty years of emissions trading discussions. I rely on 
interviews with key decisions makers that were present at these critical junctures, 
and who were present in the policy-arena prior to and after the junctures. 
Complemented by an analysis of documentary material, including the examination 
of speeches, interviews, and policy proposals, I am able to systemically analyse the 
impact that ideas had on policy-choices taken in relation to climate mitigation policy 
in both the EU and the US. Coupled with the empirical analysis of the policy-tools 
that resulted from critical junctures I am then able to conclude on the differences 
that each idea has on the diversity and ambition of each areas domestic policy-
responses to the international policy demands at each point in time.   
 
1.3 Outline of the thesis  
This thesis begins by exploring the current literature on climate change and its 
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connection to sustainable development. Beginning with a historical overview of 
environmental politics, this chapter then moves to explore the connection between 
ecological modernisation and climate mitigation policies.  It then locates and 
discusses the role of the EU and the US in previous research investigations in a 
chronological manner. This keeps the investigation in line with the historical 
overview as recommended by the theoretical lens. 
 
The third chapter outlines the conceptual framework for empirical analysis of 
climate mitigation policy change used in this study. This chapter identifies, defines, 
and structures the areas of investigation that are used in this thesis.   This chapter 
helps to narrow the focus of this investigation, so that the reader has a clear 
comprehension of the importance of the empirical evidence analysed in the fifth and 
sixth chapters in this dissertation.  
 
The fourth chapter outlines the theoretical lens used in this dissertation. This chapter 
explains the appropriateness of a historical institutional approach when seeking to 
understand change.  It focuses on assessing the literature concerning historical 
institutionalism, and specifically explains its utility in exploring the connection 
between ideas and their role in the processes of change. This chapter then moves to 
outline the methodological approach used in this thesis. It concludes by presenting 
the methodology used for the cases of the EU and the US. 
 
I structure the empirical and analytical chapters of this dissertation in a manner that 
clearly will show if, and to what extent, both the EU and the US have undergone 
ecological changes. Therefore, the fifth and sixth chapters contain the empirical 
substance analysed within this thesis. These chapters evaluate the climate mitigation 
policy tools of the EU and the US from 1992-2012.  These chapters analyse changes 
in policy ambition and policy goals of each governing body, and then examine the 
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types of policy tools that were implemented to achieve them. This chapter also 
identifies the actors and location of the development and negotiation of the identified 
policy tools. This provides initial analysis on the two stages of change that are 
needed for ecological modernisation to occur: change in policy tools and change in 
policy goals.  
 
In chapters seven and eight I trace the impact that strong ecological modernist ideas 
and weak ecological modernist ideas have had on the policy-tool choices identified 
in chapters 5 and 6. Specifically, I analyse more thoroughly the change in policy 
paradigms as well as the changes in the role of the state that both the EU and the US 
underwent in regards to recommendations made at the UNFCCC meetings. These 
chapters analyse the changes in the policy-processes, institutional structures, and the 
responsibilities of actors in order to understand the institutional adaptation of the 
EU and the US in regards to demands of international climate legislation.   
 
This thesis finishes by examining the capabilities of the US and EU in delivering 
upon their climate policy ambitions.  The conclusion examines how strong 
ecological modernism contributed to the institutional adaptation of the EU.  This 
chapter also provides an equal assessment of how American climate mitigation 
policy could be made more effective, and points to the key institutional barriers that 
need to be addressed for the US to become a more ecologically responsible state.  
This chapter examines and outlines the differences in the capacities and capabilities 
of European and American actors in order to effectively describe the institutional 
capacities of the EU and the US in creating climate mitigation policy. In doing so, 
it provides insights on best climate governance practices, as well as outlining further 




1.4 Main findings of the research  
The research findings indicate that moving towards a low-carbon economy 
fundamentally requires society to embrace behaviours that reduce the human impact 
on the natural planet.  Although someday it may be possible for a major 
technological breakthrough to occur that allows for carbon removal from the 
atmosphere, it still seems to be that the coordination of competing values demand a 
degree of structured governance. Climate mitigation policies are a complex issue, 
and the findings of this research indicate that institutions play a critical role in 
promoting the coordination between society, industry, and science that are needed 
to achieve climate mitigation goals. Governmental institutions are needed to 
promote and coordinate the achievements of broader societal institutions, and ensure 
that their societal structures are changing alongside in accordance with the scientific 
understanding of climate change and its impacts. 
 
Within ecological strategies, it seems confusing how weak ecological modernisation 
could be expected to produce tangible change. As an already “weak” strategy of 
within sustainable development strategies, it seems indeed that weak ecological 
modernisation seems to describe instead, a zero commitment to sustainable 
development. If nations are indeed to make progress on sustainable development, 
and specifically CO2 reductions as a critical component of development goals, then 
strong ecological modernisation seems the most appropriate and least radical idea 
with which to approach institutional adaptation. By looking at the EU’s path towards 
CO2 reductions one can deduce that the idea of ecological modernisation often meets 
criticism from both strong environmentalists and political conservatives. However, 
one can also see that this strategy for change often is able to create an effective, and 
pragmatic approach to environmental management, one that produces “win-win’s” 
for both the economy and environment. Although the strong ideas of ecological 
modernisation are important, they often result in a compromise with non-
environmental advocates. As such, it’s important that strong ideas exist within the 




The most important finding of this thesis is that institutional change, and the role of 
governmental institutions themselves, are a critical component of achieving climate 
mitigation goals. This is most evidently seen by looking at the creation and evolution 
of the agency Directorate General of Climate Change (DG Clima) in the EU.  As a 
newly created institution, and specific climate focused institution, this new 
organisation removes competition amongst energy and environmental agencies to 
create cohesive goals for carbon mitigation across the EU. In addition, this agency 
is able to develop such a goal due to the unique capabilities that exist within such an 
agency. The agency helps to coordinate, collect, and translate statistical data from 
industry, science and the public alike.  By channelling data and monitoring progress 
through the UNFCCC, DG Clima ensures relative consensus on statistics, which is 
needed for creating economic consensus across European institutions.  The 
communicative process and greater involvement of experts in the EU’s policy-
making produces the additional intellectual capital needed to influence and motivate 
broader institutions to commit to carbon reductions.  
Although the US has expressed an interest, and a recent commitment to climate 
change, surveying the impact of the US’s weak ecological modernist approach to 
climate change policy will equally assess the institutional capabilities of the US in 
delivering upon its climate ambitions.  This supports my counterhypothesis, which 
is that in the absence of the diffusion of strong ecological ideas, incremental changes 
will fail to take place institutionally, and carbon policy success and innovation will 
fail to occur.  
 
1.5 Wider contributions of the research 
This study attempts to connect multi-disciplinary research to form a stronger 
understanding of the incremental changes that are needed to support societies as they 
adjust to climate change. This area of investigation originally emerged from 
environmental policy studies, yet the area now has matured into warranting its own 
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separate area of policy investigation. Today, climate policy contains an intricate web 
of economic, energy, and environmental influences that must be understood in part, 
and as a whole, to fully grasp the complexity of addressing climate change. This 
thesis assesses both the change in tools, in structures, and in institutional powers, 
that contributed towards the EU’s ability to ingrain environmental considerations 
within the economy. As such, this research provides insights on the relationship 
between energy, economy and environment and how decisions taken in climate 
governance stand to impact policies created in other areas.  
 
As well as giving insight on the nature of incremental changes in climate policy, this 
thesis provides a better understanding of the nature of change within European and 
American institutions. Particularly insightful to scholars of the EU, this thesis 
displays the EU's effectiveness in a dynamic policy area, showing how the EU’s 
competence in climate policy has increased with European integration itself. At a 
time when the EU is under increased scrutiny to produce short-term economic 
success, this thesis contributes to the understanding of the nature and operation of 
European institutions. For scholars of American politics, this work shows many 
restraints on the climate policy process within US institutions that may be more 
reflective of the difficulty in adjusting American institutions to broader modern 
policy challenges.   
 
1.6 Limitations of the study 
This thesis does offer an assessment of the EU and US’s place in climate governance 
insofar as climate mitigation policy change is concerned, but also does not 
necessarily take into full account the impact that energy legislation has on the 
success of climate and mitigation policies. Despite the inclusion of energy 
legislation that would affect the reductions of CO2 (such as efficiency measures) this 
work does not fully analyse the impact of policies in the fossil fuels which may 
inhibit or enhance the effectiveness of climate mitigation policies (Bauer et al, 2016; 
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Tavoni, M., 2015). However, further analysis could be made by using the conceptual 
structure developed in this thesis to understand how the ideas of ecological 
modernisation have influenced climate mitigation considerations within energy 
policy.  
 
At the same time, this work is limited in cases and also, to some extent, the complete 
identification of all mitigation policy. This thesis focuses on the supranational and 
international efforts of the EU and the US, and therefore, does not investigate the 
impact of member states nor individual US states on CO2 reductions. Member states 
in the EU are often credited with a role in influencing the leadership of the EU itself; 
however, this thesis seeks to capture that influence only within European 
institutions, but does not investigate how member states specifically supported or 
detracted from European CO2 policies (Skjærseth, 2016; Berkhout et al, 2015; 
Jordan, 2012; Jänicke, 2011). At the same time, it may be useful to understand how 
these ideas have affected institutional change in nations outside of Europe, and 
whose place in global climate governance remains undefined.  Particularly, energy-
dense economies such as Canada and Australia would provide an interesting 
examination.  
 
Additionally, despite the efforts of this research to collect all relevant policy 
information, there may in fact be policies that affect carbon levels that are not 
included within the specific dimensions investigated. Instead, efforts from other 
organizations, such as energy, foreign affairs, and defence, may occasionally impact 
climate policy. However, this thesis provides a useful understanding of the purposes, 
and historical origins, of the many agencies involved in the climate policy arena.  
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Chapter 2.  A review of climate change and ecological 
modernisation in current literary investigations  
Climate change presents a unique challenge for society. Producing ambitious policy 
that delivers effective reductions in global emissions becomes increasingly 
important as the negative effects of climate change increase. Achieving the long-
term goals of carbon reduction requires better aligning environmental 
considerations within long-term growth, therefore adopting the notion of ecological 
modernisation. Although countries have approached carbon reductions with various 
conceptualisations of environment and economy, ambitious carbon reductions today 
require a strong commitment to change from both governments and citizens. 
However, the appropriate role of governance within environmental goals has been 
a consistent area of debate for scholars within the broader field of sustainable 
development.  As a strategy for sustainable development, ecological modernisation 
has inherited many historical debates around the appropriate roles for technology, 
governments, and regulations. Weak and ecological modernist ideas have results 
over these exact debates, yet today’s atmospheric damage no longer allows room 
for discussion. It’s important for sustainable development goals that governments 
adopt effective strategies for change; within this thesis I argue that weak ecological 
modernisation is not an effective approach for doing so.  
 
This chapter acts as a literature review and locates the aims and arguments of this 
research within broader sustainable development discussions. Specifically, this 
chapter is intended to provide the reader with a deeper understanding of the tension 
that exists between the divergent approaches to ecological modernisation. 
Surveying the assumptions of weak and strong ecological modernisation shows how 
today’s atmospheric damage requires only a strong approach to ecological 
modernisation.  Examining the existing literature on the US shows the lack of 
ecological modernist studies used at the US federal level, and clearly shows the need 
for Americans to revisit the conceptualization of technology, economy, and 
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environment within current governance. This relates to the need for better 
understanding how ideas, as opposed to interests, influence climate mitigation 
policies. Surveying the existing literates displays an additional gap in climate 
mitigation research, which is the need to understand the role of institutions in 
supporting society as they adjust to climate change.  
 
2.1 A historical division within environmental policy studies   
Climate change mitigation policies today are a complicated issue for policy-makers. 
They require coordination across multiple institutions to spur the changes that are 
needed for societies as they move towards a low carbon future. Ecological 
modernisation is one development strategy for spurring change, yet it is not the only 
one. The topic is closely related to the environmental movements that began in the 
late 1960’s and early 1970’s, and most closely to the topic of sustainable 
development that launched in the 1980’s (Hajer, 1996, p. 243-266). Many of the 
problems that originate in climate change can be seen as inherited from the problems 
of the previous environmental movements.  
 
In early environmental investigations social science scholars focused on analysing 
and examining environmental degradation. Their main concern was human 
behaviour, methods of production and consumption, industrial and technological 
developments, and the failure of governmental resource coordination, all of which 
were contributing to environmental deterioration (Hajer, 1996, p. 243-266). Many 
academic studies stemming from the post-WWII period had focused on rebuilding 
industries and promoting economic growth; as such, studies on the environment 
were neglected in favour of outlining how industry and the economy could better 
develop.   
 
The environmental investigations that began in the 1970’s therefore, focused on 
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understanding how governments could support environmental protection. These 
mainly analysed how to increase capacity building in laws and governments in a 
manner that would protect the environment better (Hajer, 1996, p. 243-266).  
However, this focus on capacity building meant that environmental studies were 
very internally directed. Environmental social scientists at this time became pre-
occupied with analysing poor environmental records of societies and institutions.  
 
In the 1980’s environmental politics investigations started to widen, and scholars 
began conducting analysis on environmental improvements. These studies took a 
theoretical and empirical turn away from the causes of environmental deterioration, 
to focus instead on better understanding how societies could begin to address 
environmental problems. This resulted in an explosion of studies in sociology, 
political science, anthropology, psychology, and human geography. The majority of 
these studies focused on developing solutions to environmental problems that 
addressed the structural, institutional and behavioural traits that were previously 
identified in the 1970’s. However, it’s important to note that these studies still 
stemmed from an environmental policy standpoint.  
 
By the 1990’s environmental studies turned away from the domestic level to begin 
examining how international cooperation could best solve environmental problems. 
Here, scholars within environmental policy began investigating research at the 
international level and how to best address problems through global cooperation. 
Of these, issues like biodiversity, deforestation, ozone depletion, acid rain, and 
global climate change became the major topics of focus. As different subject areas 
emerged as a result of a specific area of investigate (such as biodiversity policy, 
deforestation and it’s impacts on the environment, etc.) sustainable development 




The definition and the ideas on sustainable development as a concept outlined the 
dependency of humans on the natural environment. It called for a re-envisioning of 
economics to ensure that growth provided for the needs and well-being of society 
in a much wider sense (WCED, 1987, p 43). The fundamental argument of 
sustainable development was that production and consumption levels should consist 
of more than the exploitation of resources for human success. Thus, the definition 
of sustainable development was defined as “growth that met the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” 
(WCED, 1987, p 43).  
 
The Brundtland Report had three main assumptions that changed the 
conceptualization of economy and environment. First, it acknowledged that there 
were biophysical limits that required serious environmental attention in order to 
minimize the damage that was occurring mainly as a result of industrial processes 
(WCED, 1987). Secondly, when recognising the negative that these processes were 
having, that the change needed to happen mainly within the industrialised Northern 
nations so that economic development could stay within the ecological boundaries 
(WCED, 1987). Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the Brundtland report 
provided positive assurance to all countries that establishing ecological boundaries 
would be done in a manner that would not require the dismantling of capitalist 
structures, nor impede the development of future growth (WCED, 1987). Indeed, 
the Brundtland report actually called for the opposite, in that it called for an 
acceleration of the international economy via a means of enhanced scientific 
understanding, more innovative technology, and the internalisation of social and 
environmental costs the most effective means of avoiding future environmental and 
social degradation (WCED, 1987).  Therefore, the main assumption of sustainable 
development would be that in growing more efficient and innovative, thereby 




Moving towards sustainable development initiated debates on the link between the 
environment, economy, and the role of the state in coordinating and regulating these 
interests. Sustainable development goes beyond traditional environmental policies, 
in that it provides recommendations on how economy, environment, and society 
should function in unison. Although at the time of its origins both the EU and the 
US were united in support of globalisation, today one can see that the EU and the 
US have continued down very different paths in terms of what environmental 
stewardship entails.  It is within this time period where the specific divisions in 
regards to environmental management first began to emerge, mainly between 
European and American scholars and politicians.  
 
European social scientists became focused on empirical studies that supported 
ideological changes that would better promote environmental interest representation 
within politics, and thus, society (Buttel, Geisler, and Wiswall, 1984; Buttel and 
Newby, 1980;). These studies were dominated quite heavily by neo-Marxists 
debates critiquing environmental management. This research centred on the notion 
that current societal construction could not change enough to in order to adequately 
protect the environment.  This had, and continues to hold, an important place within 
environmental social science investigations today (see Dobson, 2000; Schnaiberg, 
Watts, and Zimmerman, 1986). However, the movement for drastic environmental 
reform was far less popular amongst American social scientists. Instead, the rise of 
neoliberalism in the US at this time had many implications for scholars within 
environmental studies. First, the connection to laissez-faire economics meant that 
the role of the government and regulation was pushed back (Polanyi, 1944). Instead, 
deregulation, free trade, and market-based economics became the favoured 
solutions for addressing environmental problems. This meant that environmental 
studies that adopted a neoliberal approach were dominated by the notion of market-
based solutions to environmental management.  This is what I argue continues to 
impact the effectiveness and innovation of American mitigation policy today.  
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Within broader sustainable development studies scholars focused on how to adapt 
current societies with more ecological considerations with social movements, civil 
society and green public spheres (Dryzek et al, 2003; Torgersson, 1999); with 
environmental capacity-building (e.g. Jänicke, 1991); or by integrating ecological 
concerns into current economic thinking such as in green liberalism (Jagers, 2002; 
Wissenburg, 1998); and the role of democracy and ecology (Barry, 1999); the 
fundamental transformation of broader societies focused on describing an 
ecological state (Meadowcroft et al, 2005; Lundqvist, 2001), or green states (Barry 
and Eckersley et al, 2005; Eckersley, 2004).  However, most of this literature 
resonated within European academic institutions, as in the US, this period was 
considered an era of environmental reform fatigue. Instead, American scholars 
outlined how environmental prosperity and social well-being could instead be 
driven through increased wealth gained in international trade and in industrial 
growth (Sachs, 1999; Moffet and Bregha, 1996). The American agenda centralized 
on the notion of technology, and looked at how new innovations, that arose out of 
increased industrial wealth, could better provide efficiency gains, and thereby, 
increase environmental protection.  
 
This is where the division within sustainable development policies, and 
environmental policies as a subset of them, became apparent both in ideology and 
geography. On one side, the American agenda focused on how to use technology to 
gain efficiency, thereby protecting the environment; on the other side, European 
scholars began outlining the notion of environmental governance as a means of 





Figure 2: Ecological modernisation on the spectrum of sustainability 
 
Source: derived from Hajer, 1993, Christoff, 1996, and Mol and Spaargaren, 1997  
 
2.2 Ecological modernisation   
The debates arguing for different approaches to sustainable development were 
therefore enriched with the contributions of the ecological modernisation theory 
(Mol, 1996; Christoff, 1996; Hajer, 1995). These theories moved the environmental 
policy movement towards a restructuring of environment and economy in a 
progressively modern manner (Mol and Spaargaren, 1993).  Ecological 
modernisation theorists sought to heal this division in sustainable development, and 
instead create a theoretical movement where environmental protection could be 
framed in a manner that created incentives to move towards a more sustainable 
means of development. 
 
It is important to consider that on the broader spectrum of sustainable development 
ecological modernisation is generally viewed as a “weak approach” (Mol, 
Spaargaren, and Sonnenfeld, 2009).  Ecological modernisation is built on the idea 
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that environmental considerations can lead to a “win-win” within policy-making.  
This theory overall takes the standpoint that the economy benefits from 
environmental considerations. Therefore, it’s often seen as the main strategy for 
coupling the economy and environmental branches of sustainable development 
(Gouldson and Murphy, 1996, p. 11-21).  These studies look at ingraining 
environmental concerns as an economic opportunity for further innovation to occur 
thereby taking a more economic approach to environmental management so that 
economies (Dietz and Neumayer, 2007, pp. 617-626).   
 
Ecological modernisation emerged as a “social scientific interpretation of 
environmental reform processes at multiple scales in the contemporary world”, 
(Mol, Spaargaren, and Sonnenfeld, 2009, p. 3). Ecological modernisation’s main 
contribution to the literature of sustainable development has been to diversify the 
social science literature on how societies interact and deal with the natural world. 
These scholars developed, “a systemic theory of institutional environmental reform; 
the introduction of a variety of theoretical innovations on the reaction between 
society and environment; the creation of new research approaches in environmental 
policy and practice, and contribution to discussions on globalisation of general 
social theory,” (Mol, and Spaargaren, 2000, p. 20).  Ecological modernisation 
emerged as a specific environmental and economic research agenda, a theoretical 
school which sought to specifically reconcile the environment and economy.  
 
Ecological modernists begin by acknowledging the need to differentiate between 
those resources that are most limited and those that can be substituted to some 
degree (Barry, 2007, pp. 446-464). When a resource like the atmosphere or 
biodiversity cannot be created, replicated, nor reproduced by technology 
whatsoever it is referred to as “critical threshold” (Barry, 2007, pp. 446-464). Other 
natural resources, which can be reproduced, like coal or trees, are simply referred 
to as natural capital. This implies they should be valued, but still can be used for 
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economic production.   This helps to identify which resources can and cannot be 
used for economic consumption. From this standpoint, climate change must be 
approached with a notion that recognises the atmosphere as a resource that cannot 
be reproduced.  
 
At the micro-economic level, ecological modernists emphasize the importance in 
incentivizing the use and creation of new clean technologies to achieve 
environmental goals (Gouldson and Murphy, 1997, pp. 84-86).   However, like 
sustainable development and the environmental movements it stems from, 
ecological modernisation scholars also vary as to what the appropriate role of 
governance and technology are when seeking to achieve environmental reform. 
Therefore, at the macro-economic level there is still extensive division as to what 
the appropriate role of governance is in spurring the changes that are needed for 
new technologies to come to market.  
  
From a European perspective, ecological modernisation at a macro-economic level 
became centralized around three main story-lines: the need for governmental 
structures to incentivise energy efficiency, technology innovation, and a win-win 
scenario for the economy and environment. However, it is important to note that 
this highlights the shift from environmental policy approaches in a traditional sense 
(general stewards of environmental protection) towards an approach that is 
increasingly economically-driven.  Authors like Weale (1992) and Jänicke (1991) 
originally focused outlining the role of the market in achieving ecological goals, yet 
studies moved quickly towards analysing the broader institutional and sociological 
dynamics of ecological modernisation that were needed to support these new 
environmental markets (Cohen, 1997; Hajer, 1995; Spaargaren and Mol, 1992). 
These studies methodologically took a comparative approach and shifted more 
towards analysing the role of the state in promoting industrial reform in Western 
European nations. However, these theories also moved positively towards a positive 
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perspective of environmental regulation, which authors found central as the driving 
force of innovation adoption, and also as a critical tool for incentivising behavioural 
change in the industrial sector (Hajer, 1996). These authors took a viewpoint of 
what I argue should inherently be considered the most effective approach to 
ecological modernisation.  
 
Although in the EU this research area gained wide interest, it was not used 
extensively in the US (Mol, Spaargaren, Sonnenfeld, 2009, pp. 3-14).  Instead, 
political scientists in the US continued to focus extensively on the micro-economic 
factors of ecological modernisation, thereby, mainly on the role of technology and 
innovation deployment as tools for environmental policy goals; however, in general 
the attempts to integrate the US into ecological studies in general were unsuccessful 
(Schlosberg and Rinfret, 2008, pp. 254-275). As a result, ecological modernists in 
the EU became equally as divided as the sustainable development scholars ahead of 
them, while scholars in the US moved to investigate the role of interest groups and 
their influence in American environmental policy.    
 
2.2.1 Weak and strong ecological modernisation 
Christoff (1996) was the first political scientist in this space to specifically contrast 
the divisions that he saw within ecological modernisation theory.  Similar to how 
sustainable development was viewed as strong and weak, now ecological 
modernisation became equally divided as to how to best embed environmental 
considerations within the economy.  It’s important here to clearly differentiate the 
divisions within ecological modernisation from the divisions within sustainable 
development. Strong and weak sustainable development are separated over the 
construction or deconstruction of current economies. Weak and strong ecological 
modernisation are simply divided as to what the appropriate role of government and 
industry are in transitioning to a more environmentally-conscious economy.  Strong 
ecological modernisation requires a mandated government-driven evolution to 
4151442 
45 
produce environmental considerations within the economy, whereas weak 
ecological modernisation argues essentially that competition amongst firms will 
naturally lead to the production of more environmentally-efficient technologies, 
which results in increased environmental efficiency in production processes. 
 
Authors like Hajer (1995) and Harvey (1996) outlined the importance of connecting 
ecological modernisation and sustainable development together so that sustainable 
development became “the central story line of the policy discourse of ecological 
modernisation,” (Gibbs, 2006, p.9). Here, these viewpoints should be seen as 
“strong ecological modernisation”. This researched focused on, “exactly what needs 
to be done with the capitalist political economy, especially within the confines of 
the developed nation state’”, (Dryzek, 1997, p.143). Arthur Mol and Gert 
Spaargaren worked to outline how development could take into account broader 
environmental reform, in a non-penalising manner, thereby creating “win-wins” for 
the environment by focusing on environmental programs in Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the UK that helped support economic growth.  Within these 
studies, they found that structural change must occur at the macro-economic level 
in order to spur ecological considerations.  This included specifically incentivising 
environmental shifts in industrial production and consumption at the macro-
economic level.   
 
Scholars within strong ecological modernisation research redirected sustainable 
development studies towards assessing the transformation of governments and 
societies towards greener states. Scholars focused on how to adapt current societies 
with more ecological considerations with social movements, civil society and green 
public spheres (Dryzek et al, 2003; Torgersson, 1999;); with environmental 
capacity-building (e.g. Jänicke and Weidner et al, 1997); or by integrating 
ecological concerns into current economic thinking such as in green liberalism 
(Wissenburg, 1998; Jagers, 2002); and the role of democracy and ecology  (Barry, 
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1999; Doherty and de Geus et al, 1996; Dryzek, 1996).  The fundamental 
transformation of broader societies focused on describing an ecological state 
(Lundqvist 2001a; Meadowcroft, 2005), or green states (Eckersley, 2004; Barry and 
Eckersley et al, 2005). These scholars outlined the institutional organisation 
required for governing environmentally. This required going beyond environmental 
recommendations to instead focusing on the social, environmental and economic 
impacts of proposed policies. At its core, the shift towards ecological modernisation 
resulted in the need for more systemic investigations of policies between economic, 
environmental and political impacts of proposed policies. However, this did not 
occur with equal proportion across the globe.  
 
Hajer (1993) originally caused the emergence of the second approach to 
modernisation, which he labelled termed ‘technocorporatist’ modernisation, or what 
should be considered weak ecological modernisation. This notion still seeks to 
transform society with environmental considerations, yet argues that the 
economization of nature will occur naturally, rather than requiring strict costs for 
externalities.  Rather than taking an institutionally coordinated approach that 
mandates the creation of an environmental cost to achieve environmental policy 
goals, theorists in this space argue that environmental considerations will naturally 
become part of the economy as competition forces firms to produce more 
environmentally effective goods (Hajer, 1995, p.40). For instance, whilst a strong 
ecological modernisation approach would mandate the movement towards carbon 
price as a way to direct firms, a technocorporatist approach would argue that firms 
will naturally try to reduce environmental inputs as a way to increase their own 
economic efficiency. Therefore, this approach does not argue that the 
economization of nature is necessarily needed through specific pricing structures. 
Instead, firms will have to increase their efficiency as a way to maintain their 




Table 2: Weak and Strong Ecological Modernisation 
Weak Ecological Modernisation Strong Ecological Modernisation 
Technological solutions to 
environmental problems 
Broad changes to institutional 
structure of society  
Technocratic/corporatist styles of 
policy making made by elite decision-
makers 
Open, democratic decision making 
with participation and involvement 
Concerned with the domestic 
dimensions of the environment and 
development 
Concerned with the international 
dimensions of the environment and 
development 
Economically informed Ecologically informed 
Uses only voluntary and market-based 
policy tools to reduce carbon 
emissions 
Uses regulatory, informational, 
voluntary, and market-based tools to 
reduce carbon emissions    
Driven by local and regional levels of 
government 
Driven by federal/supranational levels 
of government  
“Bottom-up” “Top-down”  
Derived from Gibbs, 1998 and Christoff, 1996 
 
Weak ecological modernists see technology as the main catalyst to change, and 
believe that corporations and private capital will provide the changes that are needed 
to completely reduce environmental impact or produce new environmental goods 
(Christoff, 1996, pp. 476-500).  Here, these scholars believe that technological 
advances will be made, which will naturally help to address environmental 
problems, and will demand policy adjustments to be made. For change to occur 
from this technology-induced standpoint, market forces should be solely 
responsible for producing the change that is needed to signal the scarcity of a 
resource, yet without governmental intervention (Christoff, 1996, pp. 476-500). 
This viewpoint therefore assumes a neoclassical economic viewpoint that 
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regulation, and therefore, imposing environmental and social costs are not necessary 
for achieving a more “modern” economy.  
 
Strong ecological modernists see technology as part of achieving a future balance 
between economics and the environment, but not as the whole picture of the changes 
needed to begin developing sustainably.  Instead, scholars taking a strong ecological 
modernist approach focus on the broader picture and look at how to change 
institutions as a whole to better reflect and encourage the reframing of economic 
ideals. Strong ecological modernisation requires government intervention to ensure 
levels of environmental protection are maintained, and that change is initiated in a 
systemic manner. I argue in this thesis that this approach is more effective in driving 
the policy ambition, and institutional changes, that are needed to ingrain climate 
concerns within broader institutional arrangements.  
 
At the same that ecological modernists were working to better understand how to 
produce the changes that are needed to make society more sustainable, climate 
change policy emerged as the “de facto” area used for the implementation of the 
sustainable development agenda (Drexhage and Murphy, 2010). Climate change 
was labelled the most urgent and pressing of the environmental concerns on the 
sustainable development agenda (Drexhage and Murphy, 2010). However, climate 
change policies also inherited the same division that sustainable development and 
ecological modernisation studies had: what is the most appropriate role for industry, 
government, and society in spurring environmental change?   
 
2.3 Ecological ideas and climate mitigation policies       
The specific agenda to coordinate sustainable development and climate was formed 
in 1992, the UNFCCC. Originally, the conference brought together countries to 
discuss how to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” 
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(UNFCCC 1992, Article 2). This was based on two premises; first, that the problems 
caused by climate change were real and secondly, that man-made CO2 had caused 
this problem (Ramakrishna, 2000, pp. 47-62). At this conference the parties agreed 
to begin to work on specific tools that could reduce the amount of CO2 in the 
atmosphere. Thus, the KP was thus born in 1997, the first treaty that turned 
sustainable development into tangible policy goals. Thus, the climate conferences 
can be seen as the first example of legislative efforts towards integrating 
environment within economy, and can be used as policy goals to analyse the 
effectiveness of sustainable development strategies.   
 
The aims of the KP were for each country to legally agree on its individual 
reductions, and then come together to create a global marketplace for CO2 (Oberthür 
and Rabitz, 2014, pp. 39-57). Although The EU took the most ambitious goals, and 
agreed to legally binding measures, other countries did not agree on the legally 
binding agreements, or on the best way to achieve emissions reductions. Some 
disagreed on the role of finance and technology, and the specific provisions given 
to developing countries (Kawabe, Wang, and Yamashita, 2014, pp. 206-212). 
Others found fault with the countries that were considered developing, in particular 
China and India. No voice of discontent was louder than the US.  Although The US 
signed the Protocol, it failed to reach majority agreement within its domestic 
legislative houses, thus negating the legality of American support. Rather than 
studies examining how the US could move to address Kyoto, academic literature 
instead has focused on extensively analysing the failures of the US.  This has led to 
a failure to understand the institutional changes that are needed to support society 
as it moves to address environmental challenges, and instead, has moved the US 
towards a path that is unlikely to produce significant carbon emissions reductions.   
 
2.3.1 The US’s weak ecological modernist approach in climate mitigation 
Although it’s been nearly twenty years since the KP was first passed, the inability 
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of the US to legally ratify the KP has dominated a significant portion of climate 
investigations in America.  Here, studies have focused on understanding the specific 
institutional mechanisms that resulted in the failure of the US to ratify the KP.  
Specifically, this research has looked extensively at the role of interests and their 
capabilities in disrupting the implementation of the KP. This research gives broader 
insight that support my hypothesis that American institutions are not changing 
adequately enough to protect society environmentally, and a new ideological change 
needs to occur to spur institutional change.  
The ineffectiveness of the two-party system in the US has been brought to attention 
in regards to climate mitigation policies, such as during the 1997 Clinton-Gore 
administration with the KP.  Here, the failure of the US to ratify was attributed to 
the Republican majority at the time, and due to the timing of an upcoming election 
year in 1998 (McCright and Dunlap, 2003, p. 348-373). However, the Republican 
party itself has been noted as a strong force for opposition, as it has been noted that 
the “democrats have become the environmental party, and the Republicans have 
become the anti-environmental party,” (Dunlap, Xiao, and McCright 2001, pp. 23-
48). However, it has yet to be tested to what extent deeply rooted anti-climate ideals 
exist in this party or if instead, this is again a simply inherited opposition due to the 
disproportion of fossil-fuel funding that has most recently been part of Republican 
politics in the US.  
 
The negative impact of interest groups in the policy process, such as the impact of 
fossil-fuel lobbying interference within the Bush administration, has been 
extensively noted as a major obstacle to the implementation of climate policy in the 
US (Brulle, 2014, p. 681-694). However, it has also been asserted that the reason 
lobbying groups have become so powerful has been due to the increasing influence 
of corporations, as opposed to citizens, within the American political arena 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2010, pp. 190). These fossil fuel groups have been able to 
control media campaigns and create anti-climate campaigns have also been 
attributed as a major reason that the US failed to pass the KP or any climate 
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legislation since then (Speth, 2005). However, here, research was divided as to 
whether the ease with which this campaign was able to influence society was due to 
the lack of public support for environmental policy in general in the US. However, 
today these studies have shown there has been extensive change from the first 
climate investigations which pointed to the reluctance of the American people to 
support climate mitigation policy, to today showing a majority support for these 
types of policies (Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins, 2012, pp. 169-188; Borick, 
Lachapelle, and Rabe, 2010).  
 
Overall, climate studies in the US for a long-time focused on the inability of the US 
to engage in the international climate arena. Rather than identifying how the US 
could perhaps better engage with the international arena, studies that sought to 
inform how the US could make progress on carbon emissions began to focus on 
state and city-level examinations. (Bulkeley et al 2011, Urpelainen, 2009; Matisoff, 
2008; Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006).  This is what is referred to as the “bottom-up” 
approach within US climate policy literature, which looks at the merits of state and 
local climate mitigation policy.  Here, one is truly able to see the connection 
between the US’s approach to climate mitigation policies and the weak ecological 
modernisation strategy. The literature here has focused on identifying the benefits 
of using a decentralised approach to climate mitigation.   
 
This research shifted the place of the US within international climate discussions 
towards being domestically focused. Although this is problematic for the 
international arena, taking a domestic approach has had merits for the US’s climate 
progress, which can be summarized into four main points. First, research has shown 
that using local-levels of governments within carbon mitigation policies are more 
likely to result in experimentation with new policy tool tools, and thus produce new 
types of tools (Lutsey and Sperling, 2008, pp. 673-685). Secondly, the local level 
also allows solutions to be more specifically tailored, and require less government 
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interference.   Thirdly, these solutions are likely to be easier to test at a municipal 
or state level, which is likely due to the fourth main aspect, that local experts find 
an easier time passing climate policy (Lutsey and Sperling, 2008, pp. 673-685).  
Overall, the literature reviewing how the local level might be an effective strategy 
for change have yet to quantitatively show that these policies produce significant 
change.  
 
Today, the pledges from cities and states only encompasses about ten percent of the 
US’s greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2014). California’s climate programs, 
known for being the most aggressive in the US, only are responsible for about 6 
percent of America’s overall share. Although research has pointed to the need for 
bottom-up climate actions to eventually become intertwined with a “top-down” 
approach to legislation, there has been a lack of attention as to the types of 
institutional adjustments that are needed to amount to serious action on carbon 
emissions reductions. At the very minimum today, the US must move towards 
participation in an international cap-and-trade market regime or begin to regulate 
their emissions.  
 
Although research has predicted that the lower-level “push” for sustainability will 
perhaps result in larger scale legislation (Bang, 2011; Selin and VanDeveer, 2007), 
I question the likelihood of this. I believe that the focus on state-level policy efforts, 
has not taken into account the ideological change that will need to happen in the US 
for this for significant decarbonisation to occur.    Although federal level studies 
investigating the place of the climate change in the US initially focused on the 
difficulties in passing legislation due to the impact of interest groups, only focusing 
on interests thus far has ignored how “prior expectations and cognitive biases affect 
how they [actors] will work within [these] institutions and adopt them to their own 
circumstances”, (Lewis and Steinmo 2012, p. 314). Focusing on the role of interests 
and the role of states as opposed to federal governments has ignored the ideological, 
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and perhaps institutional problem, that I believe is at the cause of climate change 
opposition in the US.   
 
When reviewing the literature from both an international and domestic standpoint, 
it becomes apparent that the US needs to take responsibility and ownership for its 
carbon emissions reductions. Even if the literature reviewing the US state level 
efforts are positive, there still needs to be a stronger understanding of how the 
“push” to support climate mitigation policy happens. What are the steps that are 
needed to engage in international emissions trading schemes? What are the 
institutional adjustments that are needed to coordinate “bottom-up” legislation with 
international emissions reductions needs?  Would it even be possible to evolve the 
state-level legislation towards a federal-level approach in the US?  How have other 
countries managed to create such a convincing case for climate mitigation?  
 
2.3.2 The EU’s top-down approach in climate mitigation  
Whilst the US has remained a vague figure within climate studies, the EU and its 
place within the international climate arena has become a robust area of focus. 
Within the domestic level investigations of the EU, policy investigations featured 
heavily on the relations of power and influence of actors in influencing climate 
governance, which label the EU as a directional or power-based leader (Bäckstrand, 
2008; Bulkeley and Moser, 2007; Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006; Betsill and Corell, 
2001). Studies at the international-level typically feature qualitative case studies, 
and mainly focus on the diffusion of international tools and their diffusion across 
countries (Keohane and Victor, 2011; Ciocirland, 2008; Schreurs and Tiberghien, 
2007; Schreurs, 1997; Stavin, 1997). Overall, research tends to focus on the strength 
of the EU’s ability to create an institution-wide approach to climate mitigation 
studies. In this way, one can see how the EU can be used as a representation of the 





The literature reviewing the place of the EU in global climate politics generally 
labels the EU as a “leader”. The concept of leadership is used in climate policy 
studies to help describe the role negotiating parties took when forming the 
international climate agreement (Knill and Liefferink, 2007; Skodvin and Andresen, 
2006). Within climate change, leadership generally begins with "the ambition of 
nation-states to curb greenhouse emissions,” (Skodvin and Andresen, 2006, p. 14). 
The greater reductions usually indicate a higher degree of leadership (Skodvin and 
Andresen, 2006, pp.13-27). As such, studies have focused on assessing the 
leadership in carbon emission reductions quantitatively; focusing on meeting 
targets, and forecasting if the EU will meet future targets. Qualitative comparisons 
tended to focus on specific instances of the EU achieving leadership within the 
international CO2 reductions (Oberthür and Rabitz, 2014; Uusi- Rauva, 2010; 
Urpelainen, 2009; Oberthür and Kelly, 2008; Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007; 
Lightfoot and Burchell, 2005; Lightfoot and Burchell, 2004; Andresen and 
Agrawala, 2002).   
 
Still, focusing on the leadership nature of the EU has stemmed from a domestic 
policy view that attributes the European leadership on climate change to one or more 
internal influences (Wurzel, Liefferink, and Connelly, 2016). These can be 
summarized into four main areas for investigation:  the role of the EU within climate 
efforts; the institutional design features that help mitigate overcoming problems in 
the global effort; the factors that drive variation in climate policies at national and 
supranational levels; the driving forces of climate policy beyond state-civil society 
and public opinion; and the socio-political consequences of failing to avoid major 
climate change changes (Bernauer, 2013, pp. 421- 448).  Doing so, has thus far 
explored the impact of the EU on its own internal member states, but has only 
recently translated into the impact of the EU beyond its borders.  This has led to an 
examination of specific policy tools within domestic climate change policies, yet 
has moved scholars away from an understanding of the place of domestic 
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institutions within international climate governance. 
 
Despite a thorough examination of new policy tools, the policy tool that has been 
neglected in political-science research is the EU ETS. The EU ETS was the first 
large greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in the world and today is still the 
biggest (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007, pp. 66-87). Although the EU ETS is a central 
pillar of EU climate policy, the tools have been left mainly to economic discussions 
(Helm 2010, pp. 182-196). However, investigating the tool is useful, as it should be 
seen as a triumph for climate mitigation policies. The tool seeks to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, yet is in effect, the creation of an environmental market. 
The EU ETS is a prime example of the European attempt to integrate the 
environment into the economy, yet has been criticized extensively for the 
fluctuations the market had in its first phase (Helm, 2008, pp. 211-238).  The tool 
was even used to showcase government failure, and called into question the broader 
capabilities of European institutions (Helm, 2010, pp. 182-196).  However, the tool 
should be used instead to showcase the broader capabilities of European institutions.  
 
Instead of focusing on specific instances of leadership, it would be more useful to 
understand how the EU has changed as a whole, in particular in providing the 
institutional capacity that leads to innovative climate tools. The area that still lacks 
academic investigation today are the institutional design features of the EU itself 
that help to drive climate policy. Looking at the policy factors that drive variation 
in climate policies would help to better explore a beyond the state analysis of climate 
mitigation norms in the EU.  
 
2.3.3 Building on existing comparisons of the EU and the US  
The EU and the US can thus be used as two useful cases for comparing two 
ideological divisions within environmental policy. Both the EU and the US 
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governmental bodies are similar, and therefore, useful for comparison. Both 
governments are noted for their vast economies, heavy industrialization, and large 
energy consumption, as well as their cultural similarities. With increasing 
international pressure to decarbonise, the emphasis on capacities and capabilities 
has become more pronounced, increasing the importance for an examination of the 
institutional natures of both governments on the path to a low-carbon economy. 
Surveying the previous comparisons below helps to highlight the areas of 
investigation that should be included as variables of analysis in this research piece. 
These comparisons highlight the utility in analysing more systemically why these 
differences or similarities are occurring.  
 
Previous comparisons of the two have been used to show more general differences 
in environmental governance, yet still help to highlight the areas of investigation 
that should be included in an ideological investigation (Keleman and Vogel, 2010, 
pp. 427-456). Studies for comparison have mainly focused on the EU becoming 
more American-like, which calls into question the European commitment to 
sustainable development, but also the legitimacy of the climate policies of the EU 
(Van Asselt, Harro, and Brewer, 2010, pp. 42-51). On the opposite side, this could 
mean the US is becoming more like the EU, which signals a change in the American 
approach to environmental policy, and highlights an opportunity for climate policy 
innovation to occur.  
 
The differences in the decision-making process of the two areas have been noted as 
a reason for the divergence in environmental policy.  The EU joint-decision form of 
policy-process has been credited as sheltering policy-makers from interest group 
pressure (Woll, 2004, pp. 842-846). Policy makers in the EU are said to be kept 
distant from interest groups, and work in an environment that is heavy with direct 
confrontation and bargaining over policy proposals (Woll, 2004, pp. 842-846). In 
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the US instead, policy-makers are heavily exposed to lobbyists, who are very 
influential in the policy-process (Brulle, 2014, pp. 681-694).  
 
The difference in the nature of energy industry influence is often noted as the sole 
cause of differences in lobbyist exposure in the EU and the US (Brulle, 2014, pp. 
681-694). Industry influence is typically accredited as stronger in the US due to the 
strong presence of fossil fuel groups; for these firms, carbon reduction technologies 
are a constant threat to their daily business activities (Keleman and Vogel, 2010, pp.  
427-456). Carbon reduction would mean implementing carbon strategies, 
developing sustainable business divisions, and potentially even switching their 
forms of energy usage (Keleman and Vogel, 2010, pp.  427-456).  When looking at 
the establishment of CO2 reductions, it has been argued that the US government has 
become so corporately focused that it is unable to produce any sort of environmental 
legislation that would damage the profitability of these firms.  
 
The historical setting in which policy is developed has also been noted to effect the 
degree of pressure that citizens place on government officials to form environmental 
policy (Vogel, 2003, pp. 557-580). The backdrop of environmental policy in the EU 
has been very different when compared to the US. In the 1980’s the EU experienced 
a series of crisis that increased public concern for the environment. Sickness related 
to contaminated beef and salmonella in eggs caused a public fear of the standards 
in chemicals and the environment to spread rapidly (Vogel, 2003, pp. 557-580). 
When the public pushed for further environmental regulations because of health 
concerns, the environment was seen as an imminent threat. EU public officials were 
then pushed to take actions on regulations for fear of negligence (Vogel, 2003, pp. 
557-580). Therefore, the historical aspect of the setting also must be taken into 




Differences in historical setting also points to the importance in understanding the 
differences in the cultural construction of environmental problems, which can result 
in differences in environmental policy outcomes (Vig and Faure 2004; Woll, 2004). 
However, variations in political cultures are often hard to understand the degree to 
which they influence the policy process. Understanding the influence of political 
culture is often "difficult to operationalize," meaning that it is difficult to identify 
variables that allow scholars to test for concretely for its influence. Proving that an 
idea has impacted change is incredibly difficult. In the past, researchers have had a 
difficult time analysing the norms and concretely showing that they have impacted 
change (Woll, 2004, p. 846). However, analysing the role in ideologies is extremely 
important for this study, as political culture has been connected heavily to climate 
change, which is a fundamentally environmental policy problem. By studying the 
outcomes of carbon policy, and connecting it with five dimensions of change, I am 
able to concretely test the influence of ideas on institutional change in the US and 
EU. However, this requires understanding clearly what types of change ecological 
modernisation ideas seek to cause.  
 
2.3.4 The need for better understanding ecological change today  
The divisions between weak and strong sustainable development and weak and 
strong ecological modernisation reflect an overall division as to how countries view 
the appropriate relationship between the government, people, and the planet. These 
concepts are all strategies for achieving the same policy-goals. Although ecological 
modernisation helped to more narrowly define the sustainable development 
strategy, it did not necessarily translate directly into the specific policy-dimensions 
that stemmed from the sustainable development movement. At the same time, the 
lack of studies that test the effectiveness of these different approaches has left a 
qualitative gap in understanding what the most effective strategies for driving 




Although the division in the approaches to sustainability in general can be seen as 
a geographical or perhaps cultural disagreement that stems mainly between 
American and European scholars, the division between strong and weak ecological 
modernisation actually reflects a division as to what constitutes natural capital. 
Scholars from a weak standpoint view environmental damages as replaceable by 
monetary units (Dietz and Neumayer, 2007, pp. 617-626). Countries on this 
spectrum would argue that natural capital could be replaced by man-made capital.  
Strong scholars of sustainable development find this a contradiction; sustainable 
development at its foundation seeks to create a balance between environmental, 
social and economic dimensions. Saying that the natural element can be replaced 
seems to diminish the need for sustainability at all (Dietz and Neumayer, 2007, pp. 
617-626). In addition, “the easier it is to substitute the manufactured capital for 
depleting resources in a damaged world, therefore it is implied, that less attention is 
needed for the capacity of the environment to sustain human development,” (Victor, 
1991, p. 194).  Therefore, scholars of weak sustainable development hold the stance 
that “weak sustainability often leads to weak results, but to no reversal of basic 
principles,” (Pearce and Atkinson, 1993, p. 103).  
 
At its foundations, the main divisions in sustainable development stem over what 
the appropriate role of government is in achieving environmental protection. On the 
strongest side of the sustainability spectrum, theorists would argue that society must 
be reconstructed so that capitalist structures become intentionally embedded with 
environmental and social values. On the weak side of the spectrum scholars instead 
argue that change can be driven so that existing capitalist structures can move 
towards a cleaner economy.  The centre-point of sustainable development 
arguments stem over what the appropriate role of governance is in achieving 




Today, it can be seen that society’s current constructs of environmentalism have 
“failed to reduce, even remotely adequately, the impact of humans on the 
biosphere”, (Foster, 2014). The paradigm change that has remained relatively vague 
and disconnected from the structural changes that are needed to achieve ecological 
goals. Instead, today’s atmospheric damage requires a commitment to the 
environment that promotes, and effectively causes, changes of a more dramatic 
scale to occur.  Yet, the lack of concrete understanding as to what how to best drive 
ecological change can be seen when reviewing existing studies on climate change 
literature. Nation-states, specifically like the EU and the US, can be used as an 
example as to the two opposing viewpoints in how to best drive ecological change. 
Looking at previous climate mitigation studies shows how today there is a clear 
need for understanding how these ideas translate into progress on ecological policy 
issues.  
 
Today, the push for coordinated efforts on climate change at an international level 
has grown within recent literature (Bernauer 2013, pp. 421-448). There is 
significant worry that fragmented schemes without international coordination and 
consensus on needed reductions will instead lead to a “race-to-the-bottom”, where 
firms would relocate to the regions with lower environmental standards (Newell, 
Pizer and Raimi, 2013, p. 123).  This fear is founded on the notion that industries 
will relocate to cities, states, or countries that do not monetarily regulate 
environmentally, mainly so to avoid paying environmental fees (Newell, Pizer and 
Raimi, 2013, pp. 123-146). This fear is even more acute when it comes to emissions 
trading schemes, where bottom-up legislation has been a concern. Although bottom-
up approaches have been effective in the initial launching phases of emissions 
schemes, without international consensus on the targets, it becomes difficult to 
ensure emissions trading schemes are meeting their environmental ambitions 
(Newell, Pizer and Raimi, 2013, pp. 123-146). Despite the positive progress on 
launching markets as displayed by the EU ETS, the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, and New Zealand, the progress has been slow meeting ambitious 
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reductions (Newell, Pizer and Raimi, 2013, pp. 123-146). Although the bottom-up 
approach is useful and easier, nations still need to agree on the larger-scale 
contributions needed for climate change. Without doing so, “regulating states will 
bear a disproportionate share of the costs from such regulation with no guarantee of 
reaping proportionate benefits,” (Adler, 2005).  
 
A more thorough understanding of the complete policy mechanisms and tools 
needed in the creation of an environmental market would be helpful for countries 
looking to implement a new emissions trading scheme (Aldy and Pizer, 2015, pp. 
3-24).  Specifically, it would be useful for policy-makers to investigate the 
determinants and implications of institutional design characteristics that are needed 
to support the deployment of environmental markets. Looking at international 
efforts is useful, but understanding the domestic policies have contributed to 
institutional change would help a country that is new to carbon mitigation policies 
understand how to implement a new, and effective, regime.   Therefore, comparing 
the EU and the US will help showcase the institutional mechanisms that the EU has 
used in creating the EU ETS, which helps to identify the changes the US needs to 
make in order for international CO2 reductions to be significantly successful.   
 
2.4 Conclusion  
When surveying the literature above we can find clear gaps in the research of both 
climate governance, and in comparative studies of the EU and the US. The literature 
was organised by both time and concept in order to show how the concepts have 
developed historically, and to examine how problems within earlier notions of 
environmental government still effect climate policy considerations today. 
Reviewing the literature in a historical manner also helps to show how important it 
is to take a strong approach to strong ecological modernisation in order for some 




The literature above also shows how divided approaches to climate management 
represent longstanding economic divisions between both the US and the EU 
represent. On one side, is the notion of a neoliberal approach to environmental 
management, and on the other side, is an ecological economic approach to climate 
goals. Although the above studies have contributed to the more narrowed analysis 
needed for understanding sustainable development, they do not address nor compare 
how two different approaches to carbon mitigation effect policy outcomes. COP21 
has mandated all nations to address climate change, and effectively deliver on the 
CO2   reductions; it therefore becomes increasingly important to understand how 
such different notions of ecological modernisation impact the institutional capacity 
needed for achieving long-term mitigation goals.  
 
The path to the development of the EU EUTS and proposed emissions trading 
scheme in the US can be used to assess how- and to what degree- do different ideas 
impact institutional change in climate mitigation policies?  Within this thesis, I 
argue that the current ideas with which the US approaches climate mitigations are 
currently not sufficient for developing competitive CO2 reductions. I use ecological 
modernisation as an analytical tool for examining how different ideas of how to 
approach climate mitigation policies impact policy choices, tool innovation, and 
institutional adaptation. This provides a deeper analytical understanding of climate 
change mitigation strategies, specifically when considering the end goal of creating 







Chapter 3. Developing a theoretical lens for understanding 
incremental change in carbon policies 
The conceptual framework in the previous chapter locates and defines the main 
areas of examination within this study. This framework provides the reader with an 
understanding of the origins of climate policy tools, and of the importance of 
institutional adaptation in supporting innovation in carbon policy. Now this thesis 
moves to provide the reader with an understanding of how historical institutionalism 
can be used as a theoretical lens to better examine the nature of change needed to 
support societies as they adjust to climate change. An institutional approach 
captures the interaction of agency, structures and context. This chapter first locates 
historical institutionalism within the broader realm of institutional studies. It then 
moves to examine change in institutions, as well as the relationship between ideas 
and institutional change.  
 
The theoretical lens narrows into an environmental investigation to provide the 
reader with a systemic understanding of institutional adaptation in climate 
mitigation policy. Focusing on the impact of ecological ideas driving the evolution 
of structures and norms related to carbon policy, this chapter provides the reader 
with an understanding of the stages of change an environmental idea must undergo 
in order to cause institutional change. This explains how ecological modernisation 
as an idea can be used to examine the EU’s path to intellectual leadership. This 
chapter then moves to outline the research methods used in this study so that the 
reader understands the potential impact of ecological ideas on institutions as they 
seek to achieve intellectual climate leadership.  
 
3.1 New institutional theories 
The study of political institutions and their effects on society has played a key role 
in political science investigations since the post-war period. Original versions of 
institutionalism mainly compared the formal structures of governments, but these 
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studies rarely produced anything more than basic general deductions on the 
differences of political systems (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 936-957).  In particular, 
the theory was criticized for neglecting the role of actors; the formal analysis of 
structures was not broad enough to include the consideration of preferences that 
were brought into the policy arena (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 936-957). However, 
with the turn of the “behavioural revolution”, institutional studies turned away from 
structures towards instead focusing on actors. 
 
During this time, interests were analysed as being the main source of influence on 
the choices of policy-makers (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, pp. 693-721.  Previously, 
this was an apt explanatory lens for many of the hegemonic decisions taking place 
in countries like the US and the UK, where the rise of neoliberalism encouraged 
isolationism and domestic governance regimes (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, pp. 
693-721).  Here, institutional studies focused on the role of individual actors and 
how they were able to exercise power within the constraints or opportunities offered 
by institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 936-957). Although this theoretical 
perspective offered a more analytical understanding of the role of individuals within 
institutions, the movement did not capture the role of group behaviour, nor how it 
influenced domestic politics.  Including the impact of non-state groups in policy 
analysis became mandatory as groups like industry associations, lobbyist networks, 
non-governmental organisations, and epistemic community members began to 
influence the policy-process.  
 
Rational choice theory became further criticized as globalisation called into 
question the capabilities of single nation-states in effectively addressing global 
challenges (Giddens, 1990, pp. 64). With increasingly interconnected economies, 
countries began encountering obstacles and combatting problems that extended well 
beyond their own borders (Giddens, 1990, pp.64). The end of the Cold War, the 
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spread of terrorism, and global financial recessions all showed that cooperation was 
required to truly solve policy-problems.  
 
With increasingly complex institutional arrangements, political scientists worked to 
create a theory that would provide a more dynamic understanding of the relationship 
between actors and institutional structures, but that could still be used for 
comparative studies (March and Olsen, 1984, pp. 734-749).  Scholars in 
comparative politics, therefore, began to work on creating a theoretical and 
methodological guide for cross-country comparisons that would include the analysis 
of both political structures and the role of society, or governance (March and Olsen, 
1984, pp. 734-749). New institutionalism emerged as an institutional theory that 
sought to develop a more sociological view of institutions, one that addressed the 
gap between individual and group studies.  
 
This new institutional perspective sees institutions as the result of the interaction 
between social and structural dynamics (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 936-957).  New 
institutionalists see the structures of governments as largely influenced by the vast 
network of actors and groups that define the structures of the system itself, yet they 
also see existing structures as influential on actors themselves (Hall and Taylor, 
1996, pp. 936-957). This group of political scientists takes the viewpoint that 
institutions affect both the objectives of political actors, and also affect the 
distribution of power amongst them (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 936-957).  
 
New institutional theory also seeks to accommodate the intricate nuances that come 
with language and culture.  Previous institutional theories assumed that “class, 
geography, climate, ethnicity, language, culture, economic conditions, demography, 
technology, ideology, and religion all affect politics but are not significantly 
affected by politics,” (March and Olsen, 1984, p. 735).  Instead, scholars in new 
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institutional theory moved to consider the cultural connotations that had emerged 
within the increasing complexity of policy-making in general, and looked at how to 
integrate them into a structural analysis.  
 
New institutionalist theories also sought to develop a more analytical understanding 
of change than previously seen in institutional investigations.  Adopting a new 
institutionalist approach as a theoretical lens therefore begins the research with an 
assumption that institutional change should be viewed as a critical component of 
achieving policy goals; here, institutions do not determine outcomes, but they do 
help to influence them (Capoccia and Ziblatt, 2010, pp. 931-968). Although rational 
choice theorists have argued that institutional theories often place too narrow a focus 
on governmental structures, today’s new institutional theories provide an excellent 
theoretical lens for analysing change.   
 
Analysing change has consistently been a difficult task for scholars of institutions 
(Hall, 1996, pp. 936-957). Understanding the degree to which general adjustments 
in the daily operating of institutions affect policy-outcomes can be more difficult 
than when analysing the impact that a crisis has had on an institution (Hall, 1996, 
pp. 936-957).   However, what causes these general adjustments, or change, became 
an area of contention.  Therefore, the merging of these various dynamics resulted in 
the construction of several new institutional strands, rather than one institutional 
theory. 
 
Within the three separate strands of new institutionalism, all three of the theories 
retain the same emphasis of a mutual causational relationship between 
governmental structures and the actors within them (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 936-
957). Rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and historical 
institutionalism all attempt to understand how policy-makers and their decisions 
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affect the policy-process and thus, society (March and Olsen, 2006, pp. 3-20). 
Rational choice institutionalists combine the assumptions of rational choice theory 
with a structural focus to examine how the rules and constraints of the system affect 
the decisions that actors make. This strand of scholars believes that institutions are 
used by actors to maximise their utility, and pays particular attention as to what 
actors may or may not be allowed to do within the policy-process (Hall and Taylor, 
1996, pp. 936-957). What actors can and cannot do influences the choices actors 
make, and what causes institutional change to occur. However, this point of view 
focuses solely on rules and restrictions on actors and ignores how the broader setting 
may influence policy-decisions.  
 
Sociological institutionalists take the idea that institutions are created in response to 
choices made by actors. Sociological institutionalism concerns “the way in which 
institutions create meaning for individuals, providing important theoretical building 
blocks for normative institutionalism within political science,” (Lowndes, 2010, p. 
65).  Sociological institutionalists therefore look at the broader policy norms as an 
explanatory variable for change. They describe change as something that happens 
alongside changing norms in society (Lowndes, 2010, p. 65).  However, this point 
of view does not necessarily explain how change occurs, and negates the role of 
actors’ decisions in spurring on institutional change.    
 
For scholars of historical institutionalism, both rational and sociological 
institutionalism provide a weak analysis of how influential formal structures are on 
the actors within the policy-arena. Instead, this school of thought believes that 
institutions give validity to certain rules of behaviour, but that decisions taken are a 
result of both sociological and ideological influences (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, 
pp. 693-721).  Scholars of historical institutionalism do not necessarily emphasize 
the sociological over the rational approach, but instead separate themselves from 
other forms of institutionalism by taking into account a focus also on the political 
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context and political structures of governments (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, pp. 
693-721). Historical institutionalists focus on the ways that political systems differ 
in their entirety exclusively, and then analyse how these differences influence 
overall governance when comparing political systems.  
 
In this manner, historical institutionalism combines rational choice and sociological 
institutionalism to analyse the progression of behaviour and the interaction of 
actors, rules, and structure over time. By focusing on both structures and actors, 
historical institutionalism specifically seeks to take a holistic approach to 
understanding why and how change within a system occurs. 
 
3.2 The assumptions of historical institutionalism 
Institutions in historical institutional theory are defined as the “the formal or 
informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the 
organizational structure of the polity or political economy,” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 
p. 6).  Historical institutionalists believe that institutions provide the context in 
which political actors define their strategies and pursue their own policy interests 
(March and Olsen, 2006, pp. 734-749).  The theory “takes a broad view of how 
institutions influence individual actors’ behaviours, and include normative and 
cultural dimensions which go beyond rationalist calculations,” to give a sound 
understanding of how institutions, actors, and ideas interact (Bulmer, 1998, p. 370). 
From this perspective, institutions are not just structures, but act as the physical and 
ideological boundaries that shape the strategies, goals, and decisions of policy-
makers.  
 
Historical institutionalists look specifically at how states structure their response to 
new challenges within the global political economy (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 936-
957). Achieving policy goals requires cooperation and often times results in 
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political conflict; institutions thus, define political situations and stand as both a 
cause and effect of political outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992, pp. 
27). Historical institutionalists therefore begin with the assumption that policy is the 
product of the interactions among various groups, interests, ideas, and institutional 
structures (March and Olsen, 1984, pp. 734-749). They reject the notion that 
political behaviour can be analysed as a whole, but instead seek to understand why 
decisions have been made as opposed to other policy options available to policy-
makers (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Pierson, 2000; Steinmo and Thelen, 1995; 
Hall, 1986).  
 
Scholars within this field are separated from the other schools of new 
institutionalism as they alone take into consideration the historical context within 
which policy decisions are made. Although war and economic crisis are often 
analysed for their sudden impact on institutions, taking into account the broader 
historical context and the development of institutions during times of non-crisis is 
often neglected when compared to the other explanatory variables of change 
(Pierson, 2000, pp. 251-267). Historical institutionalists thus, place great 
importance in understanding the context in which institutions develop as this often 
acts, at least partially, as an explanatory factor for policy-choices (Pierson, 2000, 
pp. 251-267). The environment that surrounds influences the perception of actors 
and how they view the structures around them.  Historical institutionalists therefore 
investigate how the overarching policy background may influence actors’ policy-
decisions.  
 
Historical institutionalist scholars analyse policy by assuming that policy develops 
in a continual path.  Defining this as “path dependency”, historical institutionalists 
believe that when a program or an organisation starts on a path, there is a tendency 
for the policy path to continue (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 936-957).  It is possible 
for policy-makers to change the course of an institution, and thus alter the policy 
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pathway, but it is difficult.   This is partly due to the fact that historical 
institutionalism sees, to a certain extent, that pre-existing policy powers tend to be 
entrenched in already present institutions (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, pp. 1-39). 
These arrangements give “actors and interests greater powers of influence over 
others whenever it comes to creating new institutions,” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 
954). Although people act according to rules and traditions already in place, they 
can change the institutional path in some way if any of these factors is altered 
(March and Olsen, 1984, pp. 734-749).  Historical institutionalism thus, places strict 
emphasis on understanding how institutional paths are altered.  
 
In order to clearly identify change historical institutionalists differentiate the status 
of institutional systems as being either changing or static.  The state of the institution 
infers a certain set of assumptions about the nature of the institution under 
examination. When institutions are static they are referred to as being in “dynamic 
equilibrium”; in this instance, none of the actors in the arena has an incentive to 
defect from existing arrangements or strategies (Thelen, 1999, pp. 369-404).  These 
equilibria are seen as effective arrangements of institutions, which contain practices, 
norms, and values (Thelen, 1999, pp. 369-404). When systems are in such a state of 
equilibrium, actors and existing arrangements reproduce within the system and 
further embed themselves within existing political systems (Thelen, 1999, pp. 369-
404).  Therefore, existing strategies become difficult to overturn, specifically as 
actors who benefit from these arrangements will seek to maximize their gains.  
 
In a negated aspect disequilibrium can also occur, which is a continued state of 
actors’ defecting from the arrangement of the system (Thelen, 1999, pp. 369-404). 
Disequilibrium is a state of unresolved strategies or preferences. Disequilibrium can 
be adjusted when actors successfully put in place strategies that address defection, 
but can also result in a crisis if the overall values and norms of the system come into 
question (Thelen, 1999, pp. 369-404). These are referred to as crises, or an event or 
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action that threatens the existence or generation of the governmental body under 
investigation (Thelen, 1999, pp. 369-404). Crises often result in institutions 
changing drastically.  
 
3.2.1 Critical junctures and incremental change  
It can be a problem predicting when institutions will move from a period of 
equilibrium to disequilibrium, but historical  institutionalists have traditionally 
tended to credit diplomatic and economic crises as the main stimulators for 
institutional change, or as major critical junctures (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 936-
957). When an actor, or group of actors, is able to change the developmental path 
of a policy, this is referred to as a critical juncture; the periods of stability in between 
are referred to as a period of continuity (Capoccia and Keleman, 2007, pp. 341-
369). Critical junctures are the point in time when an event, or series of events, 
provides an opportunity for the institution and actors within in it to pursue 
alternative methods (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992).  
 
During these critical junctures, “there is a substantially heightened probability that 
agents’ choices will affect the policy outcome” (Capoccia and Keleman, 2007, p. 
348).    These moments force institutions to respond to shocks; therefore, the change 
made is likely to be abrupt (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Cortell and Petersen, 1999, 
Steeck and Thelen, 2005). The consequences of actors’ actions during these periods 
will typically lead to one of two situations: actors and their power will be able to 
expand noticeably, or actors’ power will diminish and most likely be replaced by 
that of another actor (Capoccia and Keleman, 2007). The choices made at these 
critical junctures generally, “close off alternative policy options and lead to the 
development of institutions that generate self-enforcing path-dependent processes,” 
(Capoccia and Keleman, 2007, p. 348).  Therefore, critical junctures normally 




Critical junctures force institutions to respond to shocks; therefore, the change made 
is likely to be abrupt (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Cortell and Petersen, 1999; Hall 
and Taylor, 1996).  However, it can be difficult to judge if an event is critical, 
thereby being disruptive on a large-scale, as opposed to being simply an event in 
the institutions path of development (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, 1992).    Yet, 
historical institutionalists also recognise that change can occur without crisis; 
however, this change is different in the nature and magnitude to which it affects a 
system. These are referred to as incremental changes, which are smaller and less 
noticeable (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, pp. 1-39).  Still, these changes can be difficult 
to assess the degree to which they affect a system (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, pp. 1-
39). However, incremental changes are interesting as they are the most common 
type of change to occur within institutions.   
 
Incremental changes generally infer that the structure of institutions remain intact, 
but imply that some form of change is still occurring within the system to alter the 
rules of the political game (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Generally, incremental 
change is seen as positive change; governmental bodies themselves are created to 
represent the interests of the constituents they represent.   Therefore, incremental 
changes can mean that the institutions under analysis are changing in accordance 
with the changing values of society (Streeck and Thelen, 2009, pp. 1-39).  Although 
not all policy demands warrant change, “the problems of the public still demand 
attention on most bases,” (Streeck and Thelen, 2009, pp. 1-39). Therefore, these 
gradual changes can be useful for analysing how governments respond to challenges 
on a daily basis, or how governments are responding to the demands and needs of 
its citizens.   This can also imply that if governments are not making changes on a 
constant basis, then there may be a failure of institutional capabilities in responding 
to citizens’ demands.  
 
Previous studies using historical institutionalism found incremental changes 
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difficult to identify and judge. Instead, scholars moved to develop an evolutionary 
explanation of institutions in response to external stimuli which offers a likely 
explanation of the way in which a system must literally adapt to address new policy 
issues (Lewis and Steinmo, 2012, pp.314-339). Rather than the types of changes 
being different and separate as previous historical institutionalists outlined, change 
from this perspective is likely to act in a cyclical approach. Exploring change 
through this evolutionary lens gives greater insights into the increasing complexity 
of political patterns across time, and gives an explanation of change occurring in 
more of a cyclical manner (Lewis and Steinmo, 2012, pp.314-339). 
 
From this point of view, incremental changes are fundamentally related to achieving 
policy goals. Resembling the notion of evolution in Darwinian Theory, these 
theorists outline how institutions must evolve similarly to how species adapt in 
biological evolution (Lewis and Steinmo, 2012, pp.314-339). Arguing that the 
relationship between adaptation and survival has been investigated previously 
across science, economics, sociology, anthropology, and psychology, institutional 
scholars now adopt the notion that institutional evolution must occur in order for an 
institution to survive (Lewis and Steinmo, 2012, pp. 314-339). This notion sees 
incremental changes as a mandatory and important part of institutional survival 
(Lewis and Steinmo, 2012, pp.314-339).  
 
In these evolutionary terms, change must occur on a constant and regular basis. 
Institutions, therefore, must respond to external stimuli as species do in biology.  
Here, "human’s creative capabilities and problem-solving abilities are important 
mechanisms for generating continued variation in human social systems" (Lewis 
and Steinmo, 2012, p. 316). The knowledge capacity of policy actors is directly 
responsible for influencing the “complexity of political institutions themselves, the 
opportunities for new variation to emerge, and likely the rates of institutional 
change," (Lewis and Steinmo, 2012, p.  317).  From this Darwinian aspect, actors 
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must respond to a policy-demand appropriately to cause institutional change. This 
means that if actors are able to correctly address issues, they will improve 
institutional arrangements through trial and error methods (Lewis and Steinmo, 
2012, pp. 317). When the correct policy answer is put in place, innovation within 
policy will occur, which can then replicate itself in further policy measures (Lewis 
and Steinmo, 2010, pp.314-339). Actors, therefore, become important in this 
investigation, and this theory, as they become the vehicles for change.  They must 
have the capacity to address issues correctly, and to formulate appropriate policy-
responses. Therefore, in order to truly understand the influence of actors in the 
policy process, one must first acquire an understanding of the external sources that 
may influence actors as they make policy-decisions. 
 
3.2.2 Ideas and institutional change      
When seeking to understand what external sources effect actors’ choices, historical 
institutionalists tend to favour either interests or ideas as the main source of 
influence on policy decision-makers (Hall, 1997, pp. 174-207).  On one side, 
scholars see interests as the main cause of influence on actors involved in the policy 
process. In climate change, this notion has been much explored, specifically the 
impact of corporate interests in the policy-process (Lewandowsky et al, 
2015; Dunlap and McCright, 2011; Helm, 2010; Anderson, 2009; Bryner, 2008; 
Rabe, 2004; Dunlap and McCright, 2003; Betsill and Correll, 2001). These 
“materialist theories” take the notion that interests infiltrate the policy-arena and 
shape actors’ opinions, thus, forming actors’ ideas. However, if this approach is 
embraced, there is still ambiguity over why agents perceive interests the way they 
do.   
 
Scholars in comparative studies faced limitations when using interests as a tool for 
describing how actor’s made decisions during times of uncertainty. This approach 
ignored the prior cognitive biases that actors brought with them into the policy-
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arena (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, pp. 693-721). Instead, taking an ideational 
approach became a useful tool for understanding how external and internal sources 
of bias influence actors in the policy-making process.  This perspective investigates 
how actors interact with a set of existing “prior expectations and cognitive biases 
that affect how they will work within [these] institutions and adopt them to their 
own circumstances,” (Steinmo and Lewis, 2012, p. 314).  These prior expectations 
and existing biases can be referred to as ideas.   
 
When taking an idealist approach, ideas, rather than interests, become the key 
external stimuli that spur institutions to change. Ideas are seen as responsible for the 
new formation of new structures after a period of equilibrium becomes unstable 
(Blyth, 2001, p. 2). They act as “institutional blueprints during periods of 
uncertainty, as weapons in distributional struggles, and as ‘cognitive locks’”, 
(Blyth, 2001, p. 2). Ideas are important as they define how institutions evolve. 
Investigating the core ideas that hold actors during times of change shows how 
“ideas fundamentally alter people’s conception of their own self-interests,” and how 
they “impact how actors choose to structure their policy-goals and decisions,” 
(Blyth, 2001, p 3).  Ideas are said to be successful, or influential, when they diffuse 
the policy arena and creating lasting, effective results. 
 
For an idea to cause change, or alter the path of policy development, it normally 
goes through three phases: formation, negotiation, and operation (Young, 1999). In 
the formation phase, actors often act as policy-entrepreneurs to conceptualise the 
idea.  They are influenced by both personal ideas as well as external interests’. 
During this phase, actors gather inputs from various sources to form an 
understanding of how to best approach a policy-problem (Young, 1999). Here, 
information is informally present in policy-discussions, and combines with the 
overall setting at the time to influence an actor, or actors, response to a policy-
demand. This response, or idea, is then brought into the public policy-arena during 
4151442 
76 
the negotiation phase (Young, 1999). Finally, ideas then influence policy-choices 
in the operation stage. Here, the fundamental concepts of the idea manifest 
themselves in tangible policy evidence (Young, 1999). This stage is where an idea 
results in structural and organisational responses to the policy-problem (Young, 
1999). If changes are made organisationally, then an idea is credited as being 
successful. If no changes are made, then one can assume that the idea that was used, 
or formulated, was an inappropriate policy response. These stages therefore, display 
how an idea can and should influence change.   
 
3.3 Outlining the mechanism for institutional change  
The concept of ecological modernisation as an idea can be used as part of a broader 
theoretical concept to analyse the incremental changes that are needed to ingrain 
climate considerations in the broader political economy.  Therefore, we can 
conclude, if an idea such as strong ecological modernisation is formed, and present 
in the policy area, then one would expect institutional change in relation to the five 
aspects developed in the previous section; change in information coordination, 
change in policy tools, change in policy goals, change in policy paradigms or the 
hierarchy of policy goals, and change in the role of the state.  
 
Change must occur within all of these dimensions in order for an economy to 
accommodate ecological considerations (Eckersley, 2004, pp. 180-208). Therefore, 
although there are two different approaches to ecological modernisation, or towards 
engraining environmental considerations within the political economy, we can use 
these five dimensions of change to analyse the impact that each notion has on 
institutional change. This will allow me to understand not only to what degree the 
EU and the US have institutional adjusted to address climate change, but will also 
allow me to concretely analyse the authenticity of both of their individual 




Although carbon policy goals have quantitative outcomes, this thesis seeks to more 
specifically understand the qualitative outcomes of this policy. Carbon emissions 
reductions require a fundamental paradigm shift. As such, policy-makers within this 
policy area therefore have two main goals within carbon policy: to quantitatively 
produce reductions but to also choose policy tools that produce behavioural or 
systemic change.  Success here can also be seen as, “the ambition or stipulation of 
ambitious objectives that produce real change in behaviour, and compliance, to the 
extent to which implementers, including target groups, work to follow the stipulated 
requirements,” (Bressers, Bruijn, Lulofs, and O’Toole, 2011, pp.187-208).  
However, these changes can be hard to measure. It will be important therefore in 
this research to define how to measure this qualitative change.  
 
The EU ETS as a specific carbon policy also supports the initial hypothesis within 
this thesis. The EU ETS represents the price of carbon, which shows that the 
environment has been given some inherent value. This therefore helps support the 
thesis which is that if in fact the goal for climate mitigation policies is to support a 
carbon policy (or to create a fundamental value for the environment), then the EU 
has undertaken an approach that is effective. The alternative would be to either 
create a regulatory regime that mandates reductions of carbon. There is no third 
scenario with climate change mitigation goals. Therefore, assuming then that the 
EU/US have mutual economic ambitions and carbon footprints (or the most similar 
economic ambitions as possible within comparative studies) then the EU becomes 
an apt investigation for examining what incremental changes the EU undertook to 
create such an economic value for the environment.  
 
This research piece therefore will gather, examine, and analyse the five dimensions 
of change that are required to create an ecological paradigm shift.  This helps to 
provide better qualitative goals for evaluating the EU and US’s capabilities that are 
needed to create long-lasting emissions reductions. This also helps to define a 
rational ambition for climate policy in the US. The US is unlikely to embark down 
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a policy-path that is damaging to US economic interests, so this time of framework 
helps to direct American climate policy studies towards a complementary pathway 
for emissions reductions.   
 
3.4 Conclusion  
Taking ideas as the initial cause of catalytic change does not dispute the influence 
of interests nor individual agents in the political process.  Instead, focusing on ideas 
allows one to differentiate between the creative capabilities of individuals versus 
the vested corporate interests that oftentimes arise in the climate policy process.  An 
ideational approach expands climate research beyond the typical interest 
investigations that exist in political science, and brings a new positive contribution 
to the analysis of how institutions must change in response to the challenge of 
climate change.  Taking an idealistic approach provides a deeper understanding on 
the framing of climate change policy, as well as the nature of the human capacities 
that are needed for increasing the capability of institutions when seeking to adapt to 
the challenge of climate change.   
 
When using a historical institutional lens from this ideational perspective, ideas then 
become a critical area of investigation as they are what influence actors to make the 
choices they do. As this thesis investigates climate change, the conceptualisation of 
how actors view climate change becomes increasingly important. Paraphrasing 
Blyth, these ideas must define both how climate change affects, “what the economy 
is, how it operates, and the place of the individual or collectivist within the 
economy,” (Blyth, 2001, p.3). This research therefore specifically seeks to examine 





Chapter 4. Constructing the conceptual framework and research 
methodology 
When seeking to conduct a comparative investigation that tests the impact of ideas 
on policy outcomes, it is imperative to develop a framework that will allow the 
researcher to identify meaningful differences within institutional change. The 
theory provides a strong lens for understanding why the importance of ideas and 
change are important, yet there still needs to be a strong framework for the empirical 
analysis of this research piece. As such, a critical component of this work is 
developing a framework for the comparison of carbon policies in the EU and the 
US.  
 
This chapter seeks to both develop and more clearly define the areas of investigation 
that will be used within this research piece. It acts as the conceptual design of the 
broader research piece, and organizes the areas of investigation to be used in the 
comparative analysis of carbon policy in the EU and the US. The framework shows 
how carbon policy reflects a systemic investigation of climate mitigation policies. 
With a clear understanding of what specifically defines carbon policy, this thesis 
then moves to outline the research methods that can be used to better understand 
how institutions are adapting to climate change.  By the end of this chapter the 
reader will have a strong understanding of how tool choice, design, and goals can 
be compared to better understand the paradigm shift that has occurred in the EU but 
not US.  
 
4.1 Defining the area of investigation 
As shown by the literature review, climate change research today contains an 
intricate coordination between various dimensions of academic research. Despite 
the subject being new, political scientists have produced a high quantity of research 
that touches upon the various dimensions of climate policy, which points to the need 
to revisit how these studies are approached. Today, these research investigations are 
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most generally separated into two main areas of investigation: climate adaptation 
and climate mitigation studies (IPCC, 2007, p.141). These two subfields of climate 
change policy complement each other, but are generally separated due to their 
different time dimensions, and thus, differences in policy design (Klein, Schipper, 
Dessai, 2005, pp. 579-588).   Adaptation policies are “initiatives and measures 
[undertaken] to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual 
or expected climate change effects" (IPCC, 2007, p.86).  These measures are likely 
to be considered short-term, focusing on what nations are doing now to reduce the 
impacts of climate change effects in the next one to four years. Adaptation policy 
investigations focus on the immediate damage that result from climate change and 
as such, focus heavily on procedures, such as vulnerability studies, risk assessments 
and strategies, or infrastructure protection policies (Wellstead and Stedman, 2014, 
pp. 999-1010). Contrarily, mitigation measures consist of actions to limit the 
magnitude or rate of long-term climate change (IPCC, 2007, p.225). These policies 
tend to have twenty year outlooks, but can be shorter.  The fundamental differences 
of the areas are that mitigation studies look to see how to reduce the causes of 
climate change whereas adaptation studies seek to understand how to reduce the 
impact of climate change. This research piece focuses on mitigation policy, in that 
it looks at the tools that are taken to help move the two areas towards low-carbon 
economies (therefore looking at how to transition away from the use of fossil fuels, 
the cause of climate change).  
Figure 3: Adaptation, mitigation, and adaptive capacity 
 




Although the two areas of adaptation and mitigation are traditionally separated 
there is now significant interest in exploring the inter-connectivity that lies within 
adaptation and mitigation techniques. This is referred to as the “adaptive capacity” 
of nations (Wellstead and Stedman, 2014, pp. 999-1010). The adaptive capacity of 
a government, or policy-area, connects mitigation and adaptation measures by 
looking at the nature of change institutions have gone through. Adaptive capacity 
is the “ability or potential of a system to respond successfully to climate variability 
and change, and includes adjustments in both behaviour and in resources and 
technologies, (IPCC, 2007a, Section 17.13.1). These adjustments must “enable 
sectors and institutions to take advantage of opportunities or benefits from climate 
change” (IPCC, 2007a, Section 17.13.1). Here, governmental rules and structures 
specifically are needed to “promote the adaptive capacity of society and allow 
society to modify its institutions at a rate commensurate with the rate of 
environmental change” (Gupta et al, 2009, p. 457).  Although this study focuses on 
mitigation, understanding the likelihood of policy mitigation goals being achieved 
depends heavily on the role of institutions and how they change. Therefore, this 
study looks at mitigation goals but also provides an analysis on the adaptive 
capacity of the EU and US governments.  
 
Mitigation studies, although separate from adaptation studies, still contain a wide 
variety of research aims that are rarely divided amongst themselves. However, for 
the purpose of this study it is important to strictly clarify the area of investigation.  
Mitigation studies as a whole focus on addressing the causes of climate change, and 
therefore focus on a few main actions that institutions can take to help incentivise 
the societal shift towards a low-carbon future. These include shifting towards 
renewable energy policies, increasing the capacity of storing carbon (carbon 
sequestration), and actions that can counteract carbon emissions such as 
deforestation (carbon off-setting). Still, each of these areas are specific and can be 
seen as different because they require different types of policy actions. For example, 
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deforestation is a heavily environmental issue, whereas shifting towards renewable 
energy sources are clearly an energy issue. Therefore, identifying the types of tools 
that are used for moving society as a whole together requires using tools from 
environmental policy, economic policy, but also energy policies.  
 
Rather than focusing on individual aspects of policy- energy, environmental, or 
economic-this thesis seeks to analyse all three dimensions. The combination of all 
of these policies is what this thesis refers to as carbon policy, or the inclusive 
measures that are used to shift society towards a low-carbon future. It is important 
to note the all-encompassing focus on low-carbon legislation because it impacts the 
outcomes, or goals, of the policies investigated within this dissertation. Although 
mitigation goals broadly look at how to remove greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere, this specific research stream looks instead at how to shift society 
towards a low-carbon future and what institutional changes need to be made across 
energy, environment, and economy to do so.  
 
4.2 Developing a carbon policy taxonomy  
This thesis seeks to test the impacts of ideas on policy-choices, mainly to show that 
strong ecological modernisation is impactful in driving the changes that are needed 
to support societies as they adjust to climate change. However, in order to 
understand how ideas can impact policy-choices it is first imperative to define and 
understand the range tools that policy-makers are able to choose from when seeking 
to achieve carbon policy success.  
 
Carbon policy itself is a relatively new topic, and is evolving rapidly. With 
increasing interest in addressing climate change, nation-states and non-
governmental actors are heavily focused on achieving success in carbon policy. 
Governments are now facing many policy options, which are intricate in design and 
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function, and also in how they interact with existing policy designs. Although 
carbon policy is typically investigated from an economic perspective, the policy 
dimensions involved make it an attractive area of investigation for studies that are 
more policy oriented (Helm, 2008, pp. 211-238). The IEA now defines carbon 
policy as the different climate policies used in putting countries on a low-carbon 
growth path (Helm et al, 2003, pp. 438-450).  
 
When choosing to create mechanisms for passing policy, policy-makers are usually 
faced with a range of options they can use when hoping to solve a public problem. 
Political scientists and economists alike, specifically those involved in policy 
studies, seek to understand what tools are available to policy-makers, and why 
policy-makers favour choosing the tools they do (Majone, 1989). Both political 
scientists and economists believe that there are particular ways to categorize tool 
tools, and believe that in doing so, they can better understand more about the 
choices behind these tools themselves, but also in the effectiveness of these 
choices. By forming a stronger understanding of how policy tools function, 
political scientists hope to be able to understand the errors in policy-making in the 
past.  
 
In order to judge the effectiveness of policy, political scientists generally begin 
organising tools into what are referred as “tool taxonomies”. Earliest forms of policy 
taxonomy approaches began by researchers looking to best understand how 
governments could manipulate policy processes through symbols, signs, etc. By the 
early 1980's, taxonomy approaches had transformed into becoming a critical aspect 
of sound research methodologies (Howlett, 2005, pp. 31-50). Lester Salamon led 
the efforts to more narrowly define the categories of tools that governments could 
choose from. With extensive input from economists, he looked specifically at 
organizing how to group tools together in a manner which allowed researchers to 
reflect upon the “type, quantity, price, or other characteristics of goods and services 
being produced in society," (Howlett, 2005, pp. 35). This was important for 
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establishing more rigorous methodologies within political science investigations.  
 
These main types of tools used in climate mitigation studies generally fall into the 
informational (or persuasive) category, cooperative means, economic tools, or 
regulatory policy tools (Schmitt and Schulze, 2011, pp.1- 27). These main types 
of tools are the means through which governments how to achieve climate 
mitigation goals. Regulatory tools, which are often referred to as command and 
control tools in environmental policy, directly limit the actions of polluter. In this 
instance, the state sets the exact limits that industry members are forced to comply 
with and then sets penalties or fines for non-compliance. Economic, or market-
based, tools use markets, price, and other economic variables to provide 
incentives for polluters to reduce or eliminate negative environmental 
externalities. Cooperative tools are negotiated agreements between the private and 
public sector in which firms can volunteer to participate. Informational tools are 
mainly used to spur behavioural change by providing information to industry 
members or citizens. The assumption behind informational tools is that the more 
aware society members are of their impact on the environment, they will naturally 
be incentivised to change their behaviour.  
 
The different tools themselves require a different amount of participation, i.e., on 
the part of the state (Bressers, de Bruijn, Lulofs and O’Toole, 2011, pp. 187-208).  
Regulatory tools require the largest amount of state influence in that the state is 
required to set the rules for playing for industry members. Economic incentives 
require less, in that they generally rely heavily on the private sector (or market 
forces) to create change, as opposed to governmental “rule-setting”, yet a certain 
degree of governmental guidance is needed to define the goals of these policies 
(Bruijn, Lulofs and O’Toole, 2011, pp. 187-208). When looking at voluntary or 
cooperative agreements, there is generally the same out of state intervention 
required as in economic instruments.  Traditionally, informational tools require 
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the least amount of government intervention; when using persuasive measures 
very rarely is the state called upon to help spread information (Hall and Taylor, 
1996, pp. 936-957). However, it is important to note that these conclusions have 
been made in regards to environmental policy and are not specific to climate 
change.  
 
4.2.1 A carbon policy taxonomy  
This typology provides the general framework for understanding the basic types of 
tools that governments are able to use for developing environmental policy in 
general. Within these four dimensions governments then create more specific tools 
that address specific environmental concerns.  Often, several tools are combined in 
a tool mix formulated to address a certain environmental problem. Since 
environmental issues often have many different aspects, several policy tools may 
be needed to adequately address each one. Tool mixes must be carefully formulated 
so that the individual measures within them do not undermine each other or create 
a rigid or cost-ineffective compliance framework (Jordan et al, 2003, pp. 355-574). 
Overlapping tools lead to unnecessary administrative costs, making 
implementation of environmental policies costlier than necessary (Howlett, 2009, 
pp. 73-89).  
 
We can examine the four main measures of environmental policy, regulatory, 
economic, cooperative, and voluntary measures, to gain a better understanding of 
the basic means that policy-makers may use to address a policy problem. By 
gaining a better understanding of the sources with which government agents can 
draw upon, one can better understand the presumptions that lie behind individual 
policy tools. For instance, while a carbon tax is a specific tool, it can also be 
considered part of a larger “toolbox” of economic or market-based tools. By 
moving to investigate the main sources that environmental policy tools originate 
from, we can also better understand some of the assumptions that lie more broadly 




Informational (persuasive) tools refer to any type of knowledge data information 
that is used for decision-making processes Informational, or persuasive, tools 
attempt to influence the public's actions by giving information to the citizens. The 
presumption that lies behind informational tools is that citizens will change their 
collective behaviour if they are given facts about the environment (Schmitt and 
Schulze, 2011).    For instance, these may include specific quantitative targets on 
emissions reductions, or more broad information, like informing citizens. For 
carbon policy, public disclosure agreements are recommended as useful examples 
of informational tools (Gupta et al, 2007).  However, what specific or necessary 
information points have proven to be effective are less well-researched. Therefore, 
this thesis will pay particular attention to the more granular types of information 
that the EU has used to inform its citizens on the importance of a low-carbon 
future.   
 
Cooperative tools seek to address the gap that exists between actors and the state 
when trying to reach policy goals. These types of tools often work between 
government and industry, and act as mechanisms to support industry achieving 
government mandated goals (Bressers, de Bruijn, Lulofs and O’Toole, 2011, pp. 
187-208). Cooperative tools often aim to create arrangements that are 
economically beneficial for the private sector, yet incentivise behaviour towards 
government standards.  These tools are generally attractive, and have a history of 
moving industry towards new technological improvements.  It is worth noting that 
within carbon policy, the UNFCCC recommends that any mutually-agreed 
arrangements include targets that consist of a baseline scenario and a formal 
monitoring provision (Gupta et al, 2007).   This work will investigate the 
stringency and ambition of cooperative tools to judge their effectiveness.  (Gupta 
et al, 2007, pp. 459-471). Without such, the tool will lack the substance needed to 




Regulatory tools seek to create limitations on actors’ behaviours.  They have a 
high degree of government involvement, and are generally used to give specific 
measures of behaviour- what people can and cannot do.  Regulations and 
standards provide a certainty of emissions levels, but “their environmental 
effectiveness depends on their stringency” (Gupta et al, 2007, pp. 461). In carbon 
policy, taxes and charges are normally the two most common types of tools used.  
They are generally used to force behaviour change by requiring industry to 
collectively pay a tax on carbon emissions. For example, a 2% carbon tax would 
work in the same way that an income tax normally does. Anyone who is producing 
carbon emissions would pay 2% as part of their profit-sharing tax.   
 
Taxes and charges are generally viewed as being very effective in terms of cost 
(little cost to implement, possible to generate high revenue) but cannot necessarily 
guarantee a particular lowering of emissions (Gupta et al, 2007, pp. 459-471). It 
must be noted that these taxes have been found politically difficult to implement, 
and also to make any type of further adjustments to. This is associated with the 
amount of access anti-tax groups have on the environmental policy process (Gupta 
et al, 2007, pp. 459-471). It is also noteworthy that these taxes are found to be 
effective only when there is a high amount of stringency, or a large regulating 
body (Helm et al, 2003, pp. 438-450).  
  
Economic based tools, or market-based tools, use markets, price, and economic 
variables to provide incentives for actors to reduce or eliminate negative 
environmental externalities. Unambiguously, economic tools use the market-based 
coordination of environmental values to influence an actor’s behaviour in both the 
private and public markets (Jordan et al, 2003, pp. 355-574). Although economic 
tools appear to be private sector-oriented, the state itself actually is very important 
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for economic tools. By setting economic incentives as price signals, the state acts 
as the initial cause when promoting behavioural changes.  
Table 3: Carbon tool typology  
Tool typology Specific tool type  
Informational  Public disclosure information 
Regulatory  “Command and control” techniques- directly limiting carbon 
emissions 




Flexible pricing (non-governmental intervention)  
Subsidies (direct/indirect) 
Phase-out subsidies (of renewable energies)  
Taxes and charges  
Tradable emissions quotas   
Negotiated agreements  
Cooperative 
(Voluntary)  
Tradable emissions quotas  
Public-private partnerships (for efficiency increases) 
Targets for emissions  
 
Within economic or market-based tools, the IPCC details five main types of tools 
that may be used within carbon policy: taxes, full-cost pricing, subsidies, phase-out 
of subsidies, and tradable emissions quotas (Gupta et al, 2007, pp. 459-471). 
Tradable permits are the most popular and politicized method of carbon policy. 
These tools work by effectively creating a commodity out of carbon by giving value 
to the carbon that has been emitted into the atmosphere (Helm et al, 2003, pp. 438-
450). These permits work to establish a carbon price, which is based on a 
specifically allotted amount of emissions, which in hand determines the 
environmental effectiveness of the permits (Gupta et al, 2007, pp. 459-471). 
However, there is considerable debate as to what is the most effective strategy for 
pricing carbon emissions. On one side, some argue that the most effective way for 
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reducing emissions to set a clear price on the cost of emissions. This type of strategy 
would require the government to set an unfluctuating cost of carbon, or at the 
minimum to set a clear floor or ceiling as to how high or low the price could 
fluctuate.  Industry tends to argue this point, saying that this is more closely related 
to the concept of a regulation and the market set should be left to its own devices. 
Here, the invisible hand of the market would be the best device for causing price 
changes to occur.  
 
There are two forms of subsidies (direct and indirect) that are provisions given by 
the government in exchange for use or non-use of a good (Gupta et al, 2007, pp. 
459-471). These funds are given directly by the government to either private 
individuals or, more likely, private industries or firms. However, the definition of 
subsidies can vary depending on which industry they are allotted towards.  A 
subsidy in general is defined as “money granted by state, public bodies, or 
governments to help decrease prices of commodities (Helm et al, 2003, pp. 442). 
For environmental policies, these moneys are cash stimulants used by 
governments in order to encourage the development of new technologies that are 
typically less carbon-heavy (Helm et al, 2003, pp. 438-450). Most commonly 
subsidies are issues for lowering the use of fossil fuel, or for agriculture (Gupta et 
al, 2007). Subsidies work by giving monetary assistance to a specific sector or 
producers to prevent the decline of the industry. For instance, in agriculture, an 
industry that is suffering due to the increased effects of weather, subsidies are 
given to farmers to maintain price during non-growing season. When discussing 
fossil fuels, subsidies generally refer to governmental funding that is given to 
industries to encourage to encourage research for alternative energy 
developments.  
 
Although the initial costs are likely high for subsidization, these financial 
incentives have been noted as a key tool in helping overcome the obstacles that 
4151442 
90 
act stand in the way of new technology being dispersed in the global political 
economy (Jordan, Wurzel, and Bruckner, 2003, pp-179-200). Providing tax 
breaks and other benefits for firms helps them to save financial resources and 
encourages them towards increasing efficiency in production, thereby reducing 
CO2. Increasing the technology that can help to reduce existing carbon within the 
atmosphere is an important part of mitigation strategies. Although technology 
may not exist now, developing further technologies that can help to reduce 
existing carbon in the atmosphere is a key way to increase further ambition within 
carbon policy. Energy resources also require technical development, specifically 
renewable energies. Although the technology exists to produce the energy, storing 
the energy itself is currently a problem.  
 
All of the tools discussed above positively impact carbon levels, but many other 
policies can actually result in the increase of carbon levels. Trade and 
Development Assistance, or non-climate policies, are indirect policies that will 
effect climate change. Trade policies are the largest of impactful policies on 
climate change as often times these are formed between nations, and will push for 
an increase in transportation needed for the increased production of goods. These 
policies may not be specifically directed at emissions reductions, but may have 
significant climate-related effects (Gupta et al, 2007, pp. 459-471). Trade policy 
often seeks to increase productivity, which requires an increase in energy 
production and thus, higher carbon levels. These policies can also include 
negative effects, such a trade agreement that does not provide strong enough 
environmental stipulations.  
  
Exploring tool taxonomies from a generic standpoint to the more specific climate 
taxonomies identifies the resources a government has at its disposal. At the same 
time, this taxonomy shows the nature of how tools are intended to achieve policy 
goals. Grouping them together in a concise manner therefore helps to clearly show 
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what types of choices generally face policy-makers in the carbon policy arena. 
However, as this thesis focuses on policy outcomes, and how choices influence 
the success of policy outcomes, it is now important to define exactly what these 
instrument tools are used to achieve.  
 
4.2.2 Carbon policy targets, ambitions, and goals   
The carbon policy taxonomy as explained above shows how individual policies 
can be gathered together in order to form deductions about the general means that 
governments use to create carbon policy. Whilst policy-makers in general attempt 
to create successful policy, meaning that their policy recommendations will cause 
lasting change, carbon policies have a much more specific end goal. Strong and 
weak ecological modernisation are specific strategies used to influence policy 
outcomes that are related to carbon. Yet what these specific outcomes are tend to 
be disjointed when looking amongst the various fields of economic, 
environmental, and political science literature. Instead, connecting these fields to 
form an encompassing understanding of what carbon policies should seek to 
achieve will also help to form a more solid understanding of the impacts that 
governments should be seeking to create today.   
 
When discussing targets in climate mitigation policy, a target generally refers to the 
emissions reductions levels that states look to achieve by a specific point in time 
(C2ES, 2016). A target can refer to the specific volume of emissions reductions 
needed (thereby representing a percentage of reduction), or it can indicate a 
volumetric level of carbon that is indicated by a year. For example, a country may 
look to reduce their emissions to 1997 levels by 2030. This could also be expressed 
in terms of percentage reductions, i.e. reducing the amount of carbon emitted by 
20%. The year to which the country intends to return is generally referred to as the 
baseline (Stern, 2007). The higher the goal, or further back the year in baseline, the 
more ambitious the target is. The combination of the baseline and target can be seen 
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as a governing bodies overall climate ambition, i.e. how by which year and by how 
many tonnes of carbon does an area seek to reduce? The higher the year or more 
intensive the carbon, the more ambitious the policy is likely to be. Although these 
quantitative goals should be used as a beginner indicator of monitoring progress on 
carbon mitigation, it would be also helpful to have qualitative goals to add alongside 
these am. However, this requires better understanding existing viewpoints that are 
currently used to define carbon policy success.   
 
From an economic perspective, the end goal of carbon policy can be considered a 
low-carbon economy. This end point was originally derived from a natural science 
perspective which states that human-induced climate change is happening and the 
only way to avoid the impacts is to move towards an economy that relies on a 
minimum amount of fossil fuel usage for economic production and consumption 
(Stern, 2007). From this perspective, the goals of a low-carbon policy are two-fold: 
first, to create market-based schemes that internalise the costs of greenhouse gas 
pollution, generally through a carbon emissions trading scheme or through a carbon 
tax (Stern, 2007).  This is based on the assumption that polluters should pay a price 
for the costs of their polluting activities. Secondly, the goals of a low-carbon policy 
have traditionally called for a dramatic increase in public spending on research into 
technologies and practices to mitigate pollution (Stern, 2007).  We can see how 
these definitions of success can match to specific policy tool dimensions, i.e. the 
economic perspective. However, this negates to include what the broader goals for 
society will be.  Although deploying new markets and technology seem to be a 
useful aspect of society, this standpoint is not useful if the correct people are not in 
place to know how to operate environmental markets, nor know which technologies 
are critical to the future. Therefore, success of a low-carbon economy should go 




Combining the economic viewpoint with the existing literature from a political 
science perspective helps to more holistically define carbon policy goals. Here, the 
definition for success tends to refer to “strong internationally-agreed reduction 
targets which lead to a significant increase in the price of polluting activities,” 
(Martin, 2006, p. 8). This perspective builds slightly on the economic dimension as 
defined above by adding in the stipulation for international policy agreements, 
therefore indicating that both a carbon trading scheme and/or tax are needed for 
success, yet so are international agreements on carbon emissions. However, this 
definition still leaves out the role of the individual. This perspective points to the 
role of both technology and institutions, yet leaves out what the role of general 
society should be when working towards a low-carbon future.   Instead, one can 
look towards a more sociological perspective in order to holistically understand 
what carbon policy success needs to more holistically entail.  
 
From the point of a sociologist, transitioning to a low-carbon society also requires 
“understanding [of] community practices and their resultant emissions, as well as 
the technologies, infrastructures, and institutions” that are associated with the 
transition to a low-carbon economy (Moloney, Horne, Fien, 2010, pp. 7615). 
Furthermore, a sociological perspective emphasizes understanding the connections 
between these components and emphasizes the importance in understanding the 
behavioural change that is necessary to influence a reduction in citizens’ 
environmental footprints.  This perspective champions the notion that success in 
carbon policy should include a society that is supportive and concerned with 
mitigating the risks that stem from climate change (Moloney, Horne, Fien, 2010, 
pp. 7614-7623).  
 
Therefore, when considering strong and weak ecological modernisation as 
strategies for change, one can conceptualize the end goal of ecological 
modernisation as more specific outcomes of success in carbon policy. One here can 
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see that economic instruments must be deployed. It is also evident that international 
agreements need to be considered a critical part of low-carbon policy success. Yet 
lastly, having a more informed and aware citizen base is also a critical success of 
carbon policy. Therefore, rather than thinking in fragmented terms, it would be 
better to view success of low-carbon policies in a manner that aggregates all three 
of these viewpoints. Success for a low-carbon economy should be defined as a 
society who has overall shifted towards an environmentally-conscious economy, 
where the cost of the carbon is accounted for either in a voluntary or regulated 
manner; where progress on emissions is monitored, reported, and revised in 
accordance with international demands; and where general citizens have the 
knowledge and capability to make decisions that will reduce their carbon impact on 
the environment. This thesis therefore adopts this notion and looks to see what type 
of strategy has been more effective in driving the institutional evolution of broader 
societies towards a more carbon-considerate economy.  
 
4.3 Research Design and Methods 
Locating and defining carbon policy within broader mitigation studies helps to 
differentiate the area of examination from adaptation studies. Yet doing so also 
shows how this research investigation provides insights useful to adaption studies. 
However, better defining and narrowing the focus of carbon studies within 
broader climate studies helps to form a more accurate base for comparison. The 
conceptual framework outlined above provides an analysis of the tools, or tools, 
that governments are able to use to address carbon policy. By gathering and 
examining the tools between the US and EU between 1992-2012, I can more 
clearly analyse if change in policy tools and a change in policy goals has occurred. 
This empirical analysis identifies where the location of the policy is proposed, 
(i.e., at what level and on behalf of which specific agency) and also the degree of 
ambition in the policy goals. This allows me to analyse if change has indeed 
occurred at the first two-levels needed to show that governing bodies are adapting 
to address climate change. The framework defined above organizes and locates 
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the carbon policy research area so I can identify if change has occurred in regards 
to the type of policy tools proposed and implemented, and also in regards to the 
degree of ambition for policy goals.  Paying particular attention to the diversity 
and innovation of the tools will allow me comment on how different ecological 
strategies impact these two types of changes. 
 
In order to fully understand the institutional changes that are needed to support 
societies as they move to address climate change, it is necessary also to compare 
the change in policy paradigms and changes in the role of the state. The empirical 
analysis of this dissertation will also give an indication of the change in actors and 
agencies that were responsible for implementing carbon policy.  This will allow 
me to identify if there has been a change in actors and responsibilities. By then 
moving to trace the evolution of these particular agencies, I can better understand 
the institutional changes that are needed to support increasingly innovative 
policies (as displayed by the EU). At the same time, doing so also helps to identify 
where institutional barriers may have blocked innovative policy from being 
proposed in the US.  However, in order to comment accurately on the paradigm 
shift needed to support climate mitigation goals, it is first imperative to get a clear 
understanding of how the ideas of ecological modernisation are able to impact 
change.   
 
4.4 Hypothesis  
There are several hypotheses that I will test within this thesis, but central to them 
all is the argument that climate change ideas have been a fundamental factor in 
driving the evolution of European institutional structures and norms. Knowing that 
leadership is a critical component of achieving climate mitigation goals, and 
therefore, creating carbon policy, this thesis therefore proposes that the set of ideas 
that the EU has adopted to use in carbon policy has been more fitting to the policy-
demands of climate mitigation policy in general. This thesis therefore focuses on 
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the EU as an intellectual leader and seeks to understand how the EU’s ideological 
approach to climate change has caused institutional changes.  I therefore, also 
propose that the US’s ideological approach to climate change has been insufficient 
for spurring domestic institutional change.  
 
I begin with the proposition that if strong ecological modernist ideas are prominent 
in the carbon policy arena, then one would expect these ideas to influence decisions 
taken at critical junctures to reflect an institutional, democratic, and communicative 
approach to climate change policy. As such, we can hypothesize that if a set of ideas 
that comprise strong ecological modernisation are present, and remain so, one 
would expect to see changes in the ambition of carbon policy goals. This would be 
due mainly to the assumption that strongly coordinated responsibilities for climate 
change reductions are more likely to result in meaningful changes than a bottom-up 
approach to carbon policy. My hypothesis mainly centres around the fact that having 
a coordinated and overarching commitment to carbon emissions reductions that is 
informed by international dimensions is more likely to result in ambitious policy 
simply due to the ease in coordination that I believe interacting with the UNFCCC 
causes. Carbon policy is a new topic, one that requires intensive monitoring to 
ensure institutions are adjusting at a rate that is sufficient for avoiding the negative 
impacts of climate change.  The difficulties in ensuring individual progress meets 
global standards is simply too taxing for individual governments to coordinate 
themselves. Instead, I suggest here that engaging with the UNFCCC has been 
critical in helping the EU to coordinate, monitor, and revise their reductions targets, 
which has led to its ensuing incremental changes.  This “top-down” approach, where 
the EU gets its information from the UN to form recommendations that are then 
given to its key stakeholders is a better approach for causing institutional adaptation 




Contrarily, I hypothesize that the bottom-up approach is simply too difficult for an 
individual nation to effectively address on their own. Here, I predict that the lack of 
coordination with the UNFCCC has resulted in a lack of understanding of climate 
change and its impacts as a whole in the US (mainly due to the lack of scientific 
engagement).  I estimate that taking a bottom-up approach means that climate 
change remains an environmental issue, not a societal issue, and instead, climate 
change then has to compete with other critical agenda items. Furthermore, I 
hypothesize that the weak approach the US has used has failed to cause 
organizational changes in the US government.  
 
Overall, the main hypothesis that I test refers to the coordination of information. My 
main hypothesis is that strong ecological modernisation is a much more effective 
set of ideas for tackling the complexity of climate change than a weak ecological 
modernist set of ideas is. I assume here that a strong approach leads countries to 
engage in the international arena, monitor their progress, and revise their institutions 
accordingly. With a weak idea my estimation is that countries engage in the 
international arena with little to no consistency in terms of their representation, fail 
to monitor progress, and instead, institutions remain stagnant as there is no 
convincing numerical case shown to broader governmental institutions. This is 
because without a clear agency to coordinate the data, different agencies will 
compete to manipulate data in a way that presents the best benefit for themselves. 
For instance, an environmental agency is likely to forecast that harsher reductions 
are needed whereas an energy agency may be more likely to recommend weaker 
targets and recommend instead, focusing on funding a new low-carbon technology. 
Part of my hypothesis rests on the suggestion that the US government is increasingly 
fractured in its decision-making and the need for a non-biased source to 
independently report on progress in the US. I surmise that US institutions are 
increasingly unable to form consensus on issues, and are less likely to do so on an 
environmental topic. I believe that the increasing partisanship of the US has made 
it difficult to address climate change, and a new set of ideas are needed to create a 
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convincing case as to why it is important for governments to immediately address 
climate change.   
 
My main hypothesis is that the EU has been able to create tangible, material 
evidence of its commitment to climate change due to the presence of strong 
ecological modernist ideas. I identify key actors that further moulded and promoted 
this idea, and examine how they framed policies so that all stakeholder groups saw 
some sort of economic benefit that could be derived from the environment. I 
specifically propose that the EU’s internal platform of support for strong ecological 
ideals helped the EU to demonstrate value for compliance with industry members, 
increase public support, and maintain engagement with scientific community 
members. I anticipate as a result of this extensive stakeholder interaction, the EU 
was able to propose an increasingly diverse array of tools for climate mitigation, 
and thus, change in the system occurred to support its goals. I hypothesize that the 
changing role of the state in the EU has led directly to the emergence of its 
institutional capabilities.  
Table 4: Predictions of the hypothesis 
Changes that 
countries must 







Change in policy 
ambition and goals  
Uses  international-levels of 
governance to inform 
decision-making; more 
ambitious policy results  
Continues to use fragmented 
domestic data to coordinate 
targets; clear targets for 
reductions do not form; 
ambition remains the same  
Change in policy 
tools 
Causes change in policy tools 
to occur: shows increasingly 
diverse array of tools or 
introduces new policy tools 
Does not incentivise change 
in policy tools: policy tool 
type remains the same, no 
new policy tools are 
introduced 
Change in policy 
goals  
Causes a change in policy 
goals (more ambitious goals 
and targets) 
Does not cause a change in 
policy goals (no change in 
ambition nor targets) 
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Change in the 
hierarchy of policy 
goals (moving from 
environmental to 
overarching strategy 
for development)  
Causes climate change to 
become a central story in 
economic development 
Climate change remains an 
environmental policy issue; 
competes with economic 
issues 
Changes in the role 
of the state 
(power/responsibility 
in decision-making 
allocated in regards to 
climate mitigation 
goals) 
Causes a change in the power 
allocation of climate change 
decision-making capabilities 
Does not cause a change in 
regards to power allocation 
for decision-making, failure 
to produce climate change 
policies and/or display 
effective carbon emissions 
reductions  
 
Contrarily, considering the US’s uncertainty in global emissions reductions efforts, 
one can also expect that the idea of weak ecological modernisation will fail to spur 
institutional adaptation and the achievement of climate goals in the US. Considering 
that this approach focuses on a technocratic and unitary approach to carbon policy, 
we can hypothesize that if this idea is present at critical junctures, it may be able to 
influence negotiations during the junctures, but it will not result in institutional 
changes. I expect that this idea fails to result in a change in the ambition of policy 
goals, which therefore, fails to spur the need for innovative policy tools. As a result, 
I expect that this idea will not lead to institutional structural changes, nor in the 
climate policy-paradigm in the US. I therefore test the notion that when such an idea 
is present, actors and governmental structures remain unchallenged, unimproved, 
and static. Instead, I hypothesize that this approach fails to produce institutional 
adaptation.   
Throughout the dissertation I also test specific sub-notions that all relate to the 
impact of the ideas of strong and weak ecological modernisation on the carbon 
policy process.  In the US, I speculate that there are specific governmental 
structures, and policy may block climate policy from becoming an agenda item in 
the US.  Overall, this research seeks to understand the differences in institutional 
changes that strong versus weak ecological modernist ideas have had on climate 
mitigation policy. This dissertation specifically seeks to understand and compare 
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the incremental changes in the US and the EU in order to understand the capabilities 
of American and European institutions in supporting societies as they adapt to 
address climate change. By focusing on the demands of international science as 
outlined at critical climate junctures, this thesis will also focus on analysing the 
large and incremental changes that are needed for institutional adaptation.  
 
Overall, this research will show the differences in institutional changes that strong 
versus weak ecological modernist ideas have had on climate mitigation policy. This 
dissertation specifically seeks to understand and compare the incremental changes 
in the US and the EU in order to understand the capabilities of American and 
European institutions in supporting societies as they adapt to address climate 
change. By focusing on the demands of international science as outlined at critical 
climate junctures, this thesis will also focus on analysing the large and incremental 
changes that are needed for institutional adaptation.  
 
4.5 Methodology  
Historical institutionalism provides a useful theoretical lens for understanding 
change in climate mitigation policy. This section outlines the research design and 
method used in this thesis. The hypothesis proposed requires a concrete analysis of 
institutional development over time. This will require both comparing and analysing 
empirical evidence related to carbon policy tools. Therefore, this thesis adopts 
comparative historical analysis as a method for understanding the substantive 
differences in the nature of carbon policy in the EU and the US.  
 
Comparative historical analysis, combined with an institutional lens, allows me to 
systemically examine the formation and influence of climate change ideas in the EU 
and US. In doing so, I can examine the causal affect that relates to the ideas, 
ambition, and goal levels put in place, compared to the actual outcomes of policy 
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achievement.  This lens mandates the analysis of actors’ capabilities as compared 
to policy-demands. Understanding the historical setting at the time lets me comment 
on how pre-existing notions and the overall economy can impact actors in the 
policy-arena. This methodological lens directs the investigation towards policy-
choices to understand how pre-existing bias influenced policy-decisions. Assessing 
the organisational changes and structural adjustments made to support the policy 
allows me to understand the degree to which ideas impacted change. However, this 
requires a concrete methodology to provide the reader with confidence in the 
conclusions drawn here.   
 
Combining the comparative historical analysis with most similar systems designs 
methods is useful for analysing two jurisdictions that exhibit such strong 
similarities, yet have ended up in such different places. Although the EU and the 
US are united in discussions within the UN, one has implemented a trading scheme, 
while the other has not developed a scheme or a tax. This method lets me focus on 
controlled variables of different ideas and examine how these influenced 
institutional path developments in relation to climate mitigation leadership pledges. 
Commencing with the investigations of the discussions that stemmed from the Earth 
Summit in 1992, and finalising with the expiration of the first carbon emission 
deadlines in 2012, this thesis will examine how divergent ecological modernist 
approaches contributed to specific instances of policy change. This will provide a 
more accurate understanding of how each of the systems responded to the new 
policy challenge of climate change. This will address the lack of qualitative 
understanding between climate change goals, carbon policy tools, and institutional 
design, as needed for effective carbon mitigation policies. 
 
Understanding the impact of ideas on policy-choices requires having an accurate 
analysis of how actors thought at specific times in history. I therefore, also use 
process tracing, and specifically the interview process, to better understand the 
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impact of ideas on policy-choices. By investigating the role of governmental 
structures, the influence of epistemic community members, and the role of non-
governmental organisations, I am able to understand both the influence of ideas and 
interests (or of individual actors and groups) on the policy-process. This allows me 
to gather a more in-depth analysis of how the pressure for change affects 
governmental systems differently, and also allows me to compare the capacities and 
capabilities of policy-makers in the US and EU in carbon policy.  
 
Analysing the notion of change through ecological modernisation points to specific 
dimensions that must be analysed in order to understand how a country is 
embedding environmental considerations into its development path; policy tools, 
policy goals, policy paradigms, and changing responsibilities of the state. The 
methods outlined below will provide the reader with a concrete understanding of 
how to locate, identify, and understand the degree to which ecological modernist 
ideas contributed to the institutional adaptation of the EU and the US.   
 
4.5.1 Comparative historical analysis 
The centrality of this research piece is the comparison of the EU and US.  At the 
beginning of a comparative investigation it is necessary to “develop a set of 
guidelines in which one is able to form a plausible deduction of the similarities and 
differences between societies,” (Gerring, 2011, p. 3).  Focusing on macro-societal 
aspects of social analysis, comparative politics are a useful method for evaluating 
transnational relationships (Gerring, 2004).  Despite not being a specific method of 
measurement, the deductions that result from comparative politics have often 
formed the basis for initial commentary needed for in-depth empirical research 
(Gerring, 2011). Often focusing on cross-societal, institutional, or macro aspects of 
politics, comparative politics have a methodological base ingrained in its very 
essence (Gerring, 2011).  This analysis naturally requires at least two areas to 
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compare in order deduce on the similarities or differences between two governing 
areas.   
 
Comparative analysis is a method of social science that when combined with a 
strong theoretical lens is able to produce hypotheses on the relationships that exist 
between nations, and on the internal dynamics that affect these relationships 
(Gerring, 2011).  Historical institutionalism naturally asserts variables that should 
be examined for their impact on the policy-process. Specifically, the theory 
mandates the analysis of actors, structures, and the historical context as initial 
variables for investigation.  This creates a holistic examination of how 
governmental structures react to mechanisms both internal and external to the 
policy-process.   
This analytical approach demands that this research takes into account the role of 
alternative options in the system to analyse the full landscape of decisions made by 
policy-makers (Lewis and Steinmo, 2012, pp.314-339).  By examining all of the 
decisions made in one policy area, one is then able to deduct hypothesis on the 
relationships that these factors have both on the policy process and on each other. 
In essence, one is then able to have a firm understanding of the functioning of a 
political system in its entirety. In focusing on only one of these aspects, one would 
have an isolated understanding of a policy catalyst, but lack an understanding on 
the fully functioning of the system itself.   By applying the theoretical lens of 
comparative historical analysis to the comparison of the EU and the US, the 
differences in institutional structures, in tool type, and in tool goals, are all included 
within my policy-analysis investigation.  
 
The comparative method I adopt therefore is comparative historical analysis. 
Comparative historical analysis is a specific method that should be used to focus 
on small number of areas for comparison, in order to allow the researcher to focus 
on specific differences between nations or states. Using this approach is most 
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useful when analysing areas that are, “unified in space and/or time” (Stark and 
Bruszt, 1998, as seen in Thelen, 1999, p. 95). Therefore, the choices of the EU and 
US are important as these cases are connected in a way that will allow me to draw 
deductions as to how the two areas have ended up in such dramatically different 
places in relation to carbon management.  
 
4.5.2 Embedded case studies   
For case studies to be most effective, they must offer a specific proposition, but 
must be linkable to a large context for the method to work the most effectively 
(George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 136-138). At the same time, it is most useful to look 
at cases that are structurally different, specifically when organisational differences 
may be the leading factor in the causal differences in path investigations (George 
and Bennett, 2005, pp. 136-138). The outcome of this project is to understand what 
mechanisms have been effective in implementing carbon policy, and what 
mechanisms have acted as a hindrance when attempting to implement CO2 
reductions policy. However, I would also like to be able to draw broader conclusions 
on the nature of adaptive capacity in the EU and the US.  To do so, I need to compare 
a governmental body that has implemented a formal low-carbon policy to a body 
that has not yet development a formal policy. The economic and societal 
construction of the areas must be similar, yet different enough that political culture 
differences can be investigated as a potential catalyst to change. I therefore, chose 
the US and the EU as they are both politically and culturally similar, but most, 
importantly, are similar as highly industrialized economies.   
 
The thesis therefore begins with an assumption that is asserted from historical 
institutionalism, which is that ideas matter. Particularity, I defend the notion that 
ideas are critically important to institutional change. I specifically analyse the 
impact that strong and weak ecological modernisation have had on the climate 
policy-processes in the EU and the US. I argue that the EU’s success in achieving 
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and implementing ambitious climate legislation is a result of the revision of 
development ideals in an aggressive manner, which has resulted in an overall 
institutional change in the notion of economic growth. Now, the EU has transitioned 
to fully embody strong ecological modernisation. The diffusion of this idea in the 
policy-arena has led directly to the success of legislation such as a CO2 trading 
scheme. Conversely, I aim to show how the stagnation of economic ideas, 
particularly the narrow approach to sustainable development as outlined in weak 
ecological modernisation, has failed to produce institutional change in the US. This 
has directly impacted the ability of the US to develop carbon goals at the federal 
level. In this thesis therefore, I will trace and compare the impact that weak and 
strong ecological modernism has had on the path to developing an emissions trading 
scheme from 1992, the first international conference on climate change, to the first 
evaluation of the EU ETS in 2012. Both 1992 and 2012 are observed, pivotal 
moments in both the international and domestic climate regimes of both the EU and 
the US. These twenty years give a clearly defined pathway for investigation through 
which I can clearly trace how divergent notions of ecological modernisation 
influence climate policy outcomes. Investigating the development of this particular 
policy tool over this time period allows me to understand how prior, existing, and 
changing notions of environment and economy impact the success of climate policy. 
This effectively allows me to understand how the concept of strong ecological 
modernisation translates into policy tools, and also allows me to analyse how 
institutions respond to the demand for change.  
 
I use the Method of Most Similar System’s Design as the major comparative 
strategy of my research. This method is useful because it allows for the comparison 
of similar areas, yet also helps to eliminate other factors that may be confusing or 
contradictory to the research design.  This method is generally used when 
comparing very similar cases that only seem to differ in dependent variables 
(George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 136-138). This allows the researcher to identify and 
examine which independent variables have directly influenced the dependent 
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variable. As the dependent variable in this investigation is the reduction of CO2, or 
the committal to a top-down climate policy, I use the structures identified in 
historical institutionalism as the independent variables in my investigation. At this 
point in the research, I then am able to initially deduct as to what may have caused 
differences in climate mitigation policy in the EU and US.  
 
4.5.3 Process-tracing in case-study comparisons 
Although the case study is useful in its application, it works the best when combined 
with qualitative, ethnographic, or process-tracing methods to draw truly innovative 
insights (Gerring 2004). I will therefore use the process-tracing method to ensure 
that the historical comparison leads to an in-depth analysis, and allows me to 
concretely give evidence on my proposed hypotheses. Seeking to understand the 
nature of change in regards to carbon policy in the US compared to the EU will let 
me make broad deductions on the entirety of the governing systems themselves, but 
process-tracing lets me draw more intricate conclusions as to the external sources 
that influence, and hinder, the development of effective climate mitigation policy.   
 Process tracing was first developed in the 1980's in accordance with the case-study 
method to ensure that accurate findings on processes were being determined when 
drawing qualitative conclusions within political science (George and Bennett, 
2005). It is a method that is specifically tailored to support and investigate the 
process of decision-making by addressing gaps in existing historical accounts 
(George and Bennett, 2005).  Process tracing has been noted for its advantage in 
exploring the causal processes; in this instance, it is useful for exploring the impact 
of ideas on broader climate policy ambitions. This method “attempts to trace the 
links between possible cases and observed outcomes", so that specific deductions 
can be made as to what caused the variation in outcomes to occur (Bennett and 
George, 2005, p. 6). The goal of process tracing is to analyse information about 
specific events and processes.  
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Process tracing works by extracting all of the observable implications of a 
hypothesis, instead of only the observable outcomes that can be drawn from the 
dependent variable, and verifying them through elite data or interviews (George and 
Bennett, 2005). The method "frequently involves the analysis of political 
developments at the highest level of government; elite actors will thus often be used 
for critical sources of information about the political process under interest," 
(Tansey, 2007, p. 4). Process tracing works best when the key political actors within 
the policy-process are identified through these initial empirical documents so that 
their involvement in the process can be verified through tracing methods (George 
and Bennett, 2005). These actors interact with the policy-process through formal 
institutions. Therefore, a critical component of this methodology is identifying 
actors who are involved in the policy-process and examining recorded interviews 
and personal documents from these various sources. As such, this thesis will 
investigate the role of actors from the epistemic community, nongovernmental 
organisations, and industry organisations, in order to understand how weak and 
strong ecological modernism contributed or impeded policy success at specific 
instances in time. 
  
Weak and strong ecological modernisation are to a certain extent, ideas that are 
more often described rather than specifically referred to in the carbon policy arena. 
Therefore, finding existing material that relates to both topics is difficult. Instead, 
developing relationships with the actors identified in the empirical research will 
help to further substantiate my hypotheses on the impact of ideas in the American 
and European policy arenas.  
 
4.6 Research Methods to Generate and Analyse Data  
To begin identifying how independent variables affected the construction of policy 
changes, it was first necessary to formulate a clear understanding of the dependent 
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variable, or the degree of change made thus far within carbon emissions reductions. 
The empirical data collection in my research helped me to validate my initial 
hypothesis by comparing when specific quantitative reductions occurred, against 
when the specific policy tools, or events, occurred over time. This allowed me to 
test and compare the first two dimensions of change that are required for ecological 
modernisation: change in policy goals, and change in policy tools. From there, I 
used process tracing to better understand how specific instances hindered or helped 
broader ecological modernisation adaptation.  
 
4.6.1 Documentary data analysis   
I initially gathered empirical evidence from the EU first.  I collected green papers, 
or policy discussion proposals, which helped to identify the actors who initially 
propose policy. These documents, which are produced for specific policy actions, 
list which specific actors propose policy and what the policy objectives are. This 
gave me a clear understanding of why policy is proposed, and also by whom. 
Therefore, this phase initially helped to identify specific actors that I was later able 
to interview and trace.  At the same time, this also helped to clearly show which 
policy pieces were proposed so that I was then able to see if they were implemented. 
This was useful for identifying which motions were denied, so that I could focus on 
identifying the concrete legislative items that were successful in passing.  
 
When actual legislation is passed in the EU, there are two types of legislation that 
may result: directives and regulations. Directives must be incorporated in Member 
State law, whereas regulations are immediately legally binding in all member states 
(Weale, 1992 pp. 594-611). The US has a similar process; policy is proposed in 
bills, and policy that is implemented becomes law. However, the U’s process is 
complicated, with many specific caveats and rules that can be used for blocking and 
passing policy. The intricacies that specifically affect carbon policy will be 




Therefore, by comparing policy proposals to policy that was actually implemented, 
I am able to see how suggested policies were able to gain authority and credibly 
turn into actual law. In doing so, I also can also see which proposals were not turned 
into legislation, and thus, identify key problematic moments along the policy 
pathway. I then analyse the impact of ideas at these specific moments with a variety 
of stakeholders.  Here, I specifically sought to understand how broader events, ideas 
on ecological modernisation, and rules and structures have changed over time.  
 
In order to break down the collected material, I divide the amount of material 
collected into two decades. From here, I then divide the tools according to tool 
typology as outlined in the conceptual framework. Combined with historical 
institutionalism’s natural methodological framework, I was able to identify specific 
moments where I believed these ideas influenced decisions-taken in the policy 
process.  
 
Table 5: example empirical data collection 
Type of tool Tool aims and 
ambition 
Location of Tool 
Proposed 
Action taken 




Reducing target rates 
for industries 
producing outside the 
EU, with a focus on 
motor vehicles. CO2 
emissions of vehicles 
produced in 2012 to 
be no more than 130 
g/km.  







The original identification of these moments, or critical junctures, depended very 
much on the thoroughness of my empirical research. By surveying archival records 
during the time period of investigation, I could better locate and understand the 
viewpoints of key groups, and to identify specific individuals within them. News 
sources, such as press releases and archived broadcasts, were surveyed to 
understand the existing tensions between of domestic actors, and in their interaction 
in the international climate arena.  This helped me better formulate an initial 
understanding as to why certain instances may have been important along the 
pathway, or to question why a specific event led to a policy-failure for instance.  
 
This dissertation therefore focuses on examining the domestic responses to 
international climate proposals at four different critical junctures; the 1992 UNCED 
conference on sustainable development; the Kyoto Protocol in 1997; the 2001 
Marrakesh Accords; and the 2009 Copenhagen Conference. Each of these time 
periods mark instances in which I believe the EU’s ideas of strong ecological 
modernisation helped European policy-makers choose effective carbon policy tools. 
I believe that these instances also show how similar proposals in the US show how 
a weak approach to ecological modernism was ineffective in creating the incentive 
to address climate change, and thus, failed to produce policy innovation. These 
specific moments highlight the obstacles that climate mitigation policies face in 
existing American institutions, but also highlight how the critical organisational 
adjustments made within European institutions were influenced directly by 
ecological ideas.  
 
4.6.2 Interview Methods  
Personally engaging with experts in the policy-process adds to the uniqueness of 
the insights that are drawn in this conclusion. Developing relationships with the 
actors identified in the empirical research helps to further substantiate my 
hypotheses on the impact of ideas in the American and European policy arenas. 
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However, drawing accurate conclusions requires interviewing policy actors in a 
manner that ensures the information drawn from them is both accurate and 
plausible.  
 
Interviewing can be defined as a conversation between two people in which one 
person tries to direct the conservation to get information for a specific purpose 
(Bryman, 1984, pp. 75-92). Different interview types have different strengths and 
purposes in research. Bryman (1984) divides interviews into three main types: 
structured, semi-structured and unstructured analysis. Semi-structured interviews 
are said to be the most appropriate method when it is the aim of a researcher to 
understand the concepts that the interviewees use as a basis for their opinions and 
beliefs about a particular matter or situation (Bryman, Lewis-Beck, and Liao, 2004).  
As such, I use semi-structured interviews for the primary data collection purpose of 
this dissertation. I chose this technique as it allows the researcher to probe deeper 
into a specific instance if necessary, yet it is noted for keeping the responses of 
interviewees comparable.  
 
One aim of semi-structured interviews is to develop an understanding of a 
respondents ‘world’ so that the researcher can make effective deductions on 
research, but also then contribute to the field of knowledge itself.  A major part of 
my research has been keeping “close to this world”, and maintaining professional 
engagement with these policy-makers. At the same time, maintaining my academic 
research has forced me to retain knowledge of the literary and policy developments 
in this filed.  I have developed an extensive understanding of the existing gaps in 
the understanding of change within both European and American institutions. 
Therefore, I direct interview conversations in a manner that ensures that the 
conclusions that I am drawing are presenting new contributions to the field of 
knowledge. Although much is known about the EU achieving climate leadership, 




I structure the interviews with the aim to conduct analysis with a variety of 
stakeholders. This helps me to build a holistic understanding of how ideas have 
impacted how experts made policy decisions in both the EU and the US. At the 
same time, my professional engagement in the policy world allows me to 
comfortably test the actors’ responses to notions that I know go against their 
personally held notions of either a strong or weak ecological modernist mentality; 
this allows me to counter-test any findings that I develop as I go through the 
interview process.  
 
To ensure that the information I collect is accurate, comparable, and analysed 
effectively, I have adopted Grounded Theory (GT) as a specific tool for the analysis 
of the qualitative data gathered in the interview process.  Grounded theory uses 
theoretical sampling, where participants are selected according to criteria specified 
by the researcher. I began this research project with theoretical hypotheses, which 
meant that I already had key factors to test in my interview process- mainly, that 
institutions in the EU were driven by the idea of strong ecological modernisation. 
The theoretical testing however, is substantiated by early empirical evidence in 
order to clearly identify specific individuals, locations, and instances where strong 
and weak ecological modernisation impacted institutional change.  
 
Data collection and analysis in this thesis takes place in alternating sequences. This 
process can also be described as an interactive cycle of inductive and deductive data 
collection, in that it continuously compares results with new findings (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1994, pp. 273-285). Although I conduct the interview processes together, 
some are conducted earlier than others, which means that I am able to update my 
questions and then revisit certain interviewees with information collected in earlier 
interviews.    
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Table 6: interview methods 
 
 
The early empirical and theoretical evidence therefore indicated that the following 
types of individuals are influential on carbon policy.  This includes actors from:  
1. Academia, specifically ecological economists  
2. Intergovernmental organisations 
3. Nongovernmental organisations  
4. Lobbyists  
5. Industry representatives  
Within each of these dimensions, I identified key expert members that participated 
in the creation of carbon policy. This was facilitated through my personal 
professional experience in the carbon policy arena, in both the EU and the US. I 
worked to make sure the interviewees I worked with represented a diverse range of 
participants. These interviews represent academic, policy, industry, and scientific 
expertise on the topic of ecological modernisation, sustainable development, and 
emissions trading schemes. This helped me to form a well-balanced understanding 
of the various sources of influence on the policy-process in the EU and US, and 
helped to develop a wide-variety of original information (The full list of 




My questions are added to and amended while conducting the interviews, in order 
to ensure that more sophisticated and specific findings are tested along the way. 
Highlights of this process include conversations with noted climate economists and 
policy-makers such as Dr. Dirk Forrister, CEO of the International Emissions 
Trading Association and Kyoto Protocol negotiator for the US government, former 
DG Energy Joan MacNaughton, Senior Climate Fellow of the Brookings Institute 
Dr. Tim Boersma, and a leading academic economist on carbon markets, Dr. Robert 
Stowe of Harvard Economics, amongst others.  
 
The questions I pose seek to understand the primary conceptualisation of European 
and American carbon policy, and to concretely identify what acted as a practical 
policy driver for carbon policy in the EU compared to the US.  The interviews also 
help to verify the specific junctures that I use for comparing specific instances of 
institutional change.   
 
In order to ask questions that shed light on the concept of ecological modernisation, 
it is first necessary to confirm the familiarity of the notion of the concept with the 
interview participant. I began the interview process by first attempting to locate 
carbon policy within a specific “policy sphere” of sustainable development. This 
meant understanding and verifying differences in the conceptualisation of the 
concept in the EU and the US. For instance, with European actors I began by 
questioning if the approach to sustainable development was limited to a sole 
institution or broader European institutions. Contrarily, in the US I began my 
questions by asking if regulatory structures or the free-market were more likely to 
result in ecological considerations in the economy. Following this, I kept the 
interview rather open ended but focused the questions on analysing the role of 




Conducting the interviews in this manner served three main purposes for my 
research. First, this allowed me to eliminate the distortion of only one variable on 
institutional adaptation.  Secondly, this allowed me to test each of the notions 
associated with strong and weak ecological modernisation, to truly verify if strong 
and weak modernisation were in fact the ideas at the time, even if the interviewee 
was not familiar with this specific terminology.  Thirdly, this allowed me to connect 
various sources of influence to particular instances in time across various 
interviewees. I concluded my interview process by asking interviewees to identify 
specific junctures in which they saw progress or hindrance in the policy process. 
This allowed me to then diver further analytically into specific instances with other 
interviewees.  
 
Bias is always an issue in research, but as the interviews in this thesis are conducted 
in order to understand how an idea impacted either the EU or the US, a fair of 
amount of bias is removed in that my questions seek to understand ‘how’ not ‘why’.  
In addition, each interviewee was selected based on their renowned expertise in the 
field and therefore, was chosen for their unique capabilities and for the lack of 
political bias they exhibit in the field. Finally, as this topic is political, it is nearly 
impossible to remove all traces of bias, yet by specifically seeking to interview 
people who were from the international climate arena, and external from the EU and 
the US, I am able to collect the thoughts of people who naturally would not be 
interested in shedding biased light on the EU or the US.  These external interviewees 
are chosen for their expertise in ecological modernisation, but also for their 
interaction in the formal and informal decision-making processes in the 
international carbon policy arena.  
 
4.6.3 Participant observation  
Elite actors can be difficult to develop relationships with, and the interview process 
very much depends on these relationships, it was necessary for me at times to 
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instead attend lectures, where my questions could be addressed in an open forum. I 
was able to attend three conferences by invitation-only which allowed me to collect 
the viewpoints of three ultra-elite experts in the field. The first, Energy Day in 
Germany September 2015, featured a two-hour discussion on the EU ETS and 
featured only German economists, who are noted for their place in European climate 
policy; these included Martin Jänicke for instance, as well as industry members 
from BASF, Siemens, and RWE, EU Energy Commission Günther Oettinger, State 
Secretary Rainer Baake from the Federal Economics Ministry, and also Dr. Jos 
Delbeke, who was a key actor in my dissertation. I was able to informally ask 
questions, as I was an audience member, and was also able to speak with many of 
them briefly in regards to the EU ETS afterwards.  
 
Prior to COP2015, I was invited to attend the LSE Pre-COP Conference where I 
heard panel discussions from many of the key authors that were noted in the 
empirical evidence as influential on EU carbon policies. Specifically, Lord Nicholas 
Stern was present in addition to Dr. Dieter Helm, Dr. Cameron Hepburn, and Dr. 
Giles Atkinson. All three of these ecological economists featured in the policy-
documents analysed. The panel provided a useful discussion on the key changes 
made in the EU, as well as providing insights as to how the EU’s climate mitigation 
can better be strengthened in the future.  
 
In December 2015, I attended COP as a representative acting as an official “blue 
badged” governmental representative. Here, I was able to attend the confidential 
governmental meetings that discussed carbon markets, and the obstacles in creating 
global mitigation policies. I was able to discuss the incremental steps in developing 
climate mitigation policy with governmental officials, and was given restricted 
access to conversations that would have otherwise been difficult to collect 
information from. Here, Dr. Dirk Forrister lectured in the US tent on the need for 
an emissions trading scheme in the US, and the complications in passing a carbon 
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tax, with Dr. Robert Stowe and Dr. Joseph Aldy.  This gave me a better 
understanding of the key obstacles in the US, but also provided me with first-hand 
accounts on the relationship between climate, environment, and economic policy in 
the US.  
 
4.7 Conclusion  
Historical institutionalism provides a solid theoretical lens for understanding the 
dynamic interaction between structures, norms, and society that is needed for 
institutional change. Taking weak vs. strong ecological modernisation as two 
central ideas allows me to compare and analyse the differences in impact that ideas 
have on climate mitigation goals.  Historical institutionalism also provides a more 
dynamic understanding of how the various factors that influence climate mitigation 
policy interact with each other. The setting and norms of society are a difficult 
aspect of climate mitigation policy to analyse, yet they are a critical component in 
understanding the success and failure of policy proposals and tool implementations.  
By using this lens, I can better systemically analyse the changing role of institutions 
in promoting the coordination needed for achieving ambitious climate goals.  
 
Applying this institutional lens to the methodological framework outlined above 
provides a better understanding of the interaction between many of these variables, 
and also in their interaction over time, thereby providing a more thorough analysis 
of the nature of incremental change in the EU and the US. Through the conceptual 
framework I was able to identify the types of policy-tools that can be implemented 
within carbon policy; the methods outlined above give an understanding of how 
these aspects are analysed in this thesis. These processes allow me to test my 
hypothesis in ways which otherwise would have been impossible to substantiate.  
The empirical evidence collected will defend the notion that the EU has had more 
success in making the incremental changes that are needed to support the 
development of climate mitigation policy; however, the interview process will 
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provide unique evidence as to how a weaker version of ecological modernisation 
actually impacts the institutional evolution of the US.  Now, this research piece 
moves to provide the empirical substance of this dissertation, and to analyse the 
impact that divergent notions of ecological modernisation have had on carbon 
policy tool type, ambitions, and success.   
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Chapter 5:  Examining change in policy ambitions, tools, and 
goals in European carbon policy from 1992-2012 
This dissertation as a whole seeks to analyse the impact of divergent notions of 
ecological modernisation on the transition towards a low-carbon economy. As 
shown by the theoretical framework of this thesis, a governing area must display 
five dimensions of change in order to show they are adequately supporting societies 
as they adjust to climate change: change in policy ambitions, change in policy tools, 
change in policy goals, change in the role of the state, and also change in the 
hierarchy of policy goals. The next two chapters of this dissertation focus on 
analysing the impact that both strong and weak ecological modernisation have had 
on spurring the first three types of change, or change in policy ambitions, tools, and 
goals.   This chapter specifically focuses on the EU and its set of strong ecological 
modernist ideas to show how taking an institutional and top-down approach to 
climate change policies has positively benefited the evolution of European carbon 
policy.  
 
This chapter begins with an analysis of the carbon policy ambition and goals in 
1992. It then moves to organise and group the policy tools proposed and 
implemented over the next twenty years into the four main categories of tools as 
described in the carbon policy taxonomy: economic, voluntary, cooperative, and 
regulatory. The analysis is divided into two time periods to help break up the density 
of policy tools analysed. These periods are divided by decade, from 1992-2000 and 
from 2001-2012, to clearly show how change has occurred. In doing so, this chapter 
shows how the set of ideas that the EU has approached carbon policy with resulted 
in continuously more diverse and ambitious policy tools. This chapter identifies not 
only the types of legislation that was proposed, but also those that were struck down. 
In doing so, this part of the thesis helps to identify the critical actors and institutional 
structures that may have helped or hindered the implementation of carbon policy in 
the EU.   By the end of this chapter, the reader will have a firm understanding of 
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how the ideas of strong ecological modernisation impacted change in the type, 
nature, and ambition of carbon policy in the EU from 1992-2012.   
 
5.1 European climate mitigation policies from 1992-2000 
The time period from 1992-2000 is where one can first concretely identify the 
impact of the EU’s strong ecological modernist ideas on its carbon policy. Looking 
at this time period shows the EU moving away from traditional command and 
control approaches used previously, towards the creation of a shared environmental 
responsibility amongst member states, governments, industry and European citizens 
alike (CEC, 1998).  It is during this time period where the EU first recognised that 
“a possible way to meet climate targets would be to develop cost-effective policies 
and measures across all sectors and gases,” to achieve its part of responsibilities as 
required by the KP (CEC, 1998, p.4).  When looking at this time period one can see 
how the EU’s strong ecological modernist approach led the EU towards the 
implementation of policy tools that addressed the social, environmental, and 
economic dimensions of climate mitigation. This was the first time period where 
the EU set out clear objectives, targets, and time frames for European climate 
mitigation policy. The EU first used targets for a variety of sectors, to “help define 
the responsibility for a sector and thereby provide a useful yardstick to monitor 
progress and to mobilise political action,” (COM. 1998, p.1). Although the EU did 
not officially launch numerical targets until later in this period, it was during this 
time period where the EU first committed towards the development of official 
carbon reductions.  
 
5.1.1 Ambitions and goals of carbon policies from 1992-2000 
The major goals of the EU at this time were to create a strong mitigation policy, one 
that met the recommendations of international standards at the time. Building upon 
international discussions, the intentions of the EU at this time were to address CO2 
through an economic tool (CEC, 1998). Although the specific tool was not yet 
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decided, the EU recognised that addressing climate change would require 
engraining economic value within environmental considerations (CEC, 1998).  A 
critical component of the EU’s commitment to the UNFCCC was ensuring that the 
EU developed its policies alongside the scientific recommendations as outlined in 
the KP, which were -8% reductions with a baseline year of 1990 (Protocol,1997). 
Therefore, the EU's first major goal was to shift climate change policies from being 
solely an environmental concern, to become a community-wide policy issue. The 
idea of strong ecological modernisation emphasised taking an integrated approach 
to carbon policy formation amongst all European institutions. Therefore, during this 
time period, the EU looked to provide European decision-makers with a firm 
understanding of the risks and opportunities associated with forming a carbon policy 
in the EU. As such, the EU’s first internal goal during this time was to create a level 
playing field where all European member states were equal in environmental 
standards. As such, a major part of this period focused on addressing ways to 
remove differences in environmental compliance amongst both member states and 
industry groups (Jordan, 2005, pp. 142-184). 
 
The EU’s institutional approach towards carbon policies emphasized taking an 
aggressive stance on the need for carbon emissions reductions across all European 
member states. Reflecting the EU’s democratic decision-making approach of strong 
ecological modernisation, this time period used many types of policy tools to help 
create a dialogue amongst both industry members and private citizens in order to 
identify how the most cost-effective, yet impactful, emissions reductions policy 
tools (CEC, 1998).  In this manner, the EU's approach to carbon policy began with 
intensive stakeholder engagement that encouraged broader behavioural awareness 




5.1.1.1 Informational tools from 1992-2000   
When looking at the informational tools that the EU used during this time period, 
one is able to see the impact that strong ecological modernisation had on the 
diversity of policy tools that were implemented at this time. The heavy emphasis on 
informational tools as seen below is very different to the solely economic and 
cooperative approach than was used US at this time. Communication was at the 
centre point of the EU’s approach, and as such, many of the tools that were put in 
place were used to inform the broader community of the benefits of carbon 
compliance (COM, 2005a). These tools targeted specific aspects of daily life for 
civilians and industry members. Informational measures at this time reflected a 
strong ecological approach in that they sought to broaden citizen awareness, create 
a dialogue amongst industry members and society, and to also disseminate incorrect 
information in relation to climate change. By combining these measures with 
economic tools, the EU was able to create a civilian knowledge base that was aware 
of, and later supportive of, climate change mitigation and its adverse effects on the 
natural environment. These tools provided information on the energy footprint of 
goods, appliances, and automobiles.  
 
Informational tools can be seen as a complimentary crux to many of the economic 
instruments that were put in place during this time period. Tools like the JOULE 
Programme, Thermie, SAVE and the Altener Programme are examples of joint 
informational and economics measures that the EU took to promote the 
development of non-polluting, alternative energy sources and to improve energy 
efficiency (COM, 2005a). These were specially created to increase efficiency 
measures across heavy industrial emitters, and to promote the benefits of 
environment-friendly transport and other green transport infrastructures (COM, 
2005a).  The EU used these specific tools to show how clear economic savings could 
be gained through energy efficiency increases, thereby reiterating the “win-win” 




The SAVE programme II is exceptionally noteworthy as an example of an 
informational tool that worked to increase the broader societal support of CO2 
reductions. The SAVE Programme was originally the primary focus of the EU’s 
non-technical tools used to increase energy efficiency, but during this time period it 
became a central pillar through which the EU was able to construct solid industrial 
and societal support for adhering to more efficient energy practices (Council 
Decision 91/565/CEE.) The second phase of the programme, built to last five years 
with a 150-million-euro budget, combined the Electricity End Use Programme 
(PACE) and the Regional and Urban Management Programme (PERU) into one 
combined umbrella. SAVE II was created to promote energy efficiency and 
encourage energy-saving behaviour in industry, commerce, transport and the 
broader European public through labelling and standardisation, as well as 
dissemination measures (COM, 1996, 737). Reflecting the strong ecological 
approach again, this measure helped to shift data collection responsibilities amongst 
agencies to report on energy consumption directly to the DG Enviro.  
 
The ALTENER programme contained informational measures that promoted the 
market for renewable energy sources and their integration into the internal energy 
market (COM, 2000, 87). This programme is an example of the truly democratic 
approach to strong ecological modernisation that the EU undertook. This tool 
helped to prepare Central and Eastern European member states begin cooperating 
on the development of a European carbon policy.  The programme was intended to 
help create the necessary, "legal, socio-economic and administrative conditions for 
the implementation of a Community plan for renewables and furthermore, to 
encourage private and public investments in the production and use of energy from 
renewable sources," (COM, 2000, 87, p. 1) This programme created various projects 
to teach citizens the importance of environmental considerations in daily life in 
Central and Eastern European member states.  Measures for dissemination in 
regards to incorrect climate information were a critical component of this 
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programme, and helped to keep European carbon discussions on track with 
international expectations at the time.   This set of tools encouraged the exchange 
of experience and practises amongst member states, and moved the EU towards the 
“establishment of a centralised system for collecting, prioritising, and circulating 
information," relating to carbon (COM, 2000).  
 
5.1.1.2 Regulatory tools from 1992-2000 
Regulatory tools made up a strong component of the EUs initial climate mitigation 
strategy, although the nature of these tools is slightly less regulatory than one would 
expect. Although strong ecological modernisation generally falls on the spectrum 
of weak sustainability, one can see here a major difference between American and 
European carbon policies. Whilst the US was encouraging the cooperative 
participation of industries at this time, the EU took a firm standpoint that 
environmental regulations were to be imposed across all European member states, 
and used this time period to create a legal foundation that would later allow the EU 
to penalise member states who did not comply with CO2 reductions. Regulatory 
goals were put in place to ensure industry compliance with climate targets early on, 
yet this initial time period did not feature any monetary penalties that were levied 
against individual member states nor firms. Instead, this time period used regulation 
as a warning signal towards the rest of European industries and citizens would 
become accustomed to carbon mitigation penalties. Although informational 
instruments sought to create a win-win dialogue between broader European 
stakeholders, the strong ecological approach still took a firm stance that central 
coordination and regulation was needed to achieve ambitious climate goals.  
 
The development of numerical targets for emissions reductions themselves should 
be considered as regulatory tools at this time. Although the EU only committed to 
developing carbon goals in 1992, by 1997 the EU had committed its members to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 8% by 2012 compared to levels in 1990 
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(Protocol, 1997). The EU then moved to set targets according to each member state's 
relative wealth at the time. The reductions ranged from an emissions reduction of 
28% for Luxembourg to an increase of 27% for Portugal, showing how emission 
rates would vary depending on various stages of development (CEC, 2006). This 
included giving Eastern European countries room for increasing emissions, whilst 
creating ambitious targets for those member states that were more economically 
development. Countries that needed to decrease their emissions immediately were 
given guidelines for industry energy usage, and were asked to increase the usage of 
energy efficient technologies within industrial operations (CEC, 2006).  Countries 
that were allowed to emissions rates were instead given guidelines for transitioning 
their industries to cleaner methods of productions (CEC, 2006). These targets thus 
also acted as guidelines for industries by providing them with a direct correlation of 
information on energy consumption within industrial and economic growth.    
 
Imposing basic targets for regulations on the amount of energy used in economic 
growth helped the EU to create a strong base where it could later move towards a 
stricter regulatory nature within future climate mitigation efforts. During this time 
period, the EU transitioned away from being a solely regulatory body and moved 
towards creating a more collaborative atmosphere between the private and public 
sectors. The EU recognised that regulatory tools could be seen as burdensome and 
recommended that their use going forward should be used in conjunction with 
economic policy tools. 
 
5.1.1.3 Cooperative tools from 1992-2000 
Taking an institutional wide approach to climate change policies during this period 
meant that carbon policy tools included not just environmental policy instruments, 
but also a significant amount of energy policy instruments. As such, renewable 
energy integration became a main area of cooperation between government and 
industry members. Reflecting the democratic approach of strong ecological 
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modernisation, cooperative agreements made up a strong component of policy tools 
in the EU from 1992-2000. These tools are policy mechanisms that work between 
government and industry members to develop policies that both maintain 
environmental protection, but also to help support economic growth (Howlett, 2005, 
pp. 31-50).  During this time period, cooperative tools were put in place to help 
provide financial support and economic incentives to transition industries towards 
more efficient production methods (Lenschow, 2005, pp. 305-327). The EU 
recognised that to develop sustainably, it would need to address “the operation of 
the energy market via more efficient use of existing tools, and by an overall balance 
of fuels on the market,” (COM 1998, p .23). To do this, the EU created subsidies 
and tax breaks which would incentivise the broader usage of renewable energy 
sources (COM, 1993). This included supporting industry in increasing the usage of 
renewable energy resources, but also in increasing funding in research and 
development.  
 
The most apparent use of cooperative tools between industry and government can 
be seen in the transportation industry (Jordan et al, 2007, pp. 283-298). The EU 
realised that a majority of its goods were imported, which required long 
transportation routes, and as such, automobiles contributed towards a large portion 
of emissions rates. The EU therefore worked to identify how to best incentive the 
production of more efficient vehicles (Jordan et al, 2007, pp. 283-298). Voluntary 
commitments were made with automobile producers to reduce CO2 by 25%, 
therefore requiring the efficiency of automobiles in general to be increased (Jordan 
et al, 2007,  pp. 283-298). This increase was possible as the automobile industry had 
failed to come up with it had promised in the voluntary agreements made in 
preceeding years (Jorden et al, 2007, pp. 238-298).  In addition, the EU deployed 
economic tools alongside cooperative agreements to help support industry members 
in producing the next generation of technologies that were needed to increase 
efficiency in automobiles and thus, transition the overall transport network that was 




European enlargement during this time period required even further collaboration 
between industry and governmental members to ensure the EU was creating a 
European-wide approach to carbon management (Hicks, 2004, pp. 216-233). With 
discussions leading to the introduction of more countries into the European 
community, the EU recognised industries in new member states would need support 
in adhering to the new regulatory guidelines on emissions rates (Hicks, 2004, pp. 
216-233). In addition to the informational tools that the EU used amongst member 
states, it also worked to deploy cooperative agreements that acted as technology 
transfers between various European nations (Hicks, 2004, pp. 216-233). Here, the 
EU specifically used these agreements in a strategic manner that identified and 
recommended specific areas of collaboration that would help to address gaps in 
technology standards across the EU (Hicks, 2004, pp. 216-233). These measures 
helped to financially compensate countries that needed to research or deploy more 
innovative measures than were previously existing in Eastern Europe. By working 
between member states to broker technology transfer agreements, the EU was able 
to help further the idea of a level playing field amongst European member states, 
regardless of the year of entry into the EU.     
 
5.1.1.4 Economic tools from 1992-2000 
The economic tools put in place during this period show how the EU’s strong 
ecological approach still emphasized a sound economic base to carbon 
management. The economic tools put in place from 1992-2000 were used to address 
inefficiencies created by pollution by incorporating the external cost of pollution 
onto business-as-usual activities (Jordan et al, 2007, pp. 283-298). These tools 
worked by placing direct costs on production processes, or on the actual end product 
cost itself (Jordan et al, 2007, pp. 283-298). In this way, the EU began to create 
value for firms in both pollution abatement and pollution prevention processes. 
These tools also helped transition industry members into using renewable energy, 
but also in encouraging power plants to produce more renewable energy for the 
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general public (Directive, 2001/77). The EU at this stage provided direct funds, tax 
breaks and technology standards to large producers of power to help increase overall 
efficiency in both production and in the private lives of EU citizens.  In this way, 
the economic tools put into place at the time period helped to also support the more 
robust deployment of cooperative tools put in place.  
 
 
As the strong ecological modernist approach reflected a community-wide approach 
to carbon policy in the EU, it had to guarantee that the tools they were using at the 
time were the most efficient and useful for overall governance for the EU (Kosonen 
and Nicodème, 2009, pp. 1-33). At the same time, creating a broader value for 
society seemed to require much more than the traditional economic instruments like 
taxes or subsidies. Instead, the economic instruments during this time period 
showed the EU shifting towards a more ecologically-driven society. Economic 
instruments like the Cost-Benefit Analysis Mechanism (CBAM) mandated that 
projects and policies in the EU should include both environmental and economic 
factors in traditional cost-benefit analysis (Kosonen and Nicodème, 2009, pp. 1-33). 
Now, policy-makers were required to include a price for the environment to weigh 
against the economic benefits proposed by all policy decisions (Kosonen and 
Nicodème, 2009, pp. 1-33).   
 
The CBAM helped the EU to ensure the environment was being considered in all 
project developments, both in the present and future. However, again reflecting a 
strong ecological approach, the EU moved to further institutionalise the value of the 
environment through climate mitigation policies in the EU.   The Competiveness 
Effects of Environmental Tax Reforms Programme (COMETR) COMETR helped 
to stabilise the broader market by making sure that firms and countries that included 
environmental costs in project and policy proposals were rewarded in broader 
financial compliance (Andersen et al, 2007).  The measures included in this 
initiative focused on evolving normal accounting measures from standard financial 
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considerations into including all factors related to environmental impact; 
specifically, towards including a carbon price (Andersen et al, 2007). Before the 
initiative was created, accounting measures simply included measures related to 
financial numbers, and did not include a cost for environmental consumption 
(Andersen et al, 2007). This set of tools required European firms to include non-
financial information about economic performance, and specifically to disclosure 
their environmental impact as part of traditional financial disclosure practices 
(Andersen et al, 2007). In doing so, the EU moved towards green accounting 
standards, therefore moving away from traditional accounting measures towards 
standards that reflected a value for the environment.  
 
Including environmental impacts in financial analysis created a strain on certain 
industries that were carbon intensive, and therefore, certain member states that had 
strong industrial backgrounds and the extraction sectors, such as Spain and Italy 
(Lenschow, 2002, pp. 219-233). In order to reduce the financial strain on those 
economies the EU authorized funds to be used in the form of a Cohesion fund to 
help cushion the losses of industries and member states against the new objectives 
of the EU; mainly, against the new objective of balancing CO2 costs against 
industrial development (Lenschow, 2002, pp. 219-233). In addition, subsidies were 
given as monetary assistances to businesses specifically in agriculture, as the 
industry was impacted directly by an immediate need to reduce CO2.  
 
These economic measures were put in place to help lay a thorough foundation for 
Europe’s future regulations on CO2. By offering incentives to firms, and by helping 
fund research and technology, the EU championed the transition to a more 
sustainable means of development. This time period focused heavily on making 
both sustainable development, and carbon management, an attractive means of 
compliance for industries.  Rather than simply penalizing industry members, the EU 
worked to ensure that transition to a low-carbon economy was appealing, rather than 
4151442 
130 
straining on economic performance.  In doing so, the EU was able to create a 
positive economic relationship with the private sector. This helped to create a strong 
and democratic support for future legislation on CO2 reductions.  
 
It is important, and interesting to note, that it was during this time period, 
specifically in 1992, that the EU proposed its first official carbon policy tool. Carlos 
Rippa di Meana, at the time, acted as European Commissioner for the Environment, 
and proposed a European wide carbon tax. However, even though the EU was 
highly successful in implementing several economic tools for carbon policy, the 
carbon tax proposal failed. Instead, the proposals for an emissions trading scheme 
seemed to grow by the end of this period. By 1997 the EU had officially agreed to 
participate in an emissions trading scheme, yet why the EU moved from a carbon 
tax towards an emissions trading scheme will be investigated within the tracing 
chapters of this dissertation.    
 
Overall, the period from 1992-2000 reflected the strong ecological modernist 
approach by using a democratic, top-down, and internationally-compliant approach 
towards the development of carbon policy. This period shows that the EU looked to 
create a strong internal base of support for a future carbon market to launch by 
creating support for the reduction of CO2 in general.   Informational tools were put 
in place to help show citizens the benefits of behaving more sustainably. Regulatory 
tools were used to help firms and individuals become accustomed to the idea that 
CO2 should be regulated. Cooperative tools were implemented to ensure regulatory 
actions taken in regards to limiting energy usage would be done in a manner that 
did not harm industry competitiveness. Economic tools addressed the financial gaps 
needed to show the benefits of complying with carbon mitigation objectives.  
Together, these measures were put in place to ensure that CO2 reductions created 
opportunities across all European stakeholders.  Combined with the institutional 
adaptation that increased the competence behind the deployment of these tools, the 
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EU was able to create a strong framework for the launch of the European carbon 
market that would take place in the next decade.     
 
5.2 European climate mitigation policies from 2001-2012 
By 2001 the EU had officially ratified the KP, meaning that the EU was legally 
required to begin monitoring and reporting its progress on carbon emissions 
reductions (CEC, 1996).  This shows a marked change in the policy goals of the EU. 
However, it is also during this time period where one can see a change in the 
hierarchy of policy goals as well. It was during this time when carbon policy became 
a central pillar of European policy.  This time period focused on building on the 
foundation of support created in the previous decade, towards the launching of an 
official carbon policy.    
 
It is during this time period where one can clearly see the change in ambition and 
tools used in the EU. Reflecting the strong approach of ecological modernisation, 
the EU recognised that in order to address reductions effectively, it would need to 
go beyond the cooperative approach to using a more formal approach for carbon 
management (CEC, 1996).  The time period of 2001-2010 was thus highly focused 
on developing strict targets, deadlines, and pricing mechanisms for specific CO2 
reductions (CEC, 1996). Again showing the impact of a strong ecological modernist 
approach, tools at this time targeted an increasingly diverse range of stakeholders. 
At the same time, one can also see the shift of the EU towards an increasingly 
centralised position on climate change. Here, one can see the integration of climate 
considerations in broader community legislation.  
 
5.2.1 Ambitions and goals of carbon policies from 2001-2012 
The objective of climate mitigation policy at this time was to shift to a more 
sophisticated market-driven approach that developed economic solutions for carbon 
mitigation.  Yet, the EU's climate ambitions during this time period were very 
specific. Not only did European emissions reductions require the development and 
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revision of specific goals, but overarching qualitative goals were also used to 
transition the European economy towards the long-term objectives for 
environmental actions.  Climate mitigation policies were created to specifically 
increase the sustainable use of resources, and to integrate climate change objectives 
into different Community policies (COM, 2001a). In this way, the EU placed carbon 
policy at the centre of European climate strategies, and also in the broader economic 
development of European institutions. 
 
The tools the EU put in place during this period were mainly economic and 
regulatory. However, information sharing and dissemination of negative climate 
information remained a critical component of the climate programmes in the EU. 
These were specifically used to maintain a positive relationship with industry by 
supporting regulatory tools, and alerting industry of progress made These tools 
therefore focused on spreading information related to emissions reductions helping 
to decrease energy dependence in the EU; developing national industries in the EU; 
and creating jobs for European citizens (Hey, 2005, pp. 18-30.). These were joint 
economic and climate objectives that were not seen as conflicting, but rather as a 
beneficial means to further economic development. 
 
Recognising again that climate change was the main challenge facing the EU, the 
EU worked to move towards the ambitions outlined in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, 
which were to reduce emissions reductions by 8% by 2012, when compared to the 
baseline year of 1990 (Protocol, 1997).  Although the EU firmly had committed 
previously to achieving their CO2 reductions level, the EU used this time period to 
firmly commit to legally binding legislation. However, the EU wanted to set targets 
that exceeded the Kyoto’s ambition. Although the EU was supportive of the Kyoto 
ambitions, European actors had problems with the baseline as outlined in 
discussions over the years. Therefore, the EU government moved to create more 




In March 2007, the European heads of state and government made a commitment 
for the EU to reduce its overall emissions by 20% by the year 2020, compared to 
1990 industrial levels (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008, pp. 35-50). At the same time, the 
EU expressed its intention to commit to a 30% reduction in the instance those other 
comparable countries also made confirmed commitments (Oberthür and Kelly, 
2008, pp. 35-50). In order to make this ambition happen, the EU recommended 
putting specific goals in place that would increase the share of renewable energy 
sources in the EU energy supply to 20%, and also increase the contribution of 
biofuels to transport by 10% by 2020 (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008, pp. 35-50).  
Therefore, this time period focused on the EU increasing the diversity of its tools in 
order to strengthen previously developed tools. This required both enhancing the 
regulatory and legal basis behind existing tools, as well as identifying where new 
tools were needed to support an institution-wide commitment to climate change.   
 
5.2.1.1 Informational tools from 2001-2012 
Informational tools during this time period worked to streamline the citizen 
knowledge needed to understand how and why it was important to reduce CO2 
reductions.  Fundamentally, these tools were used to empower citizens to again 
increase the understanding of the importance of efficiency (Löber, 2010, pp. 33-51).  
More importantly, the EU worked to ensure that the public and industry members 
were well informed of the benefits of carbon-free economy.  As the previous time 
period had focused on using eco-labels and generalised information for consumer 
information, the EU transitioned now to informing citizens on the dangers and 
impacts of climate change specifically. Citizens’ understanding of the state of the 
environment was a key aspect of European climate policy at this time, and statistical 
information was made easily accessible to the public (Decision 1600/2002/EC). As 
such, carbon data became an integral aspect of all informational tools, and the EU 
worked to deploy specific statistical information that kept citizens and industry 




Member states were seen as a key aspect to the overall development of the EU’s 
climate mitigation policy, and many of the informational tools put in place were 
meant to enhance communication among member states. Member states were 
required to designate one or more bodies that would be responsible for creating 
energy labels that laid out standard product information in regards to the 
consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products (Decision 
1600/2002/EC).  Member states were required to monitor false advertisement of 
goods that were not sustainable, and prohibit the use of inaccurate information from 
being relayed to European citizens (Decision 1600/2002/EC).  By doing so, the EU 
ensured that member states were contributing in a bottom-up approach to European 
environmental policy.   
 
The EU also used statistical information to produce newly updated targets, which 
were seen as crucial informational tools for both industries members and for 
member states. These targets gave a firm level of CO2 reductions to aim for and also 
a firm timeline for when these emissions should be achieved by (Helm, 2008, pp. 
211-238). The EU constantly released data updating the EU-level emissions rates 
so that member states could understand their role in reducing emissions more firmly 
(Helm, 2008, pp. 211-238). This also helped civilians and industry members remain 
aware of forthcoming legislative measures, as they could anticipate where further 
reductions would be needed.    
 
5.2.1.2 Regulatory tools from 2001-2012 
Although this time period is typically referred to as anti-regulatory in environmental 
studies, regulatory tools actually emerged with greater precedence than used in the 
previous decade when examining specific carbon policies (Jänicke, 2005, pp. 129-
142).  Initially, the EU was adamant that the regulatory tools put in place should be 
a method of guidance for other tools, specifically those that were market-based. 
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However, regulatory tools were still needed to make sure CO2 reductions were being 
met. In order to do so, the EU needed to limit the amount of carbon that firms could 
emit in six main industries: energy, steel, cement, glass, brick-making and 
cardboard production (Decision 1600/2002/EC). These industries were noted as the 
highest contributors to CO2 mainly due to the large amount of energy they consumed 
in product manufacturing (Decision 1600/2002/EC). These industries became 
targeted to ensure that their production became more streamlined with the 
sustainable development goals of the EU.  
 
Reduction target rates were also set for industries that produced outside the EU to 
help ensure trade remained less carbon-dense in the EU. This included extensive 
legislative plans for motor vehicles (Decision, 1600/2002/EC).  This legislation 
required the average CO2 emissions of vehicles produced in 2012 to be no more than 
130 g/km (Decision, 1600/2002/EC). These standards became a common feature in 
climate mitigation policy in the EU and moved the EU away from voluntary 
measures towards specific regulatory measures. This was due to the lack of 
compliance with the voluntary measures that the EU had put in place during the 
previous time period.  
 
Beyond this, the EU began to place similar standards and restrictions on industrial 
development amongst member states to ensure national participation levels in 
emissions reductions schemes. Again, this reflected the strong emphasis that the EU 
placed on taking a democratic approach to emissions reductions. Targets were put 
in place to help limit the amount of energy each economy was allowed to consume. 
Although targets can be informational tools, they also can be regulatory when used 
to legally restrict the amount of carbon emitted per European nation (Helm, 2008, 




Originally, the EU ensured that reductions were European-wide, but by the end of 
this time period, international differentiations would also be translated into binding 
targets for member states. In 2008, the EU emissions strategy was amended in the 
European Energy and Climate Plan. This strategy included specific directions for 
how member states should combine effort in sharing the burden related to European-
wide CO2 reductions. Directions were given to achieve an agreed goal of reducing 
emissions 20% by 2020 from 1990 levels, beyond the goal that was outlined in the 
Kyoto Protocol. Member states were allowed to apply for additional EU-level 
assistance if they found that these strategies were going to be overly taxing on 
economic development (Decision, 1600/2002/EC). This kept the EU involved in 
member-state level emissions strategies, making it easier to understand where the 
leaders and laggards were in the EU-level emissions targets rates.  
 
5.2.1.3 Cooperative Tools from 2001-2012 
During this time period, the EU provided incentives for changing business-as-usual, 
and thus, worked to understand what would make industry members likely to 
decrease their carbon footprint (Lévêque, 2013 pp. 17-26). The cooperative tools 
put in place during this time helped the EU to spur innovation in technology that 
was needed to help increase efficiency in European industrial activity (Lévêque, 
2013 pp. 17-26).   Many of the tools put into place reflected the need to transition 
all industries in the EU into cleaner methods of production. Key to this was 
ingraining more sustainable energy forms for the production itself. The EU focused 
on deploying wind, solar, and biofuel energy to further encourage the overall usage 
of cleaner energies.  
 
The European Wind Initiative was launched to deploy large-scale wind turbines 
(COM, 2001a).  Likewise, the Solar Europe Initiative focused on developing a 
research, development, and demonstration roadmap to set the EU on a path for 
photovoltaic development (COM, 2001a). This joint initiative worked between the 
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member states and the European Photovoltaic industry to increase the usage of 
renewables in power production. Likewise, the Bioenergy Europe Initiative was 
focused on deploying the next generation of biofuels within the overall energy mix 
(COM, 2001a). The Sustainable Nuclear Fission Initiative helped to increase 
funding behind technology related to nuclear energy production by focusing on the 
future production of fission technologies (COM, 2001a).  With these key initiatives 
the EU hoped to help encourage the transition away from fossil-based fuels to 
greener energy supplies.  
 
The efficiency of existing energy infrastructures also represented a carbon-dense 
pathway for development that needed to be changed.  The EU put in place several 
initiatives that focused on the requirements necessary to increase existing efficiency 
standards (COM, 2001a). The European Electric Grid Initiative focused on the 
whole system requirements necessary to transition electricity production in the EU 
away from fossil fuel plants at the industrial level (Com, 2001a). This helped to 
enforce the integration of renewables into the grid, by increasing the efficiency 
goals of industrial sectors.  
 
The cooperative tools during this time reflected the EU’s transition to take an 
ecological, or strong, approach towards climate mitigation policy.  The cooperative 
tools at this time took on a much more sophisticated approach to support the 
integration of more sustainable economic performance into the European market.  
However, what can also be seen in the cooperative tools during this time the degree 
to which industry was targeted in climate regulations in the EU.  
  
5.2.1.4 Economic Tools from 2001-2012 
The economic tools put in place during the 6EAP heavily reflected the introduction 
of “new environmental policy tools” (Jordan et al, 2007, pp. 283-298). The main 
tools put in place during this time were created to support the initial deployment of 
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the EU ETS.   These measures ranged from direct funding to indirect support needed 
to increase the behavioural change of citizens into becoming more energy efficient. 
All of the tools worked in a much more sophisticated manner when compared to 
previously used economic tools.  
 
Many of the financial measures put in place came in the form of subsidies (Gupta 
and Ringius, 2001, pp. 281-299). Although these can be costly for governments, 
directly contributing funds to technology research is usually an integral part of 
overcoming the barriers to the penetration of new technologies (Kosone and 
Nicodème, 2009). Financial tools transitioned from broad means of encouragement 
for research and development as seen in 1992-2001, into specifically sector-targeted 
funds for research and development (Decision, 1600/2002/EC).  Mainly, funding 
was now given to countries and firms in order to create new power plants. These 
funds specifically were allocated towards the use of small-medium enterprises that 
could be launched much more quickly than traditional large-scale power plants 
(Decision, 1600/2002/EC).  In this way, the EU created jobs, providing a positive 
stimulation towards cleaner energy.  
 
To further increase the share of renewables in European energy supplies, the EU 
deployed green tariffs. These were specific subsidies used to develop renewable 
energy industries within certain member states (Couture and Gagnon, 2010, pp. 
955-965). These subsidies were used to provide upfront capital to member states to 
help further integrate renewable energies into their existing energy generation 
portfolio. At the same time, these subsidies also worked to help engrain 
environmental considerations within electricity pricing structures. These market-
based tools contained guidelines on the price that was to be paid to electricity 
producers if they produced power from renewable sources (COM, 2001a). This 
price was set to be equal to the cost of avoided standard electricity use that was 
based on fossil-fuel supplies, and also included a, “premium reflecting the 
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renewable, social and environmental benefits” of using a cleaner energy (COM, 
2001a).  In this way, the price of electricity moved from standard consumption to 
including the positive allotments of consuming green energy. This shows the EU’s 
ability to also embed environmental considerations within its energy markets, 
therefore indicating a broader societal shift was occurring.  
 
A hugely impactful cooperative tool put in place during this time was the 
Community's Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), which encourages 
private companies and public bodies to improve their environmental performance 
within areas of economic activity (Decision, 1600/2002/EC).  EMAS first requires 
organisations to conduct an environmental review of all of the aspects of their 
business; then, organisations must work to establish and implement environmental 
management systems based on results of the review (Decision, 1600/2002/EC). An 
evaluation of these processes then produces results that are exchanged between the 
public and other interested parties affected by the organisation (Decision, 
1600/2002/EC). If organisations can display steps towards improved environmental 
performance, mainly through showing reduced emissions rates or environmental 
impacts, the EU then will work with them to improve the costs the organisation 
takes on for improving their environmental performance. This tool helped provide 
regulations for compliance, but also incentivised private-sector members in 
emissions reductions. 
 
By far, the most predominant tool feature in this time period, and in the entirety of 
climate mitigation policy in the EU, is the EU ETS, which was launched during this 
time period. This tool works to financially link energy consumption to industrial 
production.  Industry members are provided with targets limiting their CO2, or a 
cap, on the total amount of greenhouse that can be emitted by all participating 
installations.  Allowances for emissions are then auctioned off, or are allocated for 
free, but can then be traded amongst industry members (Helm et al, 2003, pp. 438-
450).  Industry installations are required to monitor and report their CO2, mainly to 
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ensure that they provide enough allowances to the EU in order to cover their 
emissions targets (Helm et al, 2003, pp. 438-450). If an emission from an industry 
installation exceeds the amount CO2 it’s been allocated, it must purchase additional 
allowances (Helm et al, 2003, pp. 438-450). Alternatively, if an installation 
increases its efficiency, and therefore, reduces its emissions, it can sell remaining 
credits to other industry members (Helm et al, 2003, pp. 438-450). This is intended 
to provide European industries for a market-based and cost-effective method of 
reducing emissions, without necessarily calling for the intervention of a 
government.  
 
The overall emissions scheme has been divided into a number of trading periods, 
both of which were located during this time period. The EU ETS’s initial launch in 
2005-2007 was the first period, and covered approximately 12,000 installations, 
representing 40% of European CO2 overall (Caney and Hepburn, 2011, pp. 201-
234). This period covered energy activities, production and processing of ferrous 
metals, mineral industry (such as glass and cement) and also the monitoring of pulp 
and paper production (Caney and Hepburn, 2011, pp. 201-234). This phase covered 
all 27 EU member states with the exclusion of Romania, Bulgaria, and Malta. 
  
In 2008, the EU began the second phase of monitoring, which ended in 2012. This 
expanded the tool significantly. In 2007, three non-EU members joined, and the 
Linking Directive introduced the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation mechanisms, which allowed countries to invest in emissions 
reductions projects to also contribute towards lowered emissions reductions. The 
EU used four main platforms for technological development support: low-carbon 
adaption technologies, low carbon-capture technologies, renewable energies, and 
bio-fuels (COM, 2007a). In this way, the EU broadened the interaction with industry 
members to create further economic incentives for complying with CO2 reductions.  
However, this tool was heavily criticized when the price of carbon dropped 
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dramatically.  As later analysis will show, this was due to the influence of weak 
ecological modernisation.  
 
2020 is the next date of expiration for judging emissions rates at EU level. The EU 
has stated that their new target is to be a 20% of emissions by the year 2020 (COM, 
2011).   The EU has also volunteered to lower European emissions by 30% if the 
rest of global leaders would sign on a climate agreement (COM, 2011). If the EU 
does attempt to lower European emissions by 30% then an aggressive action plan, 
one that expands the EU ETS’s current industrial coverage, must be implemented 
(COM, 2011). Coverage must expand to include buildings, agriculture, and waste 
management and transport schemes (COM, 2011). With the EU’s expansion to 
include the air transport industry in 2012 it is feasible that they will be able to do 
so. Member states have accepted this area of expansion, and have created their own 
corresponding national emissions targets.  
 
5.3 Conclusion: analysing change in policy ambitions, tools and goals in 
the EU from 1992-2012 
When surveying the tools used by the EU during this time period, it is evident that 
the EU has clearly undergone the first three types of change required for ecological 
modernisation: change in policy tools, change in policy ambitions, and change in 
policy goals. Both the goals and the ambitions of the EU have progressed drastically 
from 1992-2012. Originally, the EU began with an overall qualitative ambition to 
simply reduce CO2 reductions, yet within a short period of time the EU had moved 
to identify 1990 as an apt baseline-year for reductions. Although the ambition of the 
goals may have wavered at times, the EU’s aggressive nature on the targets shows 




When simply looking at the quantitative commitment of the EU on CO2 reductions, 
one could argue that fluctuations in the baseline year of ambition could call into 
question the sincerity of the EU. However, looking at the diversity and evolution of 
the EU’s carbon policy tools clearly indicates that this is simply not the case.  The 
first era, 1992-2001, created a broad base for the support of future emissions 
reductions.  Informational tools were used to create an undisputed understanding of 
the need for climate mitigation within the EU by providing both industry members 
and civilians with statistical information. Regulatory tools were not penalized, but 
rather served as guidelines to help industry members’ transition into a time where 
they would need to pay for emitting carbon.   Direct-economic and indirect 
economic tools worked in tandem to create incentives for transitioning into a low-
carbon economy, and worked to ensure economic growth and stability of energy 
markets in accordance to the principals of European sustainable development.  
 
The second time period of European carbon policy saw the cementing of climate 
mitigation policy in the EU that displayed the commitment towards ingraining 
environmental concerns into the economy, and clearly showed the impacts of a 
strong ecological modernist approach. Informational tools worked to address the 
integration of member states, and to increase the availability of statistical 
information needed to increase carbon policy efforts, thereby reflecting both 
international standards, but also an increasingly democratic process of target 
development. Direct economic tools were used to specifically drive the 
development of renewable energy projects, and to enhance technological innovation 
needed to transition the EU’s industries into a low-carbon economy. Surrounding 
all of these tool choices was the transition of the overall economy itself; the EU used 
indirect economic tools, such as accounting measures, to complete the legalities and 
economic measures needed for a balanced economy. By shifting the taxes from 
welfare-negative taxes to welfare-positive taxes, the EU was able to make sure that 
European firms did not lose competitiveness by operating within a low-carbon 
economy.  In this way, it is evident that the EU’s commitment to climate change 
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goes much farther than the creation of new economic tools. Instead, the empirical 
data analysed in this chapter indicates that the EU has clearly moved towards an 
ecological paradigm shift.  
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Chapter 6. Examining change in policy ambitions, tools, and goals 
in American carbon policy from 1992-2012 
American climate mitigation policy has a complicated history, one that at times 
seems impressive, yet at others relatively stagnant. This thesis now moves to 
examine the change in policy tools, goals, and ambitions in the US in order evaluate 
the first three degrees of ecological change that occurred between 1992-2012. This 
chapter will thus, seek to assess to what degree weak ecological modernisation has 
had an impact on the evolution of carbon tools. In doing so, this chapter will 
empirically examine and identify the nature, diversity, and ambition of carbon 
policy in the US, in order to later analyse how the central idea of a weak approach 
to ecological modernisation impacted the policy-choices, and innovation, of 
American carbon policy.   
 
Beginning with the first discussion of carbon policy tools in 1992 and finishing in 
2012, this chapter shows how the US’s set of ecological ideas failed to produce an 
increase in the policy ambition and goals of carbon policy. At the same time, when 
reviewing the tools proposed and implemented in the US, this chapter shows the 
static nature of policy tool type in the US.  Divided into the same two time periods 
as the analysis in the EU empirical chapter, this chapter will identify both the policy 
tools implemented, and also the tools that were proposed but did not lead to 
implementation. In doing so, this chapter will examine when and where policy 
innovation failed to occur in the American carbon policy-process.  
 
6.1 American climate mitigation policies from 1992-2000 
Like the EU, the US has distinct periods in its environmental legislative history. The 
initial time period under examination (1992-2000) encompasses two different 
administrations, the George H.W. Bush Administration and the Clinton 
Administration, but mainly focuses on the efforts of the Clinton administration, as 
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this was the first administration that sought to implement climate policies at the 
federal level. President Clinton and Vice-President Al Gore commenced their term 
in office with a vehement promise to enhance the image of America, specifically 
within global environmental discussions. This administration sought to reinvent 
environmental policy and laid out specific goals and ambition for US carbon policy 
that were intended to span a time period of 25 years (Clinton and Gore, 1995). The 
administration created “principles” for reinventing environmental protection, which 
were intended to create a balance between economic, environmental and social goals 
(Clinton and Gore, 1995).  Like the EU, climate change in the US was emphasized 
as a critical point for action. Unlike the EU, this time period shows how using weak 
ecological modernist ideas failed to result in change in policy tools nor ambition. 
Instead, this chapter examines the negative impact that weak ecological modernist 
ideas had on the diversity and maturity of carbon policy instrument sin the US from 
1992-2000.  
 
The overarching objective of the Clinton-Gore administration began by committing 
the US to protecting public health and the environment as a national goal that 
required individuals, businesses, and government to take responsibility for the 
impact of their actions (Clinton and Gore, 1995).  This administration sought to 
design regulation to achieve environmental goals in a manner that minimizes costs 
for firms. To do so, the administration outlined a series of specific measures with 
which environmental policy must be formed. First, environmental regulations were 
to be performance-based, providing maximum flexibility in the means of achieving 
environmental goals, but also by requiring accountability for the results (Clinton 
and Gore, 1995).  Preventative pollution actions were to be taken where possible 
(Clinton and Gore, 1995). Market incentives were to be used to achieve 
environmental goals, whenever appropriate and possible (Clinton and Gore, 1995). 
This reflected a weak ecological modernist approach, which would clearly impact 
the policy-choices presented to policy-makers at this time. Both economic and 
cooperative tools would dominate the administration’s policy tools at this time, yet 
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surveying the proposals below shows how the ideas of weak ecological 
modernisation limit the tool options available to policy-makers.  
 
6.1.1 Ambitions and goals of carbon policies from 1992-2000  
Although the US today may perhaps be more well known for its fluctuations in 
climate change policies, it is often forgotten that the US was once a leader on 
environmental issues. In addition, many often dismiss the fact that the US was once 
committed to climate change. Yet it was during this Presidential administration 
where official targets for CO2 reductions were recommended so that performance in 
climate abatement could be measured statistically (Clinton and Gore, 1995).  
However, it is here where the European carbon policy begins to differ drastically 
from the US. After the 1997 Kyoto agreement, the EU committed its members to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 8% by 2012 compared to levels in 1990 
(Protocol, 1997). The US’s first proposal for lowering CO2 was to 1990 levels by 
the year 2000 (Park, 2005, p. 165). Although the EU was clear that this time period 
would be used for moving towards a regulated industry, the US administration used 
a weak ecological modernist set of ideas which recommended using targets in a non-
binding manner, thereby, allowing industry to choose if they would meet the 
ambitions or not. 
 
The administration led by President Bill Clinton pledged the first emissions 
reductions during this period, which were to reduce emissions levels in the states to 
1990 levels by the year 2000 (Park, 2005, p. 165). However, it’s important to note 
here that these targets did not include a target for percentages of reductions, but 
instead were loose guidelines for emissions reductions. The US here showed that 
although it had the ambition to achieve a baseline year in reduction, it did not have 
the specific targets that were needed to turn these ambitions into results.  
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6.1.1.1 Informational tools from 1992-2000 
Perhaps due to the lack of regulatory authority, informational tools clearly did not 
make up as critical of a component of the American policy portfolio as they did in 
the EU at this time. The economic approach that the US was intent on using required 
using a carbon market, yet did not emphasize the creation of a broader civilian base 
that would be supportive of carbon emissions reductions. Rather than focusing on 
how to build an informational base for target emissions reductions, this time period 
focused on simply informing stakeholders that the US was beginning to engage in 
carbon reductions. These tools focused on making government regulations 
understandable to those that were affected by them (Clinton and Gore, 1995).  The 
US communicated that regulation was to be “based on the best science and 
economics, and would be subject to the scrutiny of the epistemic community and 
the public,” (Clinton and Gore, 1995, p. 8).  This is interesting, as this did not clearly 
translate into specific targets. Instead, federal, state, tribal, and local governments 
were recommended to work with the EPA as partners in order how to identify the 
best and most common environmental goals, so that future targets could perhaps be 
formed (Clinton and Gore, 1995).  Looking at the instruments below show how 
problematic and increasingly administratively difficult a bottom-up approach to 
carbon policy can be.  
 
In these initial informational measures, one can see the intent of the US to begin 
developing climate mitigation policy, yet its inability to do so. Informational tools 
during this time period did not correlate with the developments in international 
standards at this time, and instead, show the problems that come alongside the 
domestic collection of carbon data.  Although extensive information needed to be 
collected, the EPA had difficulties in asserting the authority to collect information, 
mainly based on the lack of true regulatory authority to do so (Selin and VanDeveer, 
2009, pp. 111-136). Although the EPA had the authority to enforce regulations in 
other areas, in the area of greenhouse gases they did not possess regulatory authority. 
As such, collecting information posed a large task to the agency, and verifying 
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economic progress on emissions reductions became difficult. Instead, industry 
members were asked to release information in relation to their emissions data so the 
EPA would be able to understand who were the leaders and laggards in 
environmental compliance amongst industry members.  Environmental audits were 
enacted to understand how various industry sectors contributed to emissions 
reductions.  In doing so, the US hoped to understand how energy was being used so 
that future regulations could be developed to monitor consumption. 
 
 
During this time, the EPA was ordered to periodically prepare and also make 
publically available reports on the state of the environment (Clinton and Gore, 
1995). However, before collecting information the EPA needed more streamlined 
methods for risk assessment to ensure independent views of science were being 
conducted within their methodologies. As such, the first informational tools put in 
place were environmental impact assessments. There were no specific times 
designated for these assessments, but still the administration instead created general 
guidelines to determine the impact of new economic actions on the environment. 
The EPA also began developing guidelines for record-keeping and reporting 
measures.  More vaguely, the federal government ordered the EPA to use licenses 
and permits as they saw fit for environmental consumption. The EPA was ordered 
to ensure that any governmental funding of a project would take in a certain degree 
of consideration for the environment (Clinton and Gore, 1995). The EPA was also 
asked to develop a specific centre for environmental information and statistics, 
which would establish a central point for quantitative information (Clinton and 
Gore, 1995). In this way, the goals of the administration reflected strong sustainable 
development, while the tool choices did not.   
 
From here, informational tools declined in comparison to the implementation of 
cooperative tools. In 1999, President Clinton issued a presidential directive titled 
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“Presidential Directive on Carbon Dioxide Emissions” to confirm the 
administration’s commitment to pursuing economic growth and environmental 
progress simultaneously (Buzelli and Lash, 1997).   This directive required a full 
report to be conducted to fill in the missing informational gaps that had been 
identified as problematic in the energy policy of the US.  The report emphasised 
how information collected would promote retail competition in the electric power 
industry, and thus would deliver efficiency increases, and a reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions (DOE, 2000). The information was to be collected on an annual basis 
and would deliver the data from the previous years, from both utility and non-utility 
sectors that produced power (DOE, 2000). The data included both national and 
regional information divided into fuel type, or energy resource (DOE, 2000). The 
report was intended to thus provide the amount of carbon reduced in the previous 
year. However, the involvement of firms producing information was still collected 
on a voluntary basis.  
 
6.1.1.2 Regulatory tools from 1992-2000 
Although there were no regulatory tools put in place during this time, it’s important 
to show the complete lack of category of carbon policy tools in the US. The weak 
ecological modernist approach championed by the George H.W. Bush 
administration took the stance that regulatory tools for the environment were overly 
protective, and would result in American industries becoming uncompetitive 
(Cropper and Oates, 1992, pp. 675-740). As such, regulatory tools did not play a 
key role during this time period.  Instead, regulatory power was even stripped from 
the Environmental Protection Agency and temporarily limited the role of 
environmental regulations in various policy realms (Hahn and Stavins, 1991, pp. 1-
42). Here, it is evident that an institutional approach to emissions reductions was not 




6.1.1.3 Cooperative tools from 1992-2000  
As the weak ecological modernist approach to climate change championed the 
notion of a techno-corporatist approach to climate change, the administration during 
this time worked in  tandem with corporations to create programs that would 
enhance the role of industry in environmental cooperation. These programs were 
created for two main objectives. First, to enhance industry incentives to increase 
innovation within technology, and secondly, to increase efficiency standards to 
indirectly lead towards lowered emissions reductions (Clinton and Gore, 1995, pp. 
5-9). These tools were created to specifically develop emissions reductions 
techniques that would not harm economic development.  
 
The first measures passed were automobile fuel efficiency standards.  Recognizing 
the link between fuel usage and CO2, mileage standards were introduced as a way 
of reducing CO2.  Automobile industries saw this as an opportunity to apply 
technology standards to existing industries (Lutsey and Sperling, 2008, pp. 673-
685). Although fuels standards help reduce emissions, they also helped to increase 
gas mileage. With increasing gas prices consumers would find standards easily 
acceptable. Therefore, the industry worked to develop standards as a way to ensure 
all automobile producers were manufacturing along the same guidelines.   
 
The 1993 President Climate Change Action Plan deployed several cooperative tools. 
These tools were created to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions in a number 
of sectors across the economy through a range of partnership efforts.  The voluntary 
Department of Energy (DOE) Climate Change program was formed in cooperation 
with the electricity sector (DOE, 2000). This tool sought to encourage utility firms 
to voluntarily reduce their carbon footprint. Rather than mandating reductions, this 
program sought to understand the economic benefits that came alongside increasing 
efficiency standards in production (DOE, 2000). By working with utility firms, the 
government hoped that other sectors would then recognize the benefits, and choose 
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to comply with increasing emissions standards.  This very much reflects the 
economic approach of ecological modernisation in the US. 
 
The Energy STAR Program, jointly deployed by the EPA and DOE, was put in place 
to reduce energy consumption in homes and office buildings across the Nation 
(DOE, 1995). The EPA deployed the Energy Star Building and Green Lights 
Partnership to encourage increased efficiency within the built environment (DOE, 
1995).  This program worked to provide funding for buildings to undergo efficiency 
upgrades, which resulted in emissions reductions of more than 16 million metric 
tons of CO2, covering more than 15% of the built environment (DOE, 1995). This 
program set specific standards for energy-efficiency in office equipment, heating 
and cooling systems, residential appliances and new homes (EPA, 2006).   
 
The Energy Star label was developed to give owners a method for evaluating the 
efficiency of their buildings in comparison to others, thereby encouraging the 
competition of efficiency standards (DOE, 1995).  In this way, the tools were put in 
place to encourage and display commitment to the increasing efficiency standards 
within the built environment.  
 
The cooperative tools at this time also worked to enhance cooperation between 
federal levels of environmental management and local and state level organizations. 
These local partnership initiatives worked mainly to create a better level of policy 
cooperation between various levels of environmental organizations (DOE, 1995). 
Sustainable development challenge grants were provided to increase the formation 
of local environmental organizations needed to promote the concept of sustainable 
economic development (DOE, 1995). Performance partnership grants were also put 




Overall, cooperative tools were representative of the viewpoint that Clinton and 
Gore sought to change in the viewpoint of American environmental policy. The 
administration worked to move away from the regulatory and, thus, associated 
burdensome image that environmental policy had and instead worked to create a 
positive relationship between government and industry in relations to emissions 
reductions.  
 
6.1.1.4 Economic tools from 1992-2000  
In 1994 the signing of the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation (NAAEC) showed the administration’s desire to move forward on 
environmental legislation, and specifically included the mandatory “promotion of 
the use of economic tools for the efficient achievement of environmental goals,”, 
again reflecting the weak ecological modernist approach of the US (Clinton and 
Gore, 1995).  The Clinton administration thus used economic tools to stimulate the 
benefits for participating in energy efficiency. These measures were included 
creating tax incentives for industries involved in the renewable energy industry and 
hybrid vehicles sectors.  
 
During this time, individuals in Congress produced over 30 bills, resolutions and 
amendments that proposed economic tools in climate change. Initially, the tools 
proposed worked on three main categories of climate legislation: climate credits, 
subsidies, and direct technology funding (Selin and VanDeveer, 2007, pp. 1-27).  
The first category of tools gave credit for early action on reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. Funding and subsidies created to help reduce upfront costs that firms may 
incur when switching to renewable technologies (Clinton and Gore, 1995).  
Measures were also proposed for funding research in technologies that could be used 
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, specifically those that may lead to the future 
utility of carbon (Clinton and Gore, 1995).  At the same time, Congress also worked 
to propose tax incentives for investing in new technologies that would produce able 
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to make use out of carbon, such as carbon-capture-and-storage (Clinton and Gore, 
1995).  Unfortunately, many of the tools were not implemented.  
 
The main item the administration submitted to Congress was the Comprehensive 
Electricity Competition Act (CECA) bill to restructure the US electric industry and 
increase competition to drive down increasing electricity costs. Increased 
competition would force firms to “improve their own efficiencies and to create new 
markets for green power and end-use efficiency services” (DOE, 1999, p. vi).  The 
CECA was specifically designed to restructure the electricity market in a direction 
that included environmental provisions within the electricity markets (DOE, 1999).  
This bill included the development of renewable portfolio standards, tax incentives 
for renewables, and also created a public benefits fund (DOE, 1999). The 
administration also recommended funding for education for those who were 
studying towards environmental degrees, and would thus be able to participate in 
increasing technology standards.  
 
To support the encouragement of the restructuring program, the DOE issued a 
supporting analysis to quantify the economic and environmental benefits of the plan 
(DOE, 1999). The analysis focused on displaying the impacts of restructuring 
program on CO2 and found that the policy proposal would reduce up to 216 million 
metric tons of carbon by 2010 (DOE, 1999). However, the Environmental 
Information Administration (EIA) conducted the same study and conversely found 
that the proposal would reduce CO2 from energy usage anywhere between 147 to 
220 million metric tons annually by 2010 (DOE, 1999).  Congress found that the 
policy did not include key provisions that supported the effective functioning of 
competitive electricity markets and energy diversity while at the same time 
providing reductions in CO2 levels, and as such, struck down the proposal (DOE, 




Instead, Congress introduced and passed several policy initiatives that led to 
deregulation on the electricity sector (McCright and Dunlap, 2003, pp. 348-373). 
These measures led to power companies being able to avoid any monitoring of CO2. 
This deregulation also prohibited the administration from deploying integrated 
resource planning programs, which provided subsidies for renewable energy 
programs and also for energy efficiency programs (McCright and Dunlap, 2003, pp. 
348-373).  
 
The Clinton administration deployed economic tools in many land-use policies that 
would also affect carbon legislation. Positively, the administration was successful 
in preventing legislation that would have allowed drilling for oil and natural gas to 
take place on federal lands. Negatively, the administration also passed many policies 
that would hinder progress on carbon legislation such as tax and royalty relief for 
many oil and gas wells (McCright and Dunlap, 2003, pp. 348-373).  This 
administration specifically passed a series of policy initiatives that would encourage 
oil and gas drilling in the Gulf of Mexico (McCright and Dunlap, 2003, pp. 348-
373). While they refused to pass policy allowing drilling, the tools they put in place 
allowed federal land to be drilled in Alaska (McCright and Dunlap, 2003, pp. 348-
373). This administration also allowed for federal uranium programs to become 
privatized, leading to an increase in mining and nuclear programs (McCright and 
Dunlap, 2003, pp. 348-373).  
 
By proposing energy efficiency measures and the use of alternative fuel vehicles, 
the administration hoped to help develop a green fuel-based economy that would act 
as a catalyst for greening other sectors. Although the administration clearly 
proposed many tools that would have lead toward the increased production of 
renewable technologies, and also the restructuring of electricity markets at that time, 





The tools put in place during this period therefore display the American preference 
for cooperative-based policy-tools.  The empirical evidence gathered also shows the 
significant attention that the US gives to the electricity sector when seeking to 
produce CO2 reductions tools. Although the variety of policy tools was not 
immensely diverse, it is evident that significant strides were taken in regards to 
implementing a path to a cleaner form of economy. Although many individual tools 
were put in place, problems began to emerge and were concretely identified by the 
end of 1998. The EPA and DOE both issued statements requesting informational 
deficiencies as a source of problem within the success of their monitoring accuracy 
(Bruner and Klein, 1999, pp. 133-161).  
 
Although the Clinton administration put in place the first targets for emissions 
reduction, by the time the administration left office, emissions stood at roughly 15% 
above that target (Park, 2005, p. 165).  Therefore, it's evident when analysing the 
first period of tools that neither the policy tools nor the policy goals changed in the 
US during this time.  
 
6.2 American climate mitigation policies from 2001-2012  
The time period from 2001-2010 in Europe focused heavily on creating tools that 
would help the EU achieve its KP targets. Although the US was initially committed 
to working on climate change at this time period, this same period shows how 
important it is to take an institutional approach towards climate change, instead of 
approaching it is as solely an environmental policy. Although this time period 
featured aggressive measures taken to combat CO2 in the EU, this same time period 
began under the leadership of President George W. Bush in the US. Not only did 
President Bush champion the notion of using technological solutions to solve 
environmental problems, he also opposed international standards for carbon 
compliance. One of his first actions in regards to the broader realm of climate change 
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policy was to remove the US from the KP and instead push towards a domestically 
focused climate administration. Despite Bush being considered as a key antagonist 
to international climate regime, Congress was democratically led at the time, and 
strongly supported both increasing international support of CO2 reductions, and the 
concept of sustainable development. With increasing public support of climate 
change during this period, the US still should have been able to implement a tool 
that addressed CO2 reductions.  However, even Congressionally proposed measures 
were struck down. The evidence gathered below helps to identify the specific 
instances in which climate mitigation policy encountered obstacles in the US 
specifically due to impact of ideas stemming from weak ecological modernisation.  
 
6.2.1 Ambitions and goals of carbon policies from 2001-2012  
President Bush released specific goals in regards to carbon policy at the beginning 
of his term in 2002, which was the first official target that included a percentage for 
emissions reductions in the US (Bush, 2002a). While targets in Europe contained 
specific time periods and baseline years to set deadlines for emissions reductions, 
the target Bush released contained no baseline. Instead, the target focused on tons 
of carbon reductions as a way to eliminate emissions from the atmosphere. President 
Bush’s first target was to reduce 500 million tons of carbon from the atmosphere, 
the equivalent of reducing 18% over ten years, which would imply the baseline year 
of 2002 as opposed to the Kyoto’s recommended baseline of 1990 (Rabe, 2004, p. 
115). Overall, climate change was not a critical component of Bush’s overall 
agenda.  
 
The change in Presidential leadership at the end of this period led to a drastic change 
in the interaction of the US in international climate legislation. President Barack 
Obama took office in January 2008, and for the first time, formed the basic 
ambitions of carbon policy in the US. His campaign specifically included a 
commitment to address climate change, and a dedication to putting the US on track 
with international climate legislation (Obama, 2009a).  Therefore, in 2009, the US 
4151442 
157 
went to the Copenhagen conference in order to firmly commit itself to CO2 
reductions. Although the US did not agree to formally ratify any legislation at the 
conference itself, the US did pledge to develop federal climate mitigation policy that 
would put the US on track with other developed nations.  
In 2009, the US ratified international legislation relating to climate change through 
the Copenhagen accord.  Obama agreed to limit the US emission levels from 4% 
below 1990 levels by 2020. This was the first time the US agreed to limit the US to 
levels at 1990. However, unlike the KP, the Accord was not a legally binding treaty. 
Instead, the US was required to develop its own climate mitigation policy that would 
achieve these levels.   By 2010, the US announced government-wide CO2 reduction 
targets for 2020 for all federal agencies to take a leadership role in emissions. 
Agencies were to reduce twenty-eight per cent of direct emissions3 compared to the 
baseline year of 2008 (Sutley, 2010). The US also added a target of thirteen per cent 
for indirect emissions, such as those from employee commuting and business travel 
(Sutley, 2010). Showing the US' government’s commitment to long-term emissions 
reductions was an initial step towards creating a federal carbon policy, yet 
unfortunately, the limitations of using only voluntary or economic-based 
instruments meant that the US was consistently unable to deploy ambitious or 
innovative carbon legislation.  
 
6.2.1.1 Informational tools from 2001-2012 
Informational tools played a limited role during the Bush administration. Instead, 
many members of the American epistemic community worked to increase the 
American public awareness of climate change and to further the understanding of 
the urgent need for the US to increase their climate ambition.  Although the time 
period displays many innovative proposals, the majority of policy failed to reach 
implementation.  
                                               




The tools put in place by the administration itself were used to inform the public of 
the administration’s negative stance on climate change. While in the EU these tools 
were used to broadcast the dangers of climate change, and to spur the necessary 
public support for carbon legislation, in the US these tools served a dual purpose. 
First, to provide the public with information on climate change, but also to dissuade 
the public that CO2 reduction was a necessary policy priority (McIntosh, 2008). 
Specifically, deployed from the executive branch of the administration, these tools 
were used to show that CO2 reductions would impede economic development in the 
US.  
 
Nevertheless, several federal organizations attempted to increase the public support 
of climate mitigation during this time period. The main informational tool at this 
time was a 2003 report that combined information from all existing federal agencies 
on CO2 reductions. Authored by Peter Schwarz and Doug Randall, the report “An 
Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and its Implications for United States National 
Security”, outlined the risks that climate change would impose on the American 
public and economy (Schwartz and Randall, 2004).  The report found that the risk 
of climate change would impose “potentially dire consequences” on the US citizens 
and public economy (Schwartz and Randall, 2004, p. 1).  Although they found the 
risk “uncertain and quite possibly small” they still suggested that climate change 
should be elevated beyond the debate status it retained at the time to become a 
national security concern (Schwartz and Randall, 2004, p. 2).  This informational 
report should have acted as an initial tool for spurring carbon legislation, but instead 
was met with strong opposition from the Bush administration.  
 
Still, the EPA was able to develop smaller measures for developing climate 
mitigation policy. The Climate Leaders Offset Methodologies developed a 
standardized approach to determine the eligibility of projects proposed for carbon 
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reductions (EPA, 2008). Working similarly to the measures that the EU created, the 
methodology was developed to ensure that greenhouse gas emission reductions from 
projects met key accounting principles. The methods required projects to be 
determined if they were authentic, permanent, and verifiable (EPA, 2007). These 
measures changed accounting standards to have more of an environmental aspect 
by including a specific baseline that identified the exact quantification of reductions 
a new energy project would help to emit (EPA, 2007). The methodology was 
developed internally, and only applied to projects that required EPA funding.  
Again, this shows a large difference when compared to the European institutional 
approach shown at this time.   
 
6.2.1.2 Regulatory tools from 2001- 2012 
This time period saw very few regulatory tools implemented on a federal level.  The 
108th Congress (2003-2004) attempted to pass 96 bills, resolutions, and amendments 
relating to climate change, yet few of them were implemented (Rabe, 2004, pp. 105-
128). This congress for the first time sought to impose CO2 reductions on a national 
basis, and even attempted to target specific industries that were identified as carbon 
dense.  However, mostly all of these tools were simply proposed and died in 
Congress.  
 
The Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007 sought to impose a gradual 
reduction of emissions levels (the Climate Stewardship Act S.139). This act 
proposed to reduce emissions levels to the 2004 levels by 2012, 1990 emissions 
levels by 2020, and 60% of US reductions overall below the 1990 level by 2050 (the 
Climate Stewardship Act S.139).  Not noted as aggressive measures by the 
international community (as most nations used 1990 as the baseline starting year for 
all emissions reductions) even these basic regulations towards carbon reductions 
died in committee with a 55-43 vote in the Senate (Senate, 2007). This bill’s 
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earmarked proposal to establish a National Academy of Sciences for studying 
climatology also failed (the Climate Stewardship Act H.R. 4067). 
  
The 2007 Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act was proposed mainly to 
increase emissions efficiency standards (Senate, 2007). The act would provide 
funding as well as research and development into furthering the understanding 
behind the sequestrian of CO2, which would increase carbon capture and storage 
capacities in the US (Senate, 2007). The bill also sought to set emissions standards 
for new vehicles and gasoline beginning in 2016 (Senate, 2007).  Energy efficiency 
and renewable portfolio standards were also proposed for 2008, as were low-carbon 
electric generations standards (Senate, 2007). The bill also called for a review by 
the NSA (interestingly, not the EPA) to see if the targets in emissions rates were 
adequate. The bill died in committee.  
 
The US continued to attempt to pass similar legislative measures in the next sessions 
of Congress. By the 110th Congress, the US had introduced almost two hundred 
types of legislation that mentioned climate change.  Although CO2 reductions targets 
remained weak, every policy proposal relating to climate mitigation measures were 
struck down.  
 
The change in administration perhaps affected the importance placed on climate 
mitigation policies. To create a clear pathway for CO2 reductions, the administration 
created tools that would force federal agencies to take on a leadership role in the 
promotion of sustainability (Obama, 2007). Obama issued an executive order at this 
time that mandated that government agencies comply with his regulations on 
emissions. The “Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic 
Performance” issued targets and emissions requirements for all federal agencies that 
were resisting the target submission (Obama, 2009b). This order required a 30% 
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reduction in vehicle use by 2020; 26% improvement in water efficiency by 2020 
and 50% increase in recycling and waste diversion by 2015. The order also required 
95% of government contracts to meet sustainability requirements (Obama, 2009b). 
Federal agencies were also required to submit a 2020 greenhouse gas pollution 
reduction target within 90 days of the President taking office (Obama, 2007). In this 
way, the administration hoped that showing American leadership within 
government would increase bipartisan support for climate mitigation goals.  
 
The EPA was also given regulatory power during this time in order to help push 
forward regulation and monitoring on emissions (Obama, 2009b). The same 
executive order requested that the EPA begin collecting information on existing 
emissions so that a cap-and-trade scheme could be implemented in the future. 
Unfortunately, before the bill passed a bill was proposed that prohibited the EPA 
from regulating CO2 reductions or pollutants, saying the EPA did not have the 
authority to regulate this specific gas.  
 
6.2.1.3 Cooperative tools from 2001-2012 
Cooperative measures were used widely within this time period to increase the 
connection between domestic and international climate regimes, and also between 
domestic organizations. Mainly all of these tools worked to push forward cleaner 
technologies, and energy efficiency, such as the administrations allocation of funds 
to the DOE for the increased deployment of smart-grids (Levy and Rothenberg, 
2002, pp. 173-193). Federally, cooperative measures put in place at this time showed 
the eagerness the industries to move forward on carbon legislation. Specifically, the 
automobile industry was incredibly cooperative in recognizing its role in emissions 
reductions (Levy and Rothenberg, 2002, pp. 173-193). This industry worked with 




The cooperative tools put in place for the automobile industry worked to increase 
standards in fuel efficiency and increased mileage requirements for newly produced 
vehicles (Levy and Rothenberg, 2002, pp. 173-193).  The state of California even 
went beyond federal cooperative measures, to create more ambitious policy 
measures.  When working with the automobile industry in 2002, California 
introduced and passed AB1493, a bill requiring automobile makers to begin 
developing standards for vehicles (Schreurs, 2008, pp. 343-355). The bill passed 
and California moved forward to require automobile manufactures to reduce 
emissions by 30% by 2016 (Schreurs, 2008, pp. 343-355).  
 
In 2009, the administration funded the DOE’s Advanced Research Project Agency-
Energy (ARPA-E). This program focused on “out-of-the-box” transformational 
energy research that brought together scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs in the 
hope that further innovation would be created within cleaner technologies (Senate, 
2007b, sec. 16538). The program also provided the creation of clean energy 
innovation hubs, which were to bring together researchers and engineers in the US 
to address the most critical domestic energy challenges (Senate, 2007b). These hubs 
focused on improving battery and energy storage in renewable energies, and also in 
helping fund developing fuels that can be produced directly from solar power 
(Senate, 2007b).  This tool was proposed to develop a more aggressive approach to 
renewable energy deployment.   
 
As the administration allocated smaller budget amounts to federal environmental 
departments, Congress chose to use earmarking tactics on small appropriations for 
climate change mitigation policy (Richards and Richards, 2009, pp. 3-31). Most of 
these items sought to promote energy conservation and energy efficiency. Congress 
introduced a small resolution to attempt to introduce more clean technologies as 
well. Nuclear energy was offered as a solution, as was electricity created through 
renewable sources (Senate, 2007b. All resolutions containing even earmarking 
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appropriations or funding on energy management were denied. Equally difficult to 
pass were legislative measures needed to increase carbon-sequestrian activities. 
These funding proposals were put in place to develop carbon-capture and storage 
technologies that would remove carbon from the atmosphere, yet still let industry 
actions continue as usual.  
 
In 2011, the Operational Energy Strategy Implementation Plan was launched in 
coordination with the Department of Defence (DOD). This was a significant 
measure in American CO2 reductions as the DOD had the largest carbon footprint 
when compared to any other organization in the world (Pew, 2011).  Although the 
American military is known for their vast size, the military also uses excessive 
amounts of fossil fuels within its operations. Instead, funding was allocated from 
the defence budget to increase “energy efficiency and new energy technologies to 
give (our) troops better energy options on the battlefield, at sea, in the air, and at 
home” (Pew, 2011). The executive administration worked directly in tandem with 
the DOD to invest in more efficient aircraft engines, hybrid electric drives for ships, 
improved power for patrol bases in Afghanistan, and higher building efficiency at 
facilities worldwide (Pew, 2011). Overall, the organisation committed to deploying 
three gigawatts of renewable energy on military installations, including solar, wind, 
biomass, and geothermal energies, by 2025 (Pew, 2011). The plan was developed 
to address military actions now, but also included long-term targets to serve as a 
roadmap for transforming the way the Department uses energy in military 
operations.  
 
6.2.1.4 Economic tools from 2001-2012  
Although the Bush administration recommended using direct economic mechanisms 
to target climate change and carbon emission reductions, even market-based tools 
failed to reach policy implementation. Still, as Congress supported the need to 
reduce CO2 reductions, there many policy proposals at this time that sought to use 
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economic policy tools on a federal level.  During this time, many tools were 
proposed that suggested that the US would begin developing an ambitious climate 
mitigation policy. However, despite having an executive administration that seemed 
to support the proposals, and a liberal congress, all cap-and-trade proposals died in 
Senate. This is interesting as this type of tools seems as if it would match well with 
the US’s economic and technology-focused vision on sustainable development. 
 
The 108th Congress was able to develop incentives for industries to reduce CO2 by 
passing extensions of tax credit for electricity producers who used renewable energy 
supplies (DeCicco and An, 2002).  They also were able to provide tax incentives for 
the use of lower carbon-dense fuels, specifically for biodiesel and the use of electric 
vehicles.  
 
The US instead sought to launch The Climate Change Credit Corporation, which 
was attached to the Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act, and was proposed to 
provide funding for industry and consumers to create new technologies and 
businesses that would help lead the US towards emissions reductions (Lieberman et 
al, 2007).  This institution would have been constructed as a private and public 
company, and would have also provided credits to industries that needed assistance 
in transitioning to less carbon-dense activities.  Unfortunately, the bill died in the 
Senate.  
 
Still, the US passed the New Energy for America Act in 2008 (White House, 2012). 
This plan was created to help America transition away from an oil-dependent 
economy to a new cleaner, more efficient, energy economy by giving increased 
funding to renewable energy research (White House, 2012). The New Energy Plan 
for America sought to create five million jobs by investing $150 billion over the 
next ten years to encourage the transition to clean energy sources (White House, 
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2012). This would save more oil than the US imports from both the Middle East and 
Venezuela. The plan also sought to implement a cap-and-trade system and to 
implement the first carbon target for the US, which was to reduce CO2 by 80% by 
2050 (White House, 2012).  Although the plan did not immediately lead to the 
development of the CO2 reductions scheme as originally hoped, the plan was able to 
transfer a significant portion of funds to climate mitigation related activities, and 
actually marked the first time the US was able to pass federal legislation related to 
climate change.  
 
The McCain and Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act was the closest instance in 
which the US passed policy that would lead to the development of a CO2 trading 
scheme. This proposal called for the federal government to play a leading role in 
transitioning to less carbon-intensive operations (Skodvin and Andresen, 2009, pp. 
263-280).  The agreement called on the government to fund research and 
commercialize efforts involved in producing new energy technologies (Skodvin and 
Andresen, 2009, pp. 263-280). The proposal also included a proposal for developing 
trading emission allowances and reductions to be given as climate credits (Skodvin 
and Andresen, 2009, pp. 263-280). Proposed by Senators McCain and Lieberman, 
who were respectively republican and independent, the act failed to pass, despite 
being proposed with bipartisan support.  
 
Despite the failure of implementation on many bills, significant funding as was 
allocated towards carbon policy through the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA) in 2009. Attached to the bill were several pieces of legislation that 
would help to push forward climate mitigation policy, including many of the 
proposals that had been listed in the McCain-Lieberman bill. Congress granted over 
39 billion USD to the DOE in order to issue loan guarantees to projects that would 
“avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases” and “employ new or significantly improved technologies as compared to 
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technologies in service in the US,” (ARRA, 2009, sec 2). Although the legislation 
was not a direct act related to CO2 reduction, the heavy promotion of technologies 
for low-carbon abatement measures was significant.  
 
Congress was also able to pass the Programmatic Environment Impact Statement 
(PEIS), which streamlined the funding from various pieces of legislation into key 
energy projects (NEPA, 2011). The tool identifies energy corridors in the West that 
will help distribute renewable energy. (NEPA, 2011) In this way, the funding put 
forward for renewable energy was put into projects that would have the most 
significant impact on transitioning away from fossil fuels.   
 
With the failure of the US to begin developing a cap-and-trade scheme, Obama 
moved to redevelop a piece of administration that would directly implement such a 
scheme. Unfortunately, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
marked a slight setback for the Obama administration.  The bill was defeated as it 
was not approved in the House, but marked “the first time either house of Congress 
approved a bill meant to curb the heat-trapping gases scientists have linked to 
climate change” (Broder, 2009).  The bill would have established an emissions 
trading plan similar to the EU ETS and proposed the first coverage period for 2012-
2050 (Waxman and Markey, 2009) The scheme was well developed; electric 
utilities were posed to reduce emissions by 20% by 2020 (Waxman and Markey, 
2009).  The legislation also included $90 billion in subsidization for clean energy 
technologies and energy efficiency for renewables to be dispersed by 2025 
(Waxman and Markey, 2009).  Carbon-capture and storage was allocated $60 
billion, electric vehicles were given $20 billion, and $20 billion was reserved for 
research and development (Waxman and Markey, 2009). The bill also included 
provisions to help protect American citizens from rises in energy costs that utility 
firms could pass onto consumers in order to finance efficiency measures. This piece 
of legislation included specific order for utility firms to hold energy prices consistent 
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and to invest in energy.  Although the bill proposed 17% of emission to be reduced 
to 2005 levels by 2020, Obama went ahead and pushed further to have the US reduce 
83% by 2050 (Waxman and Markey, 2009).  
 
Although the legislation did not pass, the Senate did agree to later, “establish a 
market for the United States when international negotiations on a new climate 
change treaty begin later”, (Broder, 2009, p. 1).  The US thus, agreed to review the 
failure of provisions in order to understand how to later address the implementation 
of an American CO2 trading scheme.  
 
6.3 Conclusion: analysing change in policy ambitions, tools and goals in 
the US from 1992-2012 
From surveying the above tools, it is clear that American climate mitigation policy 
was negatively impacted by the ideas of weak ecological modernisation during this 
time period.  The tools proposed and implemented during this time period show no 
change in the ambition, type, or nature of policy goals in the US during these two 
time periods. Although there were continual proposals to begin implementing 
carbon policy during this time period, the lack of informational instruments and 
general data made available to the US caused all policy proposals to be denied. By 
looking at the difficulties that both states and agencies encountered in terms of data 
collection, it is apparent that a bottom-up approach to climate change policies are 
much more difficult than previously presumed.  
 
When comparing the diversity of carbon tools in American mitigation policy to that 
of the EU, it seems that the weak approach to ecological modernisation greatly 
impacted the type of tools that were available to policy-makers in the US. Although 
the US often describes a “market-based” approach to CO2, it may instead be more 
accurate to describe the US’s approach as “financial” or monetary. Emissions 
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markets are certainly not favoured in the US, and the sole tools that seem to be 
proposed are financial or cooperative in nature. Informational tools are largely 
missing from the US’s climate plans, while they seem to form the centrepiece of 
European climate policy. Instead, it is evident that the US has favoured using 
economic tools such as those that stimulate funding for research, or that provide 
financial compensation for efficiency upgrades. In addition, the tool choices of the 
US seem to shy away from regulating industry, and favour instead cooperative 
agreements such as tax incentives or standards for buildings and automobiles.   
 
From surveying the tools above, it becomes clear that the US has actually attempted 
to make significant contributions to climate governance, yet institutionally seems to 
encounter problems when proposing climate mitigation policy. While the EU 
implemented aggressive measures that would reduce emissions globally, the US was 
unable to form a consensus on targets for reductions, despite heavy support for an 
emissions trading scheme in multiple institutional locations.  Analysing the 
differences in the nature and ambition of the carbon tools proposed in the US points 
to the specific types of tools that are proposed, yet fail to reach implementation. 
Emissions trading schemes consistently encounter problems, despite being proposed 
from many different agencies and from different actors. However, it seems that 
decisions proposed have been more successful when they have come from the DOE 
instead of the EPA. Although proposals come from different committees, they seem 
to be continuously proposed by the same senators, from either Western or North-
eastern states.  Despite an emissions trading scheme being an economic tool and 
suited towards the US preference, no actor has been able to successfully create the 
policy unity necessary to pass an emissions trading scheme on a national level. 
Overall, when surveying the last two chapters we can clearly see that the ideas that 
the EU has used to approach carbon policy have resulted in a change in policy goals, 
ambitions, and tools.  However, we can also clearly deduct that the US’s weak 
ecological modernist approach has failed to create a convincing case for climate 
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Chapter 7. Comparing the impact of ideas on changes in policy 
paradigms and the role of the state in the EU and the US between 
1992-2000 
The empirical analysis collected in chapters five and six of this dissertation indicate 
that the EU has been more successful in driving towards an ecological paradigm 
shift than the US has.  The previous two chapters examined and compared the nature 
of change in policy tools and policy goals in both the EU and the US to see if the 
first two types of ecological change had occurred. Already, one can see that in the 
EU this appears to be so, whilst in the US this is not the case.  In the EU, the policy 
tools have becoming increasingly mature, and the policy ambitions behind these 
tools has steadily increased.  In the US, it seems that the tools have remained the 
same, as have the general policy goals. Although this empirical analysis is helpful 
in qualitatively identifying if change has occurred, a deeper dive into the actual 
changing role of the state will help to more concretely identify concrete comparisons 
between the adaptive capacity of the EU and the US.    
 
This thesis now moves to specifically investigate how an emissions trading scheme, 
or a fully operating environmental market, requires a stronger idea of commitment 
to climate change than as currently displayed in the US.  Specifically, when 
comparing the impact of ideas during critical junctures one is able to see how the 
European commitment to strong ecological modernisation has been a more effective 
strategy for catalysing institutional change than the US’s current approach has been. 
From the previous empirical chapters one is able to see how ambitious climate 
legislation, in particular proposals for an emissions trading scheme, will require 
drastic institutional adjustments before legislation can expect to be implemented in 
the US. This chapter (and the next) focus specifically on understanding how the two 
divergent approaches, a top-down vs. bottom-up approach, impact policy-choices. 
By focusing on the critical junctures identified in the empirical data collection 
process, these chapters will analyse how actors interact with ideas and how this in 
turn affects the decision-making process, and ensuing institutional adaptation in 
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both the EU and the US. Doing so will then provide deeper insights on the role of 
ideas in the policy-process and also on the incremental institutional changes that are 
needed to support society as governments move to address climate change.  
 
In the decision-making process of the EU in regards to climate change, it is worth 
noting that the DG Clima is far from being the only important actor in European 
carbon policy. However, the role of the DG Clima—now separate from its previous 
role Directorate-General for the Environment (DG Environment) —shows that the 
EU has at least gone through one of the stages needed for an ecological paradigm 
shift, which is a change in the role of the state. Today, the DG Clima is much more 
than an environmental policy legislator, as it alone has the power to legislate 
proposals in relation to climate change (DG Clima, 2014).  Thus, the EU’s 
leadership assessed in this chapter and the next chapter will pay particular attention 
to the evolution of the Commission in the development of climate mitigation policy.  
 
7.1 First critical juncture: the historical setting ahead of the 1992 
UNFCCC conference  
The UNFCCC conference in 1992 was the first critical juncture where divergent 
opinions in the conceptualisation of environment and economy in the EU and the 
US began concretely impacting their domestic carbon policy paths.  Here, one can 
see how actors championing a strong approach to ecological modernisation first 
began to impacting the European strategy for climate change mitigation.   Yet, it 
was also at this conference that the US framed its discussion on climate change 
mitigation policy that would resonate for decades. In particular, the critical juncture 
here marked the first instance in which ambiguity arose on the role of the US in 
global climate mitigation discussions, whereas this specific conference also helped 
concretely establish the EU’s path towards climate leadership. During this time 
period, economic development and environmental protection were key agenda 
topics in both international policy arenas, as well as in domestic discussions in the 
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EU and the US. Both the EU and the US went into the international climate 
discussions in 1992 with very different domestic economic climates, which perhaps 
affected the construction, and importance placed, upon their individual climate 
mitigation policies.  
 
In 1992, several European economies had high unemployment rates, stagnant 
growth rates, which seemed to be a point of frustration for both European citizens 
and policy-makers (Winkler, interview, 2015). Adding Eastern European economies 
into the EU after the post-Soviet collapse had placed additional economic pressure 
on European institutions. In particular, the agricultural industries, which typically 
had contributed to a significant portion of Eastern European growth, were 
significantly damaged (Winkler, interview, 2015).  European policy-makers at the 
time were focused on creating a single market in which goods and services would 
establish a competitive single trading area, and where businesses could operate 
across borders (Winkler, interview, 2015).  Therefore, the EU needed to develop an 
approach to economic development that would also address environmental 
degradation and produce economic growth. It was at this conference in 1992 where 
one can see how the notion of strong ecological modernisation as an effective 
strategy for climate mitigation goals first began impacting policy decisions.  
 
At this time, it seems that citizens supported the need for environmental protection 
and placed pressure on European leaders to take action on environmental legislation, 
including climate change (Winkler, interview, 2015). In the EU, “the idea that the 
world needed environmental considerations within economic growth, and climate 
change could help to do so, go back a very long way,” explained Joan MacNaughton, 
former DG Energy for the UK, and active participate in the formation of carbon 
policy in the EU (MacNaughton, interview, 2015).  “In part, this was due to the 
Scandinavian countries; they were active in environmental matters and climate 
change, for them, it was the best way to address both the problems of economy and 
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environment,” (MacNaughton, interview, 2015).  Yet in addition to the positive 
cultural legacy in favour of environmental protection, the legislative branches of the 
EU were, at the time, also supported by citizens’ demand for pollution reduction, 
which seemed to be adding to the overall political demand for concrete action on 
the environment.  A large part of the support for climate change) was the visual 
nature of climate change in Europe (Samyn, 2014).  Delbeke for instance, once 
noted that, “as a kid, my mother hung out laundry to dry. Sometimes wind would 
bring fallout from a nearby power plant so she had to wash it again,” (Samyn, 2014). 
European citizens in this point, therefore, saw industrial growth as a key threat to 
their wellbeing and supported the need for environmental regulations. 
 
Contrarily, the economy in the US was drastically different from the EU’s in the 
early 90's. Whilst the EU was struggling economically, the US was experiencing an 
economic boom that was in part founded on as part of the “.com boom” in the 
Western United States (Evans, interview, 2015). The explosion of the Internet had 
caused an eruption of new businesses in both services and manufacturing, which 
had contributed significantly towards economic growth (Evans, interview, 2015).  
As a result, the ideas conceptualizing the economy and the environment in the US 
were drastically different from those in Europe. The US seemed to think it did not 
need to preserve the environment, but instead, needed to increase its technology 
presence in order to increase domestic growth rates. Therefore, there was not an 
economic need nor physical reminder to support discussions relating to the 
decoupling of economy and environment in America.  
 
It was here where one can see the evidence of the movement to oppose a strong 
ecological modernist approach to climate change mitigation.  When looking at the 
interaction of actors after the UNFCCC conference, it seems as though the shifting 
nature of the broader political spectrum in the US directly impacted discussions 
relating to climate change. What is interesting to note is that in Europe, it seems as 
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if the conservative opposition to the environment simply did not exist in Europe at 
the time (MacNaughton, interview, 2015). There were little early concerns about the 
environment limiting economic growth, and instead, neoliberal supporter such as 
Margaret Thatcher, helped to champion the importance of protecting local 
environments as part of industrial growth processes. This shows a difference in the 
construction of conservatism in the EU and US. Whereas conservatives in Europe 
took a humanitarian viewpoint that the environment deserved value, and therefore 
felt a moral obligation to protect the environment. In the US however, the 
conservatives, the Republican party, simply continued to look at the environment as 
a free part of production processes (MacNaughton, interview, 2015).  This was a 
large initial difference in the attitudes towards the regulatory nature of 
environmental policy. 
 
There was also a significant difference in what constituted the framing of the climate 
change problem in the EU and the US, which can be seen when looking at both the 
importance of the issue, but also the employees assigned to work on the policy tasks.  
In Europe, both conservatives and liberals agreed that when structured correctly, 
environmental regulation could help to increase competitiveness in the broader 
European economy (MacNaughton, interview, 2015). Therefore, climate change 
was framed as both an economic and environmental problem, whose tasks therefore 
required using both economists and environmental scientists. In the US, the 
environment remained an environmental policy problem, yet the policy tasks and 
associated responsibilities of carbon management remained unassigned. Therefore, 
looking at the interaction with the UNFCCC conference below shows how the US’s 
weak ecological modernist approach to climate mitigation policy failed to produce 
a convincing case for addressing climate change. At the same time, this instance 
shows the positive incremental changes that were made in the EU in order to help it 





7.1.1 Actors and their ability to influence policy in the EU  
Prior to the UNFCCC conference in 1992 there were various actors who were able 
to informally influence the decision-making process of the EU in regards to climate 
change policies, mainly through treaty provisions, or other legal obligations. The 
President of the Commission had the right and authority to lead the tasks on climate 
as part of the position’s umbrella duties. At the time, this was Jacques Delors.  
Although not necessarily an environmental advocate, Delors’ main goal for the EU 
itself at the time was the unification of the European Single Market; an economic 
task (MacNaughton, interview, 2015).  Although he originally was not convinced 
that climate change needed to be a main policy agenda item, he became convinced 
that it could become a useful tool for economic development mainly through the 
influence of the DG Environment. At the time, this was Carlos Rippa di Meana, an 
Italian national who championed the idea that environmental problems required a 
commitment by all European institutions (Andresen and Agrawala, 2002, pp. 41-
51). He was a key player in pushing through the legal basis for action by the EU on 
climate change, which was initially provided by the 1987 Single European Act 
which introduced explicit environmental provisions into EU treaties (Barnes, 2010, 
pp. 41-57).  Therefore, he was a key actor who helped promote the ideas of strong 
ecological modernisation within European legislation.  
 
Di Meana had previously participated heavily in the Rio conference on sustainable 
development, again representing the EU at a key international environmental 
conference. He had participated in the drafting of several documents related to 
sustainable development, and believed that environmental policy problems required 
an aggressive approach to sustainable development (O’Riordan and Jordan, 1999, 
pp. 81-93). He therefore pushed for a carbon tax, which he saw as the best policy 




Di Meana can be seen as representative of the widely seen high-skilled set of 
European policy-makers at the time.  European member states were able to 
contribute individuals to help formulate the specific European position on climate 
change. At the time, there were two main types of policy tasks which were divided 
between member states and Commission officials related to climate change. The 
preparatory work prior to international negotiations was largely led by these “issue-
leaders” or official appointed lead negotiators. These actors were assigned a specific 
task in climate negotiations due to either their specific skill-set, expertise, or desire 
to be involved (Barnes, 2010, pp. 41-57). This informal policy process was initiated 
to avoid the polarisation of climate policy in the instance of a weak presidency, or 
in the instance that actors in the international arena could potentially be seen as a 
risk for overwhelming the EU’s voice.  Legally, therefore, member states could join 
together to block the presidency’s motions, but also individual commissioners’ 
motions.  
 
Jos Delbeke at the time acted as an issue leader on behalf of Belgium and can be 
seen as playing a critical role in reconciling the President’s focus on a single market 
with the environmental commissioner’s desire to increase environmental protection 
(Forrister, interview, 2015). With a Ph.D. in economics, his background emphasised 
the need to create clear cost-benefits in order to create consensus on climate 
(Forrister, interview, 2015). He had previously acted as the Head of Task Force 
during World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, and therefore, 
when looking at his positions, can see how he was responsible for was given helping 
to form an approach to carbon emissions reductions that was based on sound 
economics (Delbeke, 2015).  He was appointed as Head of Unit for Climate Change 
as part of his responsibilities under the DG Environment where his duties required 
him to act as chief negotiator of the Commission at the UNFCCC Conference of the 
Parties on Climate Change in 1992 (Delbeke, 2015). Delbeke was therefore able to 




Still, it is important to note that the passing of the precautionary principle in early 
1992 helped set a positive precedence for environmental responsibility ahead of the 
summit (Wilkinson, 1997 p. 153-173).  The precautionary principle shows how 
early on the EU was committed to understanding that climate change required a 
broader societal shift. This law was a marked change in how the EU designated 
responsibilities for environmental matters and legally helped to shift the EU towards 
a more ecologically-friendly economy. The precautionary principle required the EU 
to establish liability for environmental harm, thereby effectively institutionalizing 
the notion of “polluter-pays” (Wilkinson, 1997 p. 153-173).  This principle states 
that if an action is suspected of causing harm to the environment, in the absence of 
scientific consensus, the burden of proof rests with industry, not the community, to 
prove their action is not harmful. The law therefore assumes that industrial 
development is causing damage to the environment and suggests that industry can 
take steps to prove otherwise, but in the absence of doing so, they are liable for 
damages to the environment (Wilkinson, 1997 p. 153-173). For climate change, this 
was important as the law removed the need for the EU to prove that the risks from 
climate change were real, and instead shifted responsibility towards industry to 
prove that climate change was not real. Legally, this meant if firms took action that 
did not show proper risk management, including environmental impact assessments, 
they could be held liable for environmental damages. Therefore, it was with this 
change in values and in the role of the state in setting ecological boundaries that the 
European delegates attended the first UNFCCC conference.  
 
7.1.2 Actors and their ability to influence policy in the US  
There were no formal responsibilities in regards to climate policy in the US at this 
time. Instead, the policy process was highly informal, and depended on the executive 
branch to identify who controlled negotiations relating to international climate 
change legislation, (Andresen and Agrawala, 2002, pp. 41-51). In terms of 
legislative responsibilities, in general, all legislative powers reside within the US 
Congress, between the House of Representatives and the Senate where various 
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policy committees can propose legislation. From the empirical analysis in chapters 
five and six, one can see that legislation in the US was proposed and discussed 
mainly within three legislative committees; the Senate committee on Environment 
and Public Works, the House Committee for Science, Energy, and Commerce, and 
in both the Senate and House Committees on Finance. Not only could Congressmen 
and Senators propose legislation within these committees, but governmental 
agencies were also able to propose individual plans and programmes at this time 
that related to climate mitigation policies (Steel et al, 2004, pp. 1-13).   It’s worth 
noting that often, agency plans were proposed as the result of a request from 
Congress for action. However, agencies still proposed legislation themselves at 
times, specifically in terms of budgetary requests. If the powers of the legislation 
fell under the umbrella of the agency, they could argue that they needed increased 
budget capacity in order to address the problem accurately (Steel et al, 2004, pp. 1-
13). From the empirical analysis, it seems that the EPA may have made small 
requests when looking at the time period from 1992-2000.  
 
During this time period, and still today, the American President can also propose 
legislation relating to carbon policy under the powers of executive order; however, 
at this specific point in time this was noted as unlikely to occur (Costa, interview, 
2015).  1992 was an election year in the US and although George H.W. Bush had 
previously planned early action on climate change, he was nearing the end of his 
second term as president (Costa, interview, 2015).  Although an executive order 
would have directed federal or state agencies to take action immediately, such an 
order would have required congressional approval to go into law.  Bush as a 
candidate was not overly motivated as his order could have been overruled by the 
courts or nullified by legislators after he left term. In addition, it seemed as though 
Bush was reluctant to make any decision on climate when it was not a main agenda 
item for the American public (Costa, interview, 2015).  In addition, Bush seemed 
less likely to address climate change because it was during this Presidency where 




At this time, the Republican party in particular, interpreted carbon policy as a 
political issue, not as an environmental issue (Rowan, interview, 2015). The call for 
a shift towards a low-carbon future in particular seemed to resonate with a “big 
government imposing on big business, and that is how they sold it,” noted 
conference negotiator Peter Rowan and current environmental economic adviser to 
the UNFCCC. Instead, it is here where the US seemed to begin dividing not only 
amongst themselves, but from the international scientific community.  “The 
American approach seemed to be based on the “free-market approach” which 
indicated that if the environment needed preserving, markets naturally reflect a 
shortage in supply; however, it also seems that the major thought at the time from 
the conservatives was that with enough money, Americans would be able to solve 
the problems related to climate change,” (Forrister, interview, 2015).  However, it’s 
also worth noting that this time the US seemed to be reluctant to affirm the existence 
of specifically “global warming” or not; the science proving that climate change was 
real never seemed to have diffused the American policy makers at this time 
(Forrister, interview, 2015). Therefore, the American notion of how to address 
carbon emissions reflected a traditional American approach to environmental 
problems, which emphasized the importance of the formation of a market to reflect 
constraints on CO2, like had been done previously in SOx reductions (Goldblatt, 
1996; Schnaiberg, 1980). Therefore, it’s here where one can see how the US’s idea 
of weak ecological modernisation emphasized the need for a non-regulatory and 
market-based approach to come out of the first UNFCCC discussion, such as an 
emissions trading scheme or carbon tax Taking this approach automatically 
eliminated regulatory options as a policy choice for decision-makers.  
  
Although the Republican party today is well-known for their reluctance to address 
climate change, it is also hugely important to note the negative impact that the liberal 
community had on climate change in the US. Although Republican decision-makers 
emphasised the importance of taking a market-based approach, so did the Democrats 
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at this time. During this period, the left moved much closer to the centre, which one 
can see also, “had a huge impact on what was being talked about before going into 
these international climate conferences,” noted John Toppping, President and CEO 
of The Climate Institute and former Staff Director of the Office of Air and Radiation 
in the US EPA. “Not only did the Republicans gain more control during these 
discussions, but the Democrats accommodated them; they shifted right, and we did 
too,” (Topping, interview, 2015).   The greatest example of this can be seen in the 
largest advocate of climate change, Al Gore. During this time period Al Gore was a 
popular Senate voice who heavily influenced how the US began to approach climate 
change. He was known as an “Atari Democrat”, which meant that he saw the advent 
of new technologies as the main opportunity for economic growth (Heilbrunn, 2000, 
pp. 48-55).  Gore himself specifically championed the need for new technologies 
that would help the US become more environmentally efficient (United States 
Senate, 2013). He framed the discussions in what would have been considered a 
weak economic strategy, discouraging the use of regulation, pushing for market 
opportunities, and championing the notion that US could continue to deploy new 
technologies that could save the atmosphere (United States Senate, 2013). Although 
this was related more towards a conservative viewpoint in Europe, in the US, this 
was the Democratic position on climate change at this time.  
A major policy change in a non-environmental dimension seems to have had 
dramatic impacts on the issue of climate change at this whole, which began at this 
time. Directly ahead of the UNFCCC conference was the repeal of the Fairness 
Doctrine (Forrister, interview, 2015). This deregulation on media helped shift the 
nature of policy debates in the US surrounding carbon policy further towards the 
Republican agenda and, “had a big effect on the understanding of climate change 
and sustainable development in the US,” points out CEO of the International 
Emissions Trading Association, Dr Dirk Forrister.  This act shifted US public 
broadcasting systems away from public ownership towards privatisation. However, 
it seems that many of these public broadcasting agencies were sold to agencies with 
clear political agendas (Topping, interview, 2015). At the same time, the 
privatisation of media meant that television stations needed to achieve high-ratings. 
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It therefore, was not in the best interest of media organisations to promote factual 
news relating to climate as the statistical information related to carbon emissions 
reductions was considered quite mundane.  Instead, the repeal of the Act helped 
increase the sensationalism of the media which had a very negative impact on the 
campaign for climate policy, which was a result in the increased partisanship of 
climate issues (Topping, interview 2015). There was no middle ground for climate 
change in the US, it was either depicted as either the end of civilisation for the left 
or an invented cause made up by Europe to limit the success of the American 
economy on the right.   
 
At the time, Dirk Forrister was acting as a representative to the international 
negotiations, yet also was helping the Executive branch develop its proposal for an 
emissions trading scheme. He noted that, “while the Fair Media Act was in place, it 
was mandatory that any airtime being taken up by a private organisation had to serve 
a public good; after the airtime act was repealed, you could essentially say whatever 
you wanted as long as you paid for it,” explained Forrister, “and this was a big 
problem for the environment campaign” (Forrister, interview, 2015). The 
connection between media and the ability of the private sector to control its 
messaging through funding seems to have been a consistently negative source of 
influence on climate mitigation policy in the US.  Although this points to a change 
in the role of the state, it is not a positive change for climate change. Instead, again, 
we can see here how the lack of an institutional-wide approach to climate change 
meant that there were different scenarios being presented to the public in regards to 
the impact of climate change.   “The Western Fuel Lobby strategically invested in 
creating a sense of “us and them, and were very successful in doing so,” John 
Topping noted when discussing the beginnings of climate partisanship in the US 
(Topping, interview, 2015).  Although the influence of the fossil fuel lobbies has 
been extensively covered in the US, a point that is traditionally left out from the 
negative climate campaign was also the negative influence that the Democratic party 
had through media campaigns and specifically, the negative influence of celebrities 
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associated with climate change in the US. “The Celebrity-Presidency was as 
successful in isolating the normal American from climate change concerns as the 
fossil fuel industry was,” Topping argued. “Gore being involved as the main 
decision-maker in climate change discussions, and at the same time running for 
Vice-President meant that when people didn’t like him, personality then could 
become a deciding factor in whether a citizen was for addressing this major 
environmental policy or not.”  Although there are no studies that associate Vice-
President Gore as a negative influence on climate change, it is interesting to consider 
the lasting impact that he may play on policy today.  
 
7.1.3 The impact of ideas during the critical juncture   
When looking at the historical setting in the EU and the US ahead of the UNFCCC 
conference one is able to note already clear divisions in the carbon policy paths of 
the EU and the US. Here, the American public and institutions that represented them 
began to divide in regards to climate change. At the same time, it’s here where one 
can begin to see the influence of strong ecological modernist ideas influencing the 
policy path formation of the EU.  Therefore, at the meeting itself US delegates went 
into the negotiations already supporting the notion of creating an emissions trading 
scheme, which reflected its weak approach to climate change.  
 
The EU's delegation represented its broader and more economic commitment to 
climate policy. Originally, the Di Meana had been pushing for a carbon tax, but this 
required a qualified majority vote, and there was strong opposition from many 
member states (Costa, interview, 2015). They saw a carbon tax as being overly 
regulatory and an unfair burden when looking at the disproportion of heavy-emitters 
between certain member states. The opposition consisted mainly of member states 
from the South, and those that were the most heavily industrialised. They believed 
that a carbon tax would penalise the industry members located in their borders 
(MacNaughton, interview, 2015). This opposition was supported by the UK and 
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Denmark, both of which had operating emissions trading schemes, and therefore the 
notion of using an international emissions trading scheme as the main policy tool 
for carbon emissions reductions (MacNaughton, interview, 2015). Although the 
strong idea of ecological modernisation called for a carbon tax, the bargaining 
process at the summit itself resulted in the EU moving towards the proposal of a 
carbon emissions trading scheme, as a regulated tool for monitoring carbon 
emissions reductions.  
 
The US delegation was represented mainly by Gore, who played a critical role in 
framing the American responses to the UNFCCC conference.  This combined with 
then Presidential-candidate Bill Clinton’s more centrist platform resulted in a very 
different version of the idea of sustainable development and climate change in the 
US being brought into the climate-policy arena.  Although the Americans saw an 
emissions trading scheme as a useful tool for CO2 reductions, this was still an 
American liberal notion at the time. Therefore, this weak modernist idea still had to 
be proposed within broader American institutions upon the delegation’s domestic 
return.  
   
The US delegation at the juncture itself therefore pushed for the international 
climate discussions to focus on designing a market-based approach to environmental 
management like the US had used in the 1970’s for sulphur dioxides and nitrogen 
dioxides (Forrister, interview, 2015). However, both the Democrats and 
Republicans in the US saw the polluter-pays-approach that the EU was pushing for 
as being “inflexible and resulting in costly action…. which can discourage 
technological innovation that lowers the costs of regulation.”  (Clinton and Gore, 
1995). Al Gore was the lead proponent of the notion that the EU’s approach was 
overly regulatory. He argued that an emissions trading scheme could work, but only 





The calls for action that stemmed from the international discussion represented a 
compromise between the American and European viewpoints. Countries agreed to 
work to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous repercussions from an increase in the average surface 
temperature of the earth (Grubb et al, 1997). Countries therefore agreed to work 
towards the development of international legislation that would address the need for 
reductions. However, it’s worth noting that the intent was to begin working on 
legislation that set no binding limits on greenhouse gases for individual nations, nor 
would the treaty be made to work towards enforcement mechanisms. Instead, the 
framework that resulted from this conference, the UNFCCC, was created to help 
countries work together in the future to form more specific actions that would lead 
towards the mitigation of climate change.  
 
Therefore, it was with this proposal that the influential actors named above returned 
back to their domestic areas of governing.  In the US, Al Gore and other democratic 
leaders returned home to push for Congressional support for joining the international 
community in officially mitigating climate change. In the EU, Jos Delbeke and 
others returned to their specific posts within the Commission, and specifically DG 
Environment to do the same.  The European intention was to receive European-wide 
support for moving towards a specific carbon policy.  
 
7.1.4 Incremental changes made in the EU after the juncture 
The domestic policy responses to international demands of the UNFCCC therefore 
reflected a severe disproportion in terms of carbon policy. It was here, “where 
European leadership really began spreading with force, and began to focus on their 
need to reconcile the environment within the European economy”, said 
MacNaughton (MacNaughton, interview, 2015). The approaches to carbon policy 
in the EU and US represented the differences in the construction of their ideas 
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surrounding carbon policy, and in particular, in the role of the environment, 
regulation and economy. 
 
After the conference, European economists returned home and began bargaining for 
the legal grounds that future legislation would require. The biggest reflection of 
European commitment to strong sustainable development could be seen in the White 
Paper, Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment (CEC, 1993). This paper argued 
that stringent environmental measures could also be beneficial to the economy, and 
used an economic approach favoured by the member states supporting strong 
sustainability in order to create a convincing argument that climate change could be 
used as a competitive good for the economy. It’s worth noting that although 
Commission members like Di Meana had pushed for a carbon tax ahead of time, 
that a few countries argued that this would be too penalising on industry. Instead, 
the member-state majority supported the European position of an emissions trading 
scheme. As a protest, Di Meana resigned and Delbeke took his place in pushing 
forwards carbon policy in the EU (Grubb et al, 1997).   
 
The white paper clearly displayed and emphasised the need for tools that would 
change patterns in environmental, economic, and also social dimensions of climate 
policy.  Therefore, in addition to the emissions trading schemes, informational tools 
were emphasised as an important way used to create behaviour change for citizens, 
and to increase the understanding of the importance of addressing climate change 
(COM, 1993). Regulatory proposals were put forward to make sure environmental 
targets were stringent, and cooperative proposals were launched to keep industrial 
performance competitive. Overall, the white paper contained nearly 100 pages of 
strategic guidance as to how the European economy could improve going forwards.  
 
When returning from the conference, European institutions adjusted to 
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accommodate and support the creation of an emissions trading scheme.  Central to 
this was adjusting the skill sets of the people who managed and created 
environmental policy in the EU. The DG Environment underwent a change in staff, 
again reflecting Di Meana’s resignation, which can also be seen as the EU moving 
away from a regulatory approach to environmental regulation to an overarching 
economic approach. The EU recognised that climate policy would need to interact 
frequently within economy and energy required economic expertise as well as a 
deep understanding of environmental policy. Therefore, Jos Delbeke, who had 
previously been responsible for only the creation of economic tools in the DG 
Environment, took helm of a newly created special environmental task force on 
climate change within his existing office (European Commission, 2012).  
 
7.1.5 Incremental changes made in the US after the juncture 
By the time the international legislation had finally been proposed to Congress, it 
was already the beginnings of a new election season in the US. At that time, 
President Clinton was running as a “New Democrat,” a platform that had emerged 
after the democratic losses to Ronald Reagan in the 1980’s. The large margin of 
losses to a Republican candidate caused the party to move more central to further 
represent the increasingly conservative interests of the American public (Hale, 1995, 
pp. 207-221). The party moved to represent a, “new public philosophy built on 
progressive ideals, mainstream values, and innovative, non-bureaucratic, and 
market-based solutions,” (Giddens, 1981). The platform of these new ideas was 
referred to as the “Third Way”, and was outlined by as a radical reconstruction of a 
centrist position to politics.  The democratic ideas at the time differed from 
traditional Democrats strongly on the notion of economic growth, and the degree of 
governance; specifically, these ideas moved to combine a conservative notion of 
economics with a progressive approach to social policies. This position was 
developed as a way to merge liberalism with a more market-based focus to 
economics. Thus, as both Gore and Clinton had stemmed from the movement, they 
ran as democrats but embraced fiscal conservatism and a neoliberal approach to 
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economics. Although they both wanted to address climate change, their ideological 
background would already limit them to only using market-based and voluntary 
policy tools.  Anything else was seen as overly burdensome on industry.  
 
During this time Republicans had gained control of both houses for the first time 
since 1954 (Gimpel, 1996, pp. 115-117). This Congress, led by Newt Gingrich, 
entered into office with a list of specific objectives to address in the first 100 days 
of taking control. The Contract with America was signed by all but two Republican 
members of the House (Gimpel, 1996, pp. 115-117). This listed specific items of 
action for the rest of Congress, and specifically included a list of budget items that 
were seen as harmful to the government’s economic prosperity. The EPA’s 
budgetary allocation in particular, was a point of contention. The Republicans 
viewed the associated costs as being part of a regulatory burden, and when pushing 
for a balanced budget, pushed the EPA forward as part of the programmes that could 
be cut (Stowe, interview, 2015). This made it difficult for any environmental 
regulation to pass, even if the associated costs were minimal (Nekhaev, interview, 
2015).  
 
Although the provisions outlined in the compact for climate change seemed as if 
American support would be guaranteed in deploying the first legally binding 
treaties, Clinton and Gore had very different opinions as to what ratification would 
do to the US economy and the domestic environment. The Clinton-Gore 
administration took the viewpoint that, "pollution is often a sign of economic 
inefficiency and business could improve profits by preventing it”, showing some 
degree of commitment to addressing the issue. This could be seen in the report they 
released outlining the American response to the UNFCCC (Clinton and Gore, 1995). 
This domestic response to the treaty discussed how the burden for cost of 
environmental degradation would be addressed by increasing efficiency in industry, 
and thus, naturally reducing emissions.  The outline on climate change in the US 
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produced by the administration placed emphasis on a lack of bureaucratic 
interference in environment regulation, and recommended the use of market-based 
tool for addressing environmental policy goals (Clinton and Gore, 1995). 
Innovation, in this aspect, became a central component of climate mitigation policy 
in the US.  
 
7.2 Second critical juncture: the historical setting ahead of the Kyoto 
Protocol, 1997  
Although the UNFCCC began to meet on a bi-annual basis to monitor progress on 
developing climate change policy collectively, the next significant meeting for 
investigation is in 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. Building on the 1992 agreement and the 
need for sustainable development and climate change policy, this conference sought 
to produce an official international treaty on CO2 reductions.  The objectives of the 
KP were for countries to simply agree on their share of responsibility, agree to 
develop domestic methods that would address their emissions allocations.  
Reflecting their differences in ideational mind-set at the time, the EU and the US 
approached this meeting with contrasting viewpoints as to the role of governmental 
intervention needed to address carbon emissions, and also the types of tools that 
should be used to achieve carbon policy goals.   
 
The economic setting in the EU in 1997 focused heavily on economic growth, and 
again, the integration of new European economies.  The EU’s focus on strong 
sustainable development meant that the EU would need to continue to maintain a 
positive relationship between industry members and European institutions in order 
to maintain a balance between environmental action and economic prosperity.  This 
also meant that the European economic outlook needed to be revisited to ensure that 
its vision of growth reflected a commitment to ecological economics. Therefore, the 
Europeans at this time worked to communicate the importance of climate change, 
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and implementing new policy tools that would not negatively hinder economic 
growth.   
 
In the US, President Bill Clinton had just taken office for the second time, with Al 
Gore as Vice-President again.  Despite the noticeable place that climate change had 
had in the administrations previous election campaign, this time period featured a 
heavy discussion on the role of healthcare in the US. However, this might have been 
due to the fact that the Presidency was limited in terms of aggressiveness on policy 
measures. A marked difference at this time was the dominance of both the House 
and Senate by the Republican parties in the US.   Still, Vice-President Al Gore acted 
as a champion to the climate cause.  
 
7.2.1 Actors and their ability to influence policy in the EU  
Prior to the meeting itself, it became clear that member states supported the 
development of an emissions trading scheme. As such, the EU began to quickly 
collaborate with member states such as Denmark and the UK to identify what type 
of data was required for the design and monitoring of emissions trading scheme 
(MacNaughton, interview, 2015). 
 
Importantly, the ecological economic approach to sustainable development meant 
that the European approach to climate change naturally contained a certain 
consideration for maintaining a balance between economy and environment. This 
could be through policy items like the Treaty of Amsterdam which was officially 
signed in October of 1997, ahead of the conference. Although the legislation would 
not become legally impactful until 1999, the language that was laid out in the early 
days of the proposal were indicative of the broader European voice ahead of the KP 
meeting. Here, the European community specifically sought to reconfirm its 
commitment to integrating environmental considerations within European 
economic growth. This legislative proposal contained several statements that 
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impacted the broader European economic outlook, and thus, affected the capacity 
of European legislators in addressing climate change.  The treaty focused on 
establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union, yet still 
included sustainable development as a major objective of the EU itself (EC Treaty, 
1997).  The document emphasised overall environmental protection as an 
overarching objective of European institutions. This meant that for all policy, 
including climate change, “environmental protection requirements must be 
integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community policies and 
activities referred to in Article 3 in particular with a view to promoting sustainable 
development” (EC Treaty, 1997, Art. 4). This required the Commission to take 
action to prevent environmental damage from occurring, and to ensure that all 
economic activities in the EU should move to contain a certain degree of 
environmental considerations.  
As the EU had legally joined the UNFCCC framework, the steps that the EU took 
after the 1992 conference put European negotiators on track to identify what the best 
means for carbon reductions in the EU would be ahead of the KP. European 
researchers worked with industry members prior to the KP to determine which 
specific policy proposal would be the best tool for emissions abatement in the EU.  
Delbeke chaired the meetings, and aimed to understand how to develop a “cost 
effective tool that could even provide economic opportunities”, (CEC, 2001b, p. 
xxi). Delbeke hosted meetings with industry heads to understand how to best 
develop, and allocate, the amount of carbon that could be used by industry. The 
industry consultations concluded with the recommendation to, “simplify the 
legislation related to the implementation and enforcement measures behind tools, 
which would also help deploy faster and more effective results in CO2 reductions,” 
(CEC, 2002b). This recommendation would later prove to be problematic for the 
EU, yet helped the Climate task force initially create clear time dimensions to focus 
on the roll-out of the policy tool.  Climate mitigation policy, in this stage, therefore, 
reflected the dimensions of strong ecological modernisation by including 
consultative processes ahead of the discussions. In addition, the EU maintained its 
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“top-down” approach by requiring Delbeke’s team to form a single European 
viewpoint ahead of the KP negotiations.  
Therefore, strong ecological modernisation, combined with the general economic 
setting, caused European actors to go to Kyoto with a very specific viewpoint. First, 
any actions taken post-Kyoto were in line with scientific recommendation. 
Secondly, that legislation proposed afterwards ensured competitive and positive 
market impact in the EU itself; and thirdly, that decisions taken there reflect the 
consideration of and support of all member states. 
 
7.2.2 Actors and their ability to influence policy in the US  
The State of the Union (SOTU) address when Clinton began his term in 1997 
outlined the shift in the relationship between the administration and the 
environment, and clearly showed the use of weak ideas that would be used to address 
environmental proposals.  Again, reiterating the emphasis that technological 
developments would indirectly lead to environmental protection, the President 
analysed how “the new promise of the global economy, the Information Age, and 
life-enhancing technologies” would help to build stronger communities and a safer 
natural environment for American citizens,” (Clinton, 23 Jan 1996).  Although t 
climate change had been mentioned very quickly within the President’s first SOTU 
address in 1992, the environment was not mentioned until much later in the speech. 
Instead, Clinton’s discussions placed heavy emphasis on economic growth, yet 
failed to include the need for growth to be developed sustainably, or in line with 
technological developments needed to support the notion of weak ecological 
modernisation. Instead, the only mention of climate change outlined the duty to 
“make big polluters live by a simple rule: if you pollute our environment, you should 
be able to clean it up,” (Clinton, 23 Jan 1996).  When taking this into account, it 
thus seemed natural that the US would be able to create a market-based tool to help 




7.2.3 The impact of ideas during the critical juncture 
The American and European constructions of ecological modernisation impacted 
the types of actors that participated in the meetings in Kyoto, and the capacity in 
which they could influence domestic policy.  Jos Delbeke continued to represent the 
EU at these negotiations. Prior to the meeting itself, it became clear that member 
states supported the development of an emissions trading scheme. As such, the EU 
had collaborated intently with member states such as Denmark and the UK in the 
weeks ahead of the meeting to identify what type of data was required for the design 
and monitoring of emissions trading scheme (MacNaughton, interview, 2015).  
 
Although the EU had Commission members like Delbeke directly involved in the 
negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, in the US climate change again was supported 
directly through the coordination of the executive branch.  In 1997, President 
Clinton and Al Gore’s administration had recently begun its second term in office.  
Therefore, when the administration took office in January of 1997, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement was a key legislative topic, and contained again 
proposals for environmental protection that would be produced through increased 
economic growth.   
 
Still, Clinton reiterated the focus of the administration to “protect our global 
environment, working to ban the worst toxic chemicals and to reduce the greenhouse 
gases that challenge our health even as they change our climate”, (Clinton, 23 Jan 
1996). Thereby, when Todd Stern, a lawyer, joined Al Gore to represent the US as 
a special envoy on behalf of the President, it was expected that the US would support 
the international proposals for an emissions trading scheme. However, what failed 
to be taken into account, again, was that environmental proposals resulting from the 
international discussions would require executive order or Congressional approval. 
Therefore, it became important for American policy entrepreneurs to clearly 




7.2.4 Incremental changes made in the EU after the critical juncture  
After the conference, the signatory for the KP mandated that the EU required 
support from European member states. The majority support needed for official 
ratification of the EU was taken quickly and easily. European policy-makers had 
worked to show the domestic economic benefits of addressing emissions reductions 
amongst both industry members and European citizens (Winkler, interview, 2015). 
The institutional adjustments made after the KP meant that the EU’s scientific 
expertise needed to develop directly in line with the recommendations of the IPCC 
and UNFCCC. After the conference, policy-makers in the EU focused on spreading 
information relating to the importance of addressing climate change and creating a 
citizen base that was supportive of the legislative actions that would need to go into 
place in order for the EU to meet its carbon reductions responsibilities.   A critical 
aspect of this was the mandated change to the Commission itself.  In order to 
encourage the dissemination of climate information, legislation was passed shifting 
again the EU’s tone on climate change from active to pro-active. Now, in the 
instance that the scientific community released reports warning of dangers to the 
public in any aspect related to the environment, the Commission was ordered to take 
a public signal within the first six months of the policy landing on the DG 
Environments desk (Unspecified, 2007).  This removed the chance that policy could 
“expire” and instead put a specific time limit for action in the hands of the 
Commission.  
 
The most specific institutional changes that were taken after the KP, were the 
adjustments taken to accommodate and support the creation of an emissions trading 
scheme. As the EU lacked statistical information on a European scale in order to 
identify how to create the appropriate allocations for industry in the carbon 
emission-trading scheme, DG Environment worked to create a new special taskforce 
that would help to collect and disseminate information as related to CO2   reductions 
(Unspecified, 2007). Central to this was adjusting the skill sets of the people who 
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managed and created environmental policy in the EU. Keeping economists involved 
in the project, as well as expanding the policy expertise to include scientists, helped 
the EU to retain purely fact-based discussions in regards to climate change.   
 
The special task force on climate was therefore formed to continue the dialogue with 
industry to test the data that various European agencies collected. The DG 
Environment underwent a change in staff, reflecting the change of international 
demands that shifted away from a regulatory to an overarching economic approach. 
The EU recognised that climate policy would need to interact frequently within 
economy and energy required a different type of expertise. Therefore, Jos Delbeke, 
who had previously been responsible for only the creation of economic tools in the 
DG Environment, took helm of a newly created special environmental task force on 
climate change within DG Environment (European Commission, 2012). Here, one 
can see how having a DG Environment with an economic background was helpful 
in creating a clear understanding of the costs and benefits associated with climate 
change mitigation.  
 
The EU then moved to begin working on the creation of an emissions trading 
scheme, which was a notion that originated from weak ecological modernisation, 
the emphasis of as strong ecological approach to climate change helped to make 
sure the initial emissions reductions targets were set stringently enough to 
accommodate both sides of the European spectrum. Still, the document clearly 
displayed and emphasised the need for tools that would change patterns in 
environmental, economic, and also social dimensions of climate policy.  Therefore, 
in addition to the emissions trading schemes, informational tools post conference 
were used to create behaviour change for citizens, and to increase the understanding 
of the importance of addressing climate change (Tudway, interview, 2015). 
Regulatory proposals were put forward to make sure environmental targets were 
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stringent, and cooperative proposals were launched to keep industrial performance 
competitive. 
 
In addition, by 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam had gone into place legally. The 
Treaty emphasised the importance member states were to play in the environmental 
policy process in the EU, and called on member states to report any environmental 
concerns that they believed might harm the functioning of the internal market.  This 
also indirectly helped support climate change dissemination, as member states were 
required to take into account “any new development based on scientific facts," (EC 
treaty, 1997, p. 9)   This translated into climate action, as the same proposal required 
key stakeholders, as identified by policy topic experts, to review any protective 
measures proposed in response to new findings, and to communicate their opinion 
on the effectiveness of protective measures (EC treaty, 1997). 
 
The reinforcement of ecological ideas under the Amsterdam treaty meant that policy 
options to European policy-makers reflected a broad and wide variety of policy 
tools.  Informational tools were a critical aspect in helping institutions to “learn” 
and develop in direct line with the increasing complexities in the European markets 
(CEC, 2005b).  Agencies themselves were responsible for maintaining information 
and for recommending areas where they needed further data for informed decision-
making (CEC, 2005b).  At the same time, the EU stressed the importance of 
spending 3% of GDP on research and development by 2010; this ensured further 
contribution to the technological developments needed to combat climate change 
(CEC, 2005b). Member states were encouraged to take advantage of funds needed 
for the transition to low-carbon technologies, specifically, encouraging member 




7.2.5 Incremental changes made in the US after the critical juncture  
Although the US signed the Protocol, negotiators returned with a proposal that 
required congressional approval before the US federal could take action. While the 
EU worked to create the agencies needed to present a unified case for climate 
mitigation policy, the US failed to create the institutional coordination needed for 
disseminating and analysing new information.  Here, one can see how the US's focus 
on a lack of governmental interference in climate policies made it difficult to 
increase the regulatory capacity of the EPA; instead, the only way to push forward 
CO2 regulation was through a special mandate from the President, which supported 
the signing of the Kyoto. This then, transferred a large amount of responsibility to 
the executive branch of the US, which further I believe further increased the 
partisan-association of carbon policy. Making the executive branch responsible for 
climate change matters meant that climate change shifted from being an 
environmental matter to becoming a political issue.  
 
The KP was debated in both the House Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, as well as in the Senate Committee on Energy and Finance. It seemed 
that at the time, "industry in the US supported the proposal, yet there was still a need 
for clear information to understand how various types of commitments would affect 
economic performance” said then CEO of Alstom, Philippe Joubert (Joubert, 
interview, 2015).  Statistical information used in the House debates to support the 
findings was unclear in regards to the correct ambition needed for targets, as well as 
in regards to the specific obligations of developing countries in meeting their 
commitments (Forrister, interview, 2015).  Friends of the Earth, the most liberal 
lobby organisation, had data that showed the US needed to implement aggressive 
targets, whereas the Environmental Defence Fund recommended weaker targets 
(Forrister, interview, 2015). At the same time, there was a heavy amount of lobbying 
that took place during this time period where a large amount of information was 
given to members of Congress in attempts to distort the severity of climate change 
(Topping, interview, 2015). Congressional members therefore, were completely 
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unable to form a unanimous position as to which levels of emissions would be 
sufficient for addressing environmental improvement, and avoiding negatively 
impacting the US economy.  
 
Here, one can also see how the institutional eruption of conservative non-
governmental organisations made any type of climate change legislation difficult to 
implement. Although the documentation of fossil-fuel influence on the climate 
campaign has been noted for impacting legislation in general at this time, the extent 
of these efforts appear to go much further than previously documented.  For 
instance, several of the interviewees in this dissertation commented on a specific 
legacy of fact distortion associated with think-tanks that are found throughout the 
US. Specifically, interviewees pointed to the negative impact that the American 
Enterprise Institute, Cato, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute, all had on 
negatively informing the climate campaign in the US (Topping, interview, 2015; 
Forrister, interview, 2015; Neil, interview, 2015).  At this specific instance in time, 
these institutions began to create a case for further weakening the need for reducing 
CO2 emissions, which they described as a direct threat to American economic 
growth. “These institutions were mainly in charge of creating questions about data 
and high-ranking officials in the science world- those have been fuelled and found 
much higher in the US.  Federally, in the US, Republicans questioned everything; 
97% of scientists in the EPA and DOE agreed this was a problem, and that we 
needed to create policies to do something, yet it was a select few who choose 
intentionally to ignore it, and to build a campaign around that," John Topping stated 
when questioned about the role of lobbies during his time in office (Topping, 
interview, 2015).  “These organisations also fed into the federal staffers- there was 
a conscious effort to do that. Junior staffers were influenced and courted by these 
organisations and they were in charge of briefing policy-makers. They told them 
exactly what the corporate interests at the time wanted them to, and that limited the 
chance of creating federal climate policy”, said Topping while giving insights on 
the closed policy debates (Topping, interview, 2015). Therefore, American policy-
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makers moved to propose even weaker approaches to carbon policy as it seems they 
saw any type of policy relating to the KP as detrimental to the competitiveness of 
the American economy.  
 
As a result of the disinformation campaign, many policy tool options were 
eliminated for policy-makers. There was apparently little chance that any proposal 
relating to climate change would pass, and even smaller chance on a specific carbon 
policy. Instead, fossil-fuel companies rallied to support a tax to kill the proposal of 
an emissions trading scheme, even though the specific tool had stemmed from the 
American discussions that began as early as 1992 (Boersma, interview, 2015). 
However, this was not because they thought a tax would be less damaging, but 
because, "they knew supporting a carbon tax would not get congressional approval. 
Instead, “by supporting that and opposing cap and trade, it seemed that the Kyoto's 
proposals were completely misaligned with American economic interests," (Stowe, 
interview, 2015). Therefore, the type of tool to best address CO2   became even 
further distorted and climate change as a whole became an economic threat to the 
US.    
 
The lack of coordinated information in the US instead, resulted in Congress 
supporting the viewpoint that an emissions scheme would become economically 
damaging to American economic growth. Chuck Hagel, a Republican from 
Nebraska, and Robert Byrd, a Democratic senator from West Virginia, a coal state, 
led the proposal of the Byrd-Hagel bill, the US response to the Kyoto Protocol.  The 
bill forbade the US from signing international environmental treaties that did not 
include developing countries.  Hagel, at the time, was head of the Department of 
Defence (DOD), which was the organisation with the largest carbon footprint 
compared to any other organization on the entire planet (Little, 2005).  His 
viewpoint on the Kyoto Protocol was that “any time you put mandatory caps on any 
program- which I’m opposed to- you are going to have a consequence, and I don’t 
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think it’s going to be a good consequence”, (Little, 2005). He believed that the 
mandatory caps would lower industrial productivity and efficiency, and also would 
“lower job choices, and [would] lower the whole quality of economic dynamics 
when you try and artificially cap energy use” (Little, 2005). Mandatory reductions 
thus, were removed as a policy tool option.  
 
The policy response to Kyoto was instead Byrd-Hagel, which acted as a final 
example of how weak ecological modernisation affected the American choice of 
carbon policy tools. Although the Kyoto Protocol was designed to accommodate 
American policy-makers, the failure to communicate the impact of emissions 
reductions resulted in the failure to create a policy response to mitigation demands. 
Instead, the US was officially banned from signing international environmental 
treaties relating to climate change where developing countries were not obligated to 
commit, thereby sharing the legal burden with the US.  Policy proposals therefore, 
remained stagnated, and simply continued in line with efficiency standards proposed 
by the EPA. 
 
7.3 Conclusion: comparing the impact of ideas on the change in policy 
paradigms and the roles of the state in the EU and US from 1992-
2000 
The first critical junctures examined in this period show how the EU’s idea of strong 
ecological modernisation led to an effective approach to climate mitigation policy. 
The ideas of actors at this time influenced many gradual institutional adjustments 
that caused the EU to begin moving towards a new form of economy. These 
junctures mainly examine the impact that gradual institutional adjustments have had 
on the organisational and administrative capacity of the EU. The junctures analysed 
showed how strong ecological modernisation led to the creation of a convincing 
notion for climate change policy. Here the diffusion of strong ecological norms 
influenced the policy-choices of European policy-makers, and led to the creation of 
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new agencies.  DG Clima specifically placed economists at the centre of European 
climate policy, who were then able to identify the information needed to clearly 
show European citizens and policy-makers the benefits of creating climate policy. 
This increased the institutional capability of the EU, which helped to increase the 
EU’s climate capabilities. 
 
The emphasis on taking an aggressive approach to ecological modernisation in the 
end, moved the regulatory agenda towards a more dynamic atmosphere for business 
while at the same time increasing a more “sustainable, integrated, European climate 
and energy policy,” (Costa, interview, 2015). A critical objective for achieving this 
long-term transition was strengthening the internal market to ensure 
competitiveness. This legislation specifically called for the restructuring of financial 
measures to help better emphasize long-term goals of the economy instead of 
focusing on short-term results.  This is what prompted the development of tools like 
the EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) and green accounting 
standards.   
 
Contrarily, these junctures show how in the US, the weak approach to ecological 
modernisation impacted the level of changes made in the policy process. These 
junctures examine the impact that this idea had on shaping the perspectives of 
American policy-makers. Here, the junctures show how these ideas caused climate 
mitigation goals to be held as environmental goals, yet failed to become an overall 
goal for development across broader American federal agencies. Although several 
different agencies in the US recognised the importance in addressing climate goals, 
these agencies failed to develop a unified approach to mitigation goals.  As a result, 
it was difficult to for policy-makers to form a clear understanding on the economic 
impacts of climate change. The failure to have a concrete, overarching institutional 
approach to climate change allowed negative climate information to enter the 
system, and instead, a norm that climate policy would damage American economic 
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competitiveness became an institutional norm. As such, climate change goals in the 




Chapter 8. Comparing the impact of ideas on changes in policy 
paradigms and the role of the state in the EU and the US from 
2001-2012 
Tracing the junctures below examines the degree of influence that pre-existing 
notions have on actors when making policy choices within the carbon policy 
processes of the EU and the US. During this juncture, one can see how variations in 
the approach to ecological modernisation had an impact on the evolution of 
institutional structures both in the EU and US. This juncture shows how with strong 
institutional cooperation, and an informed scientific approach, ecological concerns 
came to become fully entrenched in the European economy. At the same time, these 
junctures highlight the lack of American engagement in the international climate 
policy arena, and the negative impact that this has had on the domestic formation of 
US mitigation regimes.  As such, these junctures below show the problems that 
come without having an overarching commitment to climate change and the positive 
impact that engaging with the international arena has had on the evolution of 
European domestic institutions. This time period highlights in particular how the 
EU’s strong ecological approach to climate policy continued to drive an effective 
policy-pathway to a low-carbon future, whereas the US’s approach to climate 
mitigation policies failed to result in an increase in the adaptive capacity of 
American institutions.  
 
The previous chapter focused on analysing the difficulties in creating institutional 
support for climate mitigation policy in the US and the EU. The critical junctures of 
both the first UNFCCC conference and the KP show how difficult it was for the US 
to push the environmental agenda forward without having an overarching 
commitment to climate change mitigation. At the same time, the previous chapter 
highlighted a lack of institutional evolution in the US as opposed to the sophisticated 
evolution of European policy entrepreneurs and policy arrangements. This chapter 
retains a focus on international climate conferences and seeks to showcase the 
differences in incremental changes that joining the UNFCCC meetings, as opposed 
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to not officially ratifying the KP, have had on the EU and the US. Whilst the 
previous chapter highlighted the difficulties that the US had in even committing to 
this type of policy, this chapter seeks to give a deeper understanding in the division 
of policy paths that are caused by engaging in the international policy arena. This 
chapter focuses specifically on emissions trading schemes as a policy outcome in 
order to better understand the impacts that strong versus weak ecological 
modernisation have on institutions seeking to create ambitious climate policy.  This 
chapter shows how the idea of strong ecological modernisation has specifically 
influenced the institutional adaptation needed to support the development of a CO2 
trading scheme.  
 
 
8.1 First critical juncture: the historical setting ahead of the Marrakesh 
Accords, 2001  
The year of the Marrakesh Accords marked an even further division in the climate 
policies of the US and EU. The domestic carbon policy paths post-Kyoto Protocol 
had previously already resulted in very different approaches to how to address 
climate mitigation policy in the US and EU. In the US, climate change became 
associated with Clinton, and “after his impeachment, there was a negative-legacy of 
corruption and taint that spread to the climate agenda,” commented American 
policy-maker, Dr. John Topping. Together with the Senior Climate Fellow of the 
Brookings Institute, Tim Boersma, the two both described how September 11 further 
weakened the American ability to interact in an international policy realm.  
 
The main instance in which the inability of the US to engage in an international, 
top-down, approach to climate change is evident was at the Gothenburg conference 
that took place prior to the Accords. The meeting for the European Council was held 
in June, in Sweden, ahead of the October conference. Here, this meeting focused 
heavily on European enlargement, sustainable development, economic growth, and 
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broader issues related to the reform of European institutions. The Summit took an 
especially significant turn ahead of the Accords when President George W. Bush 
chose to attend the assembly. He was the first US President to visit Sweden, and he 
chose to do so specifically to discuss the place of the US in climate change and to 
strum up support for US foreign policy in the Middle East. Unfortunately, although 
the occasion helped to reinforce the European position on both globalisation and in 
international cooperation on addressing global warming, the occasion also helped to 
further isolate the US in terms of climate policy. More than 50,000 protestors 
attended the European meeting ahead of the Accords, including more than 15,000 
devoted specifically to a “Bush Go Home” protest. The centrality of these arguments 
focused both on the Middle-East and on the US’s lack of responsibility in global 
climate agreements. Thus, while the meeting helped the Swedish government to 
push for stronger sustainable development strategies in the EU, it also gave George 
W. Bush ammunition for showing how the international arena was “anti-American”. 
This instance ahead of the Summit helped Bush emphasize his points that an 
American only approach, one that was led by the EPA, and informed by 
Congressional expertise, would be the most effective way to combat climate change.  
 
8.1.1 Actors and their ability to influence policy in the EU 
The Treaty of Amsterdam had provided a path that further increased the 
supranational authority for European institutions in the area of climate mitigation 
policy.  To build on the strength of the newly outlined institutional arrangements in 
the EU, the Union revisited its approach to growth and development in the Lisbon 
Strategy for Growth and Jobs. Written by European economists such as Maria João 
Rodrigues and Christopher Freeman, the economic strategy for development in the 
EU emphasized the need for knowledge and learning in governance. Again, 
reflecting the commitment to ecological modernisation, the Commission outlined 
the need for “sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion," (CEC, 2006, p. vi).  Although the original drafting of this 
legislation included nearly no mention of sustainable development, the influence of 
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Nordic actors in key positions of power helped to push ahead the importance of 
sustainability as a whole. The EU Presidency at this time was under Swedish regime 
and after the 2009 Gothenburg meeting of the European Council, text was added to 
the document to help reconcile environment economy as again, a “win-win” strategy 
for development.   
 
At the centre of this European economic vision was a reiterated focus on climate 
change, which was seen as the best example an environmental policy that could also 
produce economic growth. In particular, including climate concerns in the economy 
were seen as key to making the EU, “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world,” (CEC, 2006, p. vi). The EU thus, worked to create 
quantifiable progress in sustainable development, and climate change became the 
realm for doing so (CEC, 2006, p. vi). Carbon policy, and specifically, the emissions 
trading scheme became a critical tool for showing quantifiable progress in European 
policy (Helm, 2015).  
 
The reinforcement of strong ecological ideas under the Lisbon Treaty meant that 
policy briefings to European policy-makers before the conference reflected a broad 
and wide variety of policy tools.  Informational tools were seen as a critical aspect 
in helping institutions to “learn” and develop in direct line with the increasing 
complexities in the European markets (CEC, 2005b).  Agencies themselves were 
responsible for maintaining information and for recommending areas where they 
needed further data for informed decision-making (CEC, 2005b).  At the same time, 
the EU stressed the importance of spending 3% of GDP on research and 
development by 2010; this ensured further contributions would be made to the 
technological developments needed to combat climate change (CEC, 2005b). 
Member states were encouraged to identify where specific funds were needed for 
the transition to low-carbon technologies; specifically, the Commission worked to 
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encourage member states to move towards renewable energies that promoted better 
resource efficiency (CEC, 2005b). 
 
Jos Delbeke was to attend the conference on behalf of the Climate Change Unit, DG 
Environment in the EU (Our Director General, 2015). He coordinated with all 
relevant stakeholders beforehand, and helped to develop a document that would 
provide an outline of the economic impact that CO2 reductions would have on the 
broader EU economy. Politicians like Margot Wallström, Commissioner for the 
Environment, helped to push forward the strong ecological approach in broader 
European institutions beforehand, and pushed for an institutional-wide approach 
towards climate mitigation policy that was centralised out of the EU, yet supported 
by member states (Bernstead, interview, 2015). Ms. Marianne Wenning also helped 
to support Jos Delbeke brining extensive expertise in environmental economics into 
the policy arena. She was Head of Unit in Europe Aid and in DG Environment 
(industrial emissions and air quality) before becoming Director for Legal Affairs 
and Cohesion in DG Environment from 2011 to 2013 (European Maritime Day, 
2017).  
 
8.1.2 Actors and their ability to influence policy in the US 
The shifting overall American conservatism at this time period had enormous 
ramifications on the passing of climate legislation in the US. President Bush himself 
embodied the changing ideals of the Republican party at the time, and played a large 
role in the climate negotiations in the international arena.  Although the international 
arena focused now on strengthening the international regime for emissions trading 
schemes, Bush was determined to push forward the recommendations of a weak 
approach in the international climate policy. Bush had previously opposed the 
Protocol as he opposed the Kyoto Protocol because it exempted major population 
centres such as China and India, from compliance, and [allegedly?] would cause 
serious harm to the U.S. economy (Bush, 2001).  Instead, Bush took the viewpoint 
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that climate policy tools should focus on improving air quality and electricity 
efficiency standards, a continual of the proposals that had been used to achieve 
environmental progress before in the US in the 1970's. Bush asserted that any 
strategy for climate mitigation should include a gradual “phasing in of reductions 
over a reasonable period of time, providing regulatory certainty, and offering 
market-based incentives to help industry meet the targets,” (Bush, 2001). Rather 
than engaging with the international arena, Bush pushed forward a domestic policy 
regime on climate change, showing again, the negative impact that a weak 
ecological modernist approach has on carbon policy outcomes.  Instead, he 
supported policy measures with weaker targets as the “purported lack of sound 
science” surrounding climate certainly made it difficult to enforce a degree of 
regulation in the US (Forrister, interview, 2015).   
 
Fundamentally, avoiding atmospheric damage requires cross border coordination, 
and September 11 made that impossible in the US. "This moved the US away from 
working together, and instead, the US began thinking in a “them” vs. “us”- context 
for all policy; essentially, everyone and all concepts proposed from overseas were 
seen as negative entities within every branch of the American political system,” said 
Boersma (Boersma, interview, 2015). This either supports the hypothesis, which is 
that a lack of coordinated viewpoint helped increase the opportunity for information 
fact distortion, or points to a larger obstacle of the US building an anti-UN idea.  
Regardless, this seemed to have significant impact on how the US viewed working 
with UN institutions in general. Thus, while the EU joined international negotiations 
for developing operational rules for an emissions trading scheme in Marrakesh, 
Morocco, US negotiators did not even join in the discussions in Marrakesh, even 
though they had negotiated with the EU beforehand on the technical components 




Instead, Christine Todd Whitman, head of the EPA, gave a firm answer to acting 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder by saying, “no, we have no interest in 
implementing that treaty,” (Borger, 2001).  Although both she and Treasury 
secretary Paul O’Neill both pushed for the need for American support of the KP, the 
President gave a speech ahead of the conference pointing to American concerns with 
the legislation.  Think tanks supported the President by pointing out “Americans 
would be better served if the Administration adopted a "no regrets" plan of action 
to reduce greenhouse gases domestically over the short term and augmented efforts 
to improve research and climate modelling capabilities so that policymakers could 
better understand how climate change is affecting the environment,” (Coon, 2001). 
Here, we can see how the US’s own lack of domestic expertise in Science impacted 
their vision of the global forum.  It’s interesting to point out that in the EU, the 
climatic modelling understanding had increased mainly under Jacqueline McGlade 
after the KP. Her position was expanded so the EU could continue to monitor and 
understand its own impacts on global climate change (EEA, 2013). However, this 
shows again, the negative impact that not engaging with the international arena, or 
using a weak ecological approach, had on the domestic capacity adjustments of the 
US. Although the US may have needed an internal understanding of climatic 
modelling capabilities, the EU was informed on those issues by the IPCC as part of 
its participation in the framework discussions.  
 
It is also worth noting that in addition to a lack of internal expertise, there was also 
a noted effort made to distort facts related to climate change at this time (Pearce, 
2010). The Hockey Stick controversy is perhaps the best example of the negative 
influence that the fossil fuel industry was able to exert on the public acceptance of 
climate change. In 1998, the IPCC released a report outlining increasing changes in 
the global surface temperatures and was quickly met with criticism from scientists 
based mainly in the US (Pearce, 2010). It was later revealed the American Petroleum 
Institute had funded anti-climate researchers to conduct research and make media 
appearances in which they were to question the novel statistical methods used in the 
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graphs (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004).  In addition, Bush and Cheney both had 
extensive experience and continued interaction with the fossil fuel industry ahead 
of the meetings to discuss how a cheap oil strategy was the only way for the 
American economy to grow (Roberts and Downey, 7 July, 2016). The pro-fossil fuel 
regime in place at the time certainly did not help to create a pro-active approach 
towards carbon emissions reductions.  
 
Instead, the American’s technology-centric approach continued to present limited 
options to American policy-makers ahead of the Accords and further distorted the 
importance of climate change throughout the American media (UCS, 2004). Despite 
the fact that the focus point of the 2001 Accords was to address the role of markets 
and technology in climate mitigation policies, US politicians insisted that “the 
global economy would be better served if the US continued to lead opposition to the 
Protocol's command-and-control regulatory approach and looked for alternative 
ways to encourage nations to reduce emissions voluntarily,” (Coon, 2001). 
Although the Accords were to focus heavily on the issues of an emissions trading 
scheme, the broader political atmosphere at the time argued that the “U.S. economy 
would be better served by low tax and deregulatory policies and a competitive 
domestic energy market that fosters long-term improvements in energy efficiency 
and new technologies,” (Coon, 2001).   
 
8.1.3 The impact of ideas during the critical juncture   
American policy-makers briefed before the conference were unable to take official, 
legal responsibilities in any international climate negotiations (Forrister, interview, 
2015).  Instead, the EU joined with developing countries to develop almost all of 
the terms of the deal at the conference. EU negotiators were able to show, for the 
first time, an in-depth analysis not seen in previous environmental treaties 
(MacNaughton, interview, 2015). The treaty’s outline was extremely detailed, and 
helped to push forwards the EU’s strongly economic, and heavily statistical, 
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approach to the environmental problem (MacNaughton, interview, 2015). The 
document also paved a legal pathway for a future-monitoring regime.  
Although US participants did not take part in the Accords, the conference itself 
focused heavily on the issue of “capacity building in developed countries” (Vrolijk, 
2001). The Accord itself focused on better understanding the individual UNFCCC 
obligations of each country, but also, on how more Annex 1 (large industrialized 
nations) could be incentivised to commit to further obligations for global emissions 
reductions.  The EU took an approach that was based on the recommendations of 
the scientific community, and pushed for an absolute cap, or agreed upon limit, on 
global emissions reductions emissions so that countries would feel pressure to 
develop stronger national policies (UNFCCC, 2012). However, conference 
negotiators still tried to accommodate the American point of view, despite their lack 
of official presence.  The discussions therefore produced “Kyoto Mechanisms”, 
which were new programmes designed for increasing the role of finance and 
technology transfers in mitigating climate risks (Vrolijk, 2001).   
 
The main outcomes of the Accords were for countries to share and collaborate on 
“learning experiences”.  A technology transfer group was established as part of the 
new Clean Development mechanisms so that in addition to a market-based 
emissions trading scheme, there would be a technology focus “so the US can also 
take part in future negotiations (Vrolijk, 2001, p. 46).  Although the period seen 
from 1992-2000 had focused on a research period for the involved nations, the 
period from 2001 going forwards clearly established an action framework for both 
markets and for technology.  The period going forwards was to specifically look at 
the “removal of barriers, environmental regulation, and end means needed for 
technology” that would be used to mitigate carbon (Vrolijk, 2001, p. 41). Although 
the US championed this as their favoured domestic strategy for achieving 
international carbon policy aims, they still did not support the discussions insisting 
that their own domestic regime would eventually produce the same results as the 





8.1.4 Incremental changes made in the EU after the juncture  
The Commission showed the European commitment to strong ecological 
modernisation when the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), was 
launched in 2001 to specifically support the European’s learning ambitions as stated 
in the Marrakesh Accords. A specific working group within the ECCP was set up to 
discuss how to construct an emissions trading scheme among participating nations 
and industries with different economic backgrounds in the EU (CEC, 2001b). It 
brought together scientific experts from various European agencies to discuss how 
to specifically address climate change in a robust policy manner, specifically when 
taking into account the desire to create a new carbon market. Members in these 
discussion groups were chosen for their availability to ensure consistency in 
discussions and, where possible, the EU tried to identify representatives who had 
been involved in previous discussions, and were well versed on the subject of 
mitigation overall (CEC, 2001b). Many organizations were represented by the same 
representative that had attended both the 1992 and 1997 meetings, which helped to 
ensure continuity in European climate policy development (Forrister, interview, 
2015).  The ECCP, thus, was launched to act as a forum for exchanging views prior 
to the launch of the EU ETS, and to help build broader coordination amongst various 
European stakeholders that would be critical in achieving European climate 
mitigation goals. The ECCP can be seen as a programme of the EU centralising its 
climate research under one main umbrella. Although responsibilities related to 
climate change would grow amongst various individuals, the ECCP helped to act as 
a centralised programme for collecting data, viewpoints, and the overall progress of 
European climate mitigation.  
 
The emphasis on learning and data collection at the Marrakesh accords was helpful 
in influencing the European institutional adjustments made after the meeting.  
National Focal Points were created under the umbrella of the EEA to make sure 
European-level information matched the data collected from over 1,000 experts 
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across 350 national institutions (EC, 2012 In order to become a verifier within these 
organisations, scientists were required to obtain a license and accreditation to ensure 
all the information they produced was completely accurate and without industry 
influence (EC, 2012).  The EU then created a register of verifiers under the general 
authority of the Commission to ensure environmental data was coordinated, 
communicated and completely non-biased (EC, 2012).  The EU consequently, 
continued to expand on the information it had available, and by 2005 had an 
impressive array of statistical information collected that could be used to show how 
emissions reductions would impact economic production and consumption 
(Forrister, interview, 2015).   
 
With the informational data collected from the ECCP, European climate economists 
were able to focus on how to create an emissions trading scheme that officially 
launched in 2005.  The main choices on how to design such a scheme were 
designated to Delbeke and his team immediately after the conference.   The largest, 
and first, contention was over the degree of centralization of the structure itself; 
mainly, in how the structure should act in connection across countries the various 
countries, or the degree to which centralisation would be needed in the emissions 
trading scheme (Kruger, Oates, and Pizer, 2007, pp.112-133). A strongly centralized 
structure placed emphasis on the supranational level, whereas a decentralized 
structure would allow the decision-making to remain within member states.  
Depending on how the agency was constructed would affect the flexibility in pricing 
mechanisms over time, and in the degree of compliance to the authority (Ulrecht, 
interview, 2015). A decentralized structure construction would give individual 
member states responsibilities for setting targets, for distributing permits, for 
verifying data, and for enforcing fines. A centralized system would allow all of the 
responsibilities to lie within the EU level, including the responsibilities to ensure 
member states would comply with their targets. The EU’s strong approach to 
ecological modernisation waivered here, where one is able to see the negative 
impacts of moving away from a strongly centralised approach to climate change. 
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The EU chose to create a structure that lay somewhere in between the EU-
centralised powers and member-state distributed levels of power and, as a result, 
ended up with a scheme that only fulfilled about half of its original intentions 
(Kruger, Oates, and Pizer, 2007, pp.112-133).  Still, within the next few years 
following the Summit the EU successfully interacted with the international regime 
to create its own emissions trading scheme.  
 
8.1.5 Incremental changes made in the US after the juncture  
Discussions within the US Congress following the conference focused on deciding 
if the US should address climate change through CO2 reductions, even though 
environmental experts in the EPA urged Congress to do so (Topping, interview, 
2015).  Still, the President and his advisors continued to question the scientific 
certainty in climatic models and instead, moved the US further towards a weak 
approach to carbon policy. The lack of overarching commitment to climate change 
meant that carbon policy was still handled between the Executive Branch (as the 
topic touched on foreign policy aspects as the KP was an international treaty) and 
between the EPA. Although most literature reviewing interest here would point to 
the negative impact that the media was able to have on climate change, it is 
important to point to the incremental institutional changes that the US’s ideological 
approach to climate change caused at this time.  
 
As the US’s weak approach to ecological modernisation emphasized a domestic, 
economic driven-approach to climate change the President removed President 
Clinton's previously created Executive Council on Environmental Competitiveness 
that had been established following Vice-President Gore’s initial signature on the 
KP.  This organisation, which had included the Kyoto and Marrakesh legal 
negotiator Todd Stern, was instead replaced by the Council of Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) to provide economic recommendations on supposedly building a 
domestic-facing carbon emissions trading scheme (Forrister, interview, 2015). 
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However, the personnel staffing the organisation was much different than the EU’s 
environmental economists and instead contained, “a hard-line group of advisors 
with close links to the US oil industry,” (Harrabin, 2006). Specifically, CEQ 
Chairman James L. Connaughton’s capabilities were questioned due to his previous 
professional experience in lobbying for deregulation on environmentally harmful 
industries such as the Aluminium Company of America and the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association of America (Harrabin, 2006). The American Petroleum 
Institute, for example, had previously employed Phillip Cooney, before he took a 
chair position in the CEQ.  This meant that climate policy makers in the US were 
perhaps more suited towards creating energy policy, as opposed to pure climate 
policy. 
 
The lack of an official organisation reporting on carbon data was a large difference 
from the EU at this time. Although the EU had no specifically centralised location 
for carbon data, the deployment of the ECCP meant that the EU was moving towards 
a more centralised vision of climate change. Therefore, when the international level 
proposed the needed emissions levels to agree upon, the EU was able to confirm the 
impacts of such a proposal with their own domestically collected data. Instead, at 
this time in the US, the EPA did not have the regulatory authority to collect 
emissions data. Instead of having a response to the global call for reductions that 
was based on an analysis of past polluting activities, the US instead released its 
predictions for what such an agreement would mean in the US. Instead of an 
environmentally informed discussion on climate change, the US responded with an 
energy position. The DOE released a report titled, “An Analysis of Strategies for 
Reducing Multiple Emissions from Power Plants” that estimated future American 
pathways for reductions that was based off of the DOE’s existing energy prediction 
data methodologies (DOE, 2001). Although the report emphasised the importance 
in creating a market-based tool to achieve deep decarbonisation, it questioned the 
level of global capping needed to achieve reductions (DOE, 2001).  Therefore, this 
shows the problems of only coordinating a domestic response to climate against an 
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international response to climate change. This report, backed only by American 
collected data, directly contradicted the international advice given by the IPCC to 
UNFCCC members.   
 
The CEQ responded with its own analysis on American decarbonisation pathways 
stating that including caps on carbon as part of a multiple emissions strategy would 
lead to a more dramatic shift from coal to natural gas for power, and thus, higher 
electricity prices when compared to regulating only sulphur dioxide and nitrogen 
oxide (Harrabin, 2006).  Although the DOE report slightly questioned international 
data, the CEQ report took a hard-stance against the recommendations set forth by 
the UNFCCC. Policy-makers located in both the House and Senate who were 
responsible for creating and implementing carbon policy at this time were therefore 
sent conflicting messages as to what levels of reductions targets were necessary to 
achieve decarbonisation in the US and what the economics behind doing so would 
look like.  
 
In addition to institutional adjustments made in the Executive Branch, the legislative 
branches of the US government also went through incremental changes in order to 
help inform the American position on climate change policy.  During this time 
period the jurisdiction of carbon policy legislation was moved away from the 
Committee on the Environment towards being a responsibility of the House 
Committee on Energy and Energy Resources.   Unfortunately, this small change 
coincided with changes in staffing rules in the House of Representatives. This now 
meant that seniority, not capabilities, would be used to judge how policy-makers 
were assigned to various committees (Stewart and Jonathan, 2005). Republicans 
specifically changed committee assignment rules to decision-by-seniority 
preference; the longer a representative had been in office the higher preference 
he/she received for picking committee seats. The Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee was a senior Committee, and thus, a first choice for the oldest member 
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on the House to choose (Topping, interview, 2015). This meant that a new policy 
topic was led by Congressman Fred Upton, a Republican from Illinois, whose 
background consisted of training from the US Military Academy and teaching at a 
high-school level (Upton, 2015). Upton continually questioned the science behind 
mitigation proposals, which was clear when looking at his non-scientific 
background.  Policy options were thus proposed and analysed by policy-makers who 
were not suited to the task of statistical analysis that is needed for forming carbon 
policy. 
 
The focus of using a weak ecological modernist approach to climate mitigation 
policies resulted in limited and less ambitious policy choices be available to 
American policy-makers. Limiting policy options to market-based tool failed to 
produce the information needed to form a clear understanding of the effects of 
carbon policy. At the same time, the lack of informational tools provided a window 
of opportunity for external organisations to increase negative campaigns, which 
resulted in pressure to produce even weaker legislation. As a result, policy tool 
options in the US remained focused on producing legislation that reflected the 
technology-induced idea of sustainability. Again, these tools sought to increase 
clean energy jobs, renewable energy targets, and energy efficiency standards in 
buildings in cars. These tools would produce easy wins for decarbonisation 
strategies, but are typically noted as the “low-hanging fruit” needed to achieve deep 
decarbonisation (Ergas, 2012, pp. 86-95).  
 
8.2 Second critical juncture: the historical setting ahead of the 
Copenhagen Summit, 2009  
The Marrakesh Accords showed the differences in carbon policy pathways that the 
EU and the US would continue upon for the early 2000’s. Whilst the EU clearly 
moved to create, and launch, its own emissions trading scheme, the US moved rather 
uncertainly towards a generic market-based policy tool. Although the UNFCCC 
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meetings continued to meet on a bi-annual basis after Marrakesh, it is really the 
conference in 2009 where you can see the impact of strong ecological modernisation 
moving the EU towards a more effective decarbonisation strategy than the US. 
Although the Summit typically has been investigated as a disappointment, due to 
the failure to again bring the US into an international regime, the Summit also 
uniquely highlights the ability of the Europeans to shift its own climate regime 
towards a much more ambitious pathway for reductions. However, the conference 
is also important for showing how the approach used by the US is ineffective, even 
when its domestic institutions are governed by a pro-climate regime.  
  
The historical setting ahead of the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 had a drastically 
different tone when compared to the previous UNFCCC conferences. President 
Barack Obama had taken over the Presidency of the US, and for the first time since 
the KP, officials seemed convinced that the US would make a commitment to 
reducing their emissions. Despite the European crisis coming into effect in early 
2009, negotiators felt that Denmark, a Nordic nation whose government reflected 
commitments to strong ecological modernisation, would help to reinforce the 
emphasis for international cooperation, and would help to support the long-term 
benefits needed for climate mitigation policies (MacNaughton, interview, 2015). In 
the US, President Obama had taken office just prior to the conference in 2008. For 
the first time, sustainable development ideas seemed to take a bigger place in policy 
discussions. 
 
The lack of popular support for President Bush’s overall policies at the end of his 
presidency meant his opposition to climate provided an opportunity for Obama to 
gain public support of a climate campaign. However, here, again, the lack of specific 
organisational authority for climate mitigation, or specific policy to address it, meant 
that the Executive branch would take a leadership role in informing the climate 
mitigation strategies of the US. Positively, a major part of this platform was joining 
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the international community in reducing emissions. “This was a turning point for 
the US, and a key opportunity to create lasting and effective mitigation policy,” 
noted Dr. Robert Stowe, Harvard professor of economics and multiple-COP 
participant (Stowe, interview, 2015). "President Obama had run on a campaign that 
featured climate change as a key aspect of his policy agenda, and Copenhagen 
seemed an opportune moment for the US to express a commitment to climate 
mitigation goals." However, it seemed that doing so was already an impossibility 
before the Americans even entered the discussions.  
 
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 had shifted both the EU and the US to being 
concerned about the overall well-being of their economies.  When the recession 
began to take place in the US first in 2007, all discussions relating to carbon policy, 
“took a back burner to anything that was not related to employment and economy. 
Instead, the recession questioned the general state of the economy, people’s 
priorities for policy, and how much attention should actually be given to climate 
change,” Tim Boersma stated. “The government moved to address security concerns 
and climate change was part of that notion, but was not an immediate concern due 
to the stress it encountered with financial discussions”, Boersma pointed out when 
commenting on the construction of climate and economy in the US. Here, it seems 
again, that the US’s lack of economic understanding of the benefits of climate 
change moved them towards the construction of an uninformed climate discussion 
Instead, the EU’s approach to decarbonisation used the environment to help identify 
opportunities in economic growth that would coincide with the overall aims of 
European mitigation legislation. It is yet again at this instance where one can see the 
importance of moving climate change policies toward a centralised, over-arching 
development strategy, rather than acting as only an environmental policy.  
 
8.2.1 Actors and their ability to influence policy in the EU  
The EU reiterated a commitment to strong sustainable development in the Lisbon 
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Strategy that went into play shortly before the Summit. The financial crisis put 
pressure on European policy-makers to ensure emissions reductions ambitions 
would not impact the growth path of the EU.  European policy-makers prior to the 
conference were therefore focused on how to set commitments in a way that would 
create meaningful progress for the EU ETS, yet avoid harm to individual European 
member-state economies (MacNaughton, interview, 2015). However, by allocating 
significant power to the individual European nations, the climate policy of the EU 
became significantly weaker.  
Although institutional changes post-Marrakesh meant that the EU had the necessary 
data to launch an emissions trading scheme, the DG Environment still lacked the 
authority to set the caps on emissions, and the coherence to form a unified opinion 
on what the appropriate allowances should be as a result of the decision to allocate 
a certain degree of responsibilities towards member states (Hintermann, 2010, pp. 
43-56).  As a result, in the years ahead of the Summit, the EU struggled with 
retaining power against industry opposition. The lack of centralised authority in the 
EU gave the member states significant power, including the legal authority behind 
emissions reductions compliance (CEC, 2003). Rather than having a uniform 
requirement for reductions, companies were instead able to choose between three 
main options in regards to how they could participate in the EU ETS. First, parties 
could simply choose to make investments in more efficient technologies, or agree 
to shift towards less carbon intensive energy sources for production purposes (CEC, 
2003). The second option presented to parties was an option to purchase allowances 
or credits from the emissions market, and the third option was to combine the first 
two options into a unique cooperative scheme (CEC, 2003). In the instance that 
parties found they had more emissions allowances than they actually needed, 
companies were able to sell them to other firms or back to the system (CEC, 2003). 
Although this gave both member states and industry members a certain degree of 
flexibility in choosing how to reduce their emissions as part of the EU ETS, it also 





The biggest problem in the initial construction of the EU ETS was both the lack of 
available authority in the EU, and the lack of enforcement that resulted from the 
shared responsibility decisions. Interesting, this also created informational 
problems, again, when regarding the data that was needed for carbon compliance.  
Member states used UN data, which differed from the European data, which was 
slightly weaker than what the EU recommended (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007, 
2007, pp. 66-87).  Unfortunately, few countries in the EU had their own data to 
verify their own targets, except for Denmark and the UK (MacNaughton, interview, 
2015).  Although the ECCP had made a large focus on increasing information, the 
data was collected on a voluntary basis for firms (Egenhofer et al, 2011). In addition, 
the collection and reconstruction of the data needed to estimate allowances absorbed 
a significant amount of financial resources, and policy attention in broader 
environmental institutions.   
 
The emphasis on producing results quickly caused time to be a large problem in the 
EU ETS, specifically when looking at time in regards to the ambition of targets set 
for the launch of the tool. Firm accounting measures were needed to ensure that the 
time dimensions set would allow firms to accurately apply the discount rates that 
were a central part of the EU ETS. The EU ETS needed to identify a period, where, 
“profit produced now included and compensated for the costs of complying with the 
ETS in the future” explained Dr. Robert Stowe.  "Without a future goal of a cost, 
the scheme would have been unable to provide a useful discount-cost as no 
compliance measures could measure potential reductions," (Stowe, interview, 
2015). Therefore, at the launch of the EU ETS in 2007, the EU called for a target of, 
“up to 50% by 2050 compared to 1990” (Council Press, 6272/07). This was 
identified as a period and ambition that would produce both the, “medium and long-




The European target originally adopted had reflected an overly ambitious schedule 
for implementation. Data was not prepared accurately, and the emphasis in 
launching the tool as soon as possible harmed both the tool, and the sustainability 
of the EU. Member states were given significant authority, which was supposed to 
help retain a certain degree of flexibility for firms within the system (Ellerman and 
Buchner, 2007, pp. 66-87). Unfortunately, the Emission’s Trading Directive issued 
95% of available allowances to emitting industries as a result of member-state data 
(Ellerman and Buchner, 2007, pp. 66-87).  This previous move away from the 
regulatory nature of the EU, towards letting firms voluntary help identify allowance 
shows the problems a non-regulatory climate regime can experience.   
 
However, in 2007, the price of carbon dropped near to zero, showing an incorrect 
construction of supply and demand, which resulted from the division in reporting 
responsibilities taken amongst member states. Still, the EU moved to fix their main 
policy tool and the revised EU ETS was adopted in December 2008, reflecting an 
increased dedication to a strong ecological strategy to decarbonisation. Here, the EU 
moved to further centralise the authority of EU-level institutions, yet did so in a 
manner which still sought to avoid too much of a regulatory focus. Auctioning 
instead of receiving allowances for free helped to develop further incentives for 
compliance, and also reduced the role of windfall profits for energy producers4 
(CEC, 2004). However, more authority was needed to further develop a stronger 
legal base, as was attracting more firms to the notion of launching the role of 
emissions auctions. 
 
Experience from the first trading period showed that the decentralised system 
needed to collect data and streamline implementation heavily contributed to 
                                               
4 These profits occur when energy producers pass on the costs incurred through 
allowance purchases to consumers despite receiving them for free.  
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excessive allocation of allowances and the resulting crash of the carbon price (CEC, 
2004). For the problems with the tool to be addressed, the EU would need to make 
institutional adjustments in the responsibilities of data collection, but also in 
allocating the authority behind information collecting at the EU level. At first, the 
EU suggested the creation of a department that was both climate and energy, but not 
environmental. However, a group from the European Parliament wrote to Barroso 
saying expressing that they were, “a little alarmed at the suggestion that a new 
Commission Directorate General for Energy and Climate Change might be 
established without environmental considerations,” (Schoenefeld, 2014). Instead, 
Parliament expressed its opinion that:  
 
“Climate policies require a transversal and sustainable approach, 
looking at industrial emissions, transport, energy, buildings, 
agriculture, development and foreign policy, and we feel that having 
a Directorate General responsible for both energy and climate would 
not be best placed to deliver such a horizontal approach. To the 
contrary there is a risk that short-term economic interest would 
interfere and conflict with the aim of designing effective and 
sustainable climate policies” (Health and Environment Alliance, 
2009).  
 
The UNFCCC conference therefore was a key opportunity for the EU to expand the 
individual countries, and firms, involved in the coverage of the EU ETS.  Continuing 
the momentum after the conference would require European institutions to adjust 
their existing institutions in a manner that would help them better coordinate an 




8.2.2 Actors and their ability to influence policy in the US  
When Obama himself had taken office in 2008, he showed the first signs that a 
strong ecological approach to climate change would be used for achieving climate 
mitigation goals in the US. The general tone of Obama’s speeches seemed to 
indicate the fact the US would move away from its domestic focused regime to 
engaging with the international community. At the same time, Obama also began to 
show signs of creating a more ecologically-focused carbon policy.  When outlining 
his plan of action, he commented on the need to address climate change by stating 
that: 
 
“Few challenges facing America, and this world, are more urgent 
than combatting climate change. The science is beyond and dispute 
the facts are clear- sea levels are rising, coastlines are shrinking. 
We’ve seen record drought and spreading famine-storms are growing 
stronger with each passing hurricane season. Climate change and our 
dependence on foreign oil will continue to weaken our economy.”5 
 
Although Obama gave support to the epistemic community for the first time, 
scientists and NGO's proved to be a point of contention in the policy-process of the 
US. Specifically, NGO's presented a problem when they voiced their disagreement 
on the stringency of emissions targets. Without the clearly proven official cost-
benefit analysis on various emissions targets and baselines that were needed from 
an environmental perspective, the Heritage foundation for example, was able to 
argue with the economic impact that different emissions targets would have.  
Therefore, these various targets were discussed heavily in the media prior to going 
into the negotiations. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times 
                                               
5 State of the Union Address, 2008 make sure the font matches with below 
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(NYT) presented even further contradicting viewpoints on the American reductions; 
the Journal pointed to the possible negative impacts on the economy that a 40% 
reduction target would have, whereas the NYT economist Paul Krugman’s 
published opinion were that targets were not important, but creating a clear cost for 
carbon was (Krugman, 2009). Here, he pointed out that “even when polluters receive 
free permits, they still have an incentive to reduce their emissions if there is a clear 
cost for carbon, that way they can sell their excess permits to someone else,” 
(Krugman, 2009).  Despite the fact that interests are commonly referred to as the 
main source of misinformation in regards to climate in the US, it can be seen that 
the simple lack of clear information at all in regards to climate also impacts the 
ability of the US to create ambitious carbon policy.  
 
Still, before the conference, various members of the US government including 
Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and again, Todd Stern, emphasized that solving the 
climate problem required international cooperation, and pledged that the 
congressional members attending the conference would be able to return home with 
mechanisms that would reflect an American commitment to climate change.  The 
American vision of the UNFCCC negotiations was supposed to focus on the role of 
technology, which mirrored the idea of weak ecological modernisation in the US. 
The NYT wrote that the President would seek an, “expansion of domestic energy 
supplies, both from traditional fuels like oil and natural gas and from cleaner sources 
like wind and the sun,” to help fight climate change.  From fossil fuels, for instance, 
the US seemed keen on championing themselves as the country most likely to make 
progress on carbon capture and storage. However, it should be noted that many 
European supporters, specifically nations like the UK at this time, were against the 
notion of relying on technology to produce significant reductions (Neil, interview, 
2015).  However, still, President Obama pushed ahead of the conference to open up 
new federal land to develop wind farms and solar energy plants to reduce the 
nation’s reliance on foreign oil, thereby decreasing its carbon footprint (Wilson and 
Nakamura, 2012, Jan 24). Therefore, the US delegates again including 
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representatives from the Executive Branch, including the President himself, 
attended the COP in 2009.  
 
However, it’s still important to note that overall, the American economy was still 
suffering from the crash of 2008. Overall, American policy-makers were focused on 
creating legislation that would lift banks out of recession and would do so quickly. 
This contrast created a problem for the US and climate mitigation goals. “When 
discussing sustainability and climate change, you need financially to shift towards 
a thinking that it long-term, and this was difficult,” said Rowan (Rowan, interview, 
2015).   “The recession in 2007-2008 helped further the idea of a market-based 
approach to carbon reductions, and as a result, direct legislation for climate 
mitigation policy was limited,” (Rowan, interview, 2015). Instead, again, the 
emphasis was made that increasing the role of technology transfers in global climate 
would help the US to produce both environmental protection but also increased 
economic growth. This meant that US policy tools would remain limited for US 
policy-makers at the conference itself, which again shows the negative impact that 
a weak ecologist approach had on American carbon policy.  
 
8.2.3 The impact of ideas during the critical juncture   
The EU delegation, once again headed by Delbeke, thus, went to Copenhagen 
hoping to enhance the European support of the EU ETS in the international forum, 
and increase the amount of countries involved in the scheme (Delbeke, 2015). The 
overall economic problems appeared to be separated from the climate problems 
discussed at COP, in particular due to the Danish leadership (Bernstead, interview, 
2015). Denmark had been an early supporter of emissions trading schemes, and even 
had launched their own trading scheme prior to the EU ETS and saw COP as a 
critical moment for pushing forward both European leadership on sustainability but 




The Danish negotiator at COP embodied the strong ecological approach of the EU 
itself. Connie Hedegaard, a previous Minister of Environment from Denmark, was 
“playing in her own home field”, notes Björn Bernstead, the head of the World Wide 
Views on Climate Change project, a dissemination organisation for climate change, 
and previous 2009 delegation member. “She had an advantage in pushing across 
solutions, because she already knew the media, and was comfortable speaking with 
them.  She was very clear in saying climate was not a trade-off between economy 
and environment, but that creating carbon policy was a win-win situation for the 
economy and environment; she reiterated this point throughout her media 
conferences in Copenhagen,” noted Bernstead (Bernstead, interview, 2015).  
Hedegaard emphasised the importance of a strong international scientific standards 
and had the, “IPCC weigh in the news frequently, to show that climate change was 
getting worse, and was an economic risk,” (Bernstead, interview, 2015). 
Interestingly, Hedegaard was seen as a conservative politician who saw climate 
change as part of a moral obligation to the planet.  
 
Hillary Clinton was named Special Envoy for Climate Change, the first person to 
be appointed so as within the duties of Secretary of State in the US government. 
This placed all climate mitigation policy discussed within the state department, 
specifically within foreign affairs.  Obama also approved Todd Stern as the 
administration’s second special envoy. Both Clinton and Stern joined a delegation 
going to the UNFCCC with an intention to show the new American commitment to 
climate change, and to begin developing a domestic policy towards a low-carbon 
policy path in the US. Rather than joining the discussions with the existing countries 
who had ratified, the US delegates focused on negotiating with China to produce a 
commitment that was more technology-focused. Technology standards, or 
investment targets, were proposed to reflect a commitment to the reduction of 
emissions. This would have allowed the US to create a contribution that mirrored 
its own success. “A peer review mechanism, or technology-indicator could have 
moved the US into being an environmental leader” Rowan commented, “yet they 
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simply could not create the overarching idea that it was important to do something”. 
(Rowan, interview, 2015).  However, perhaps this was due to the lack of regulatory 
authority on collecting data. “By the end of the conference, it was obvious that the 
Chinese would not agree with the American standards, which differed from their 
own estimation of what was needed for technology investments and carbon 
reductions targets specifically,” (Evans, interview, 2015).  As neither country had 
participated in any of the previous climate conferences, they were left debating 
against each other’s own domestically collected statistics.  
 
The Copenhagen conference resulted in what was considered an international failure 
of climate legislation. As the US had spent the majority of its time negotiating with 
China, a vacuum had opened for developing countries and Nordic nations to argue 
against the US’s proposals for joining the agreement. Many nations felt that the US’s 
proposals on both technology and emissions reductions were too weak to create any 
effective change in emissions reductions. At the same time, many nations also felt 
it unfair of the US to take such weak positions when at the time, the US was one of 
the world’s largest industrial supporters. Although the Conference documents 
proposed an increase in cooperation and ambition on behalf of many nations, it still 
failed to officially include the US in any sort of official commitment to carbon 
emissions reductions.  
 
8.2.4 Incremental changes made in the EU after the juncture  
Although the conference itself may have been considered a disappointment, it 
should be considered a major victory for the strength of European domestic climate 
regimes. As a result of conference participation, Delbeke and others involved in the 
discussions were able to prove the utility of a centralised carbon agency during the 
conference. As a result, the Climate DG was given increased responsibilities shortly 
afterwards as a new and separate agency, with its own director, which increased the 
legal authority needed to maintain consistency across its carbon market. The final 
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decision to create a DG Clima November 24, 2009 and the EU appointed Jos 
Delbeke (CEC, 2009). Hedegaard took the helm of the newly created Commissioner 
for Climate Action, who was charged with coordinating the environmental 
dimensions of climate change and citizens’ concerns.  Her mandate was to promote 
the development and demonstration of low carbon and adaptation technologies, and 
develop a strong science and economic base for climate policy. This organization 
would also be responsible for crosscutting responsibility for developing adaption to 
climate change in the EU and for working with other commissioners to understand 
how carbon reduction policy action would affect various policy branches.   
 
The heavy Nordic leadership at the Summit also created a positive addition to the 
EU ETS itself. Shortly after the conference, the EU ETS moved to include of 
Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein in the EU ETS, which expanded the amount of 
energy-intensive installations under coverage, and therefore, increased the ambition 
behind European targets (CEC, 2014). As a result, the proportion of general 
allowances that were distributed freely fell by a slight margin to 90% (CEC, 2014). 
The penalty for non-compliance increased by more than double its value in the 
previous phase, and rose to €100 per tonne (CEC, 2014). The amended system 
addressed many of the problems that the EU had encountered prior to the summit. 
The changes moved more centralised authority to the EU, and moved the overall 
climate mitigation system closer to a centralized form of governance.  This shows 
how an increased institutional, and increasingly democratic approach to carbon 
policy helped solved the market-based problems in European carbon policy.  
 
Although the Nordic leaders helped to push for a strong approach in international 
emissions to be taken, concessions with industry caused institutional bargaining to 
produce weaker targets. However, the EU was still able to increase its institutional 
authority in the realm of climate change.  Member states lost significant authority 
when the EU gained decision-making authority over National Action Plans (NAPS). 
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The second phase projections were based on the 2005 emissions verified data, which 
was collected from the launching of the ECCP (CEC, 2004). This implies that the 
creation of the ECCP helped to streamline informational tools, and helped them to 
deliver on their intentions.  The nations lost authority on the choice of allocation, 
mainly so the European Commission could develop a European-based methodology 
for assessing member states allocation places (Hoffman and Betsill, 2009, pp. 15-
18).  This was done to create a cap that was a more accurate representation of the 
aggregate industries included in the system. From there, the EU provided a firm 
European-wide cap on the number of emissions allowances that were to be 
distributed. 
 
Although the EU did not succeed in fully modifying their emissions trading scheme, 
the Europeans still moved forward in creating a new form of market. “The EU 
moved from sustainable development to creating environmental equity”, 
commented early critic and economist Dieter Helm. “The EU’s approach may not 
have not been flawless, but the approach towards sustainable development is 
unprecedented; they intended to create value for the environment, and they did,” 
(Helm, interview, 2015).  In the decision-making process of the EU in regards to 
climate change, the DG Clima is far from being the only important actor in European 
carbon policy, yet the role of DG Clima, now separated from its previous role in DG 
Environment, itself shows the importance the EU has placed in climate policy.  
 
8.2.5 Incremental changes made in the US after the juncture  
The US delegation returned from the conference without an official agreement, yet 
with a recommendation to reduce its domestic greenhouse gas emissions by 20% 
below 1990 levels by 2020 (UNFCCC, 2009). Although the President seemed in 
favour of the proposal, an international agreement would still require Congressional 
majority support for official signatory status. However, there were several obstacles 
internally needed to support mitigation goals. This was the first Congress in which 
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different parties controlled the House and Senate since 2001-2003. The House was 
controlled by a Republican majority of 242.  This was the least productive congress 
since the Second World War, with the lowest approval ratings. Despite international 
proposals continuing to call for an emissions trading scheme, which was in fact a 
proposal that had mirrored the American delegation’s recommendations, the internal 
domestic policy approval proved to be difficult in the US.  “The Republicans 
blocked anything that came up for new legislation, and questioned the connection 
between the costs of the trading scheme as opposed to the economic benefits that 
would be created from developing such a tool,” (Boersma, interview, 2015).  
 
The lack of understanding of environmental economics here seems to be a much 
greater norm than previously identified. The committee discussions included 
questions about data; the high-ranking officials in the science world who made 
recommendations on the proposals prior to the domestic development were 
questioned extensively for their validity and expertise during the Senate committee 
discussions (Boersma, interview, 2015). Although the executive branch supported 
the proposals, the internal support from the EPA caused many conservative 
congressional members to question how the area would impact the energy and 
growth of the US (Neil, interview, 2015).  From this instance forwards, the distrust 
between the government and scientific community would only increase in the US, 
proving to be detrimental to climate mitigation policies. 
 
This contention between emissions, information, and the economic utility of climate 
change caused over 100 bills proposing emissions trading schemes to fail in 2009. 
However, the lack of understanding of how the US would need to support emissions 
was not clearly shown domestically, missing again, the utility of expressing the cost-
benefits of climate change, and an opportunity to create domestic support for 
international arrangements. Policy proposals of tool types therefore, remained 
stagnant. The Waxman Markey Bill was proposed as a final resolution of how to 
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address environmental problems, and “can be used as a case-study of all of the 
problems passing American climate policy will encounter in the United States” as 
said by Dirk Forrister. The discussions beforehand reflected not only the lack of 
economic concerns to climate change, but showed how, “the extreme right sees 
climate change and its association with United Nations as a threat to the national 
interests of the US” (Boersma, interview, 2015).   However, even more problematic 
was the lack of skill-set American politicians had when attempting to coherently 
explain and estimate how the emissions trading scheme would function in the US.  
 
For the first time in American history, a coalition of private organisations supported 
an emissions trading scheme. The US Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) was a 
joint dialogue between industry and environment that contained organisations like 
Shell, BP, WRI, Pew, and Brookings Institute. “The problem, however, was not the 
lack of information at this point: it was the failure to have the right people in the 
right place- at the right time!” Forrister explained when commenting on the pivotal 
moment that would be have pushed an emission-trading scheme ahead (Forrister, 
interview, 2015). This can further be seen when analysing the capabilities of the 
specific legislators involved in the passing of the bill.  
 
Henry Waxman, a democrat senator from California, and Ed Markey, a democratic 
senator from Massachusetts, sponsored the Waxman-Markey Climate Bill in 2009. 
The bill proposed an innovative solution by combining tools from that would spur 
technology, and aim to lower emissions. The bill included renewable electricity 
standards, informational tools, and a package of cooperative measures that would 
help industry comply in the instance targets was put in place.  Specifically, the bill 
sought to develop "emission allowances" that would create tradable pollution 
permits modelled after the Clean Air Act (ACES, 2009).  However, the lack of 
capabilities in US decision-making created a large problem Waxman himself 
became responsible for creating the legislation relating to the emissions trading 
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scheme. “Waxman was confronted with an obstacle and did not feel confident in 
making the decision to pass the policy. He was presented with a variety of climatic 
and economic models that showed him what international science recommended as 
opposed to what the costs to the US economy would be. He simply did not 
understand the difference between a standard growth equilibrium model as opposed 
to the environmental Kuznets6 model that was needed to make a decision, nor did 
he have the time to take to do so as it was soon going to be August in Washington,” 
Forrister explained (Forrister, interview, 2015).  
 
The timing of the legislation proposal, and its closeness to the close of Congress, 
presented a problem in terms of prioritization for the policy outcomes. “Lindsay 
Graham, who was also a supporter of the bill, dropped out simply because 
immigration came onto the scene and he was supporting that, and felt that was 
enough to challenge conservatives ahead of recess,” (Forrister, interview, 2015). 
Although Graham had been a strong supporter of climate legislation with John 
McCain traditionally, the closeness to election season created a problem for Graham 
and other politicians who were seeking re-election that year.  “Barbara Boxer (a 
Democratic representative from California) was up for re-election, and when she 
dropped out of the bill Waxman got nervous. Barbara was in an election year, her 
incumbent was (Jim) Inhofe (a long-time climate legislator) and she did not want to 
be attached to anything too risky”, (Forrister, interview, 2015). Therefore, Barbara 
Boxer dropped out of Senate floor discussions, causing her proposal to fail. 
Therefore, the partisan connection to policy also meant that during an election year 
very few legislators wanted to support a climate proposal.  
 
                                               
6 A environmental Kuznets model hypothesizes that as an economy develops, market forces will first 
increase then decrease economic equality. In this instance, the model was used to show how carbon 
emissions would increase alongside economic growth, but eventually cause a market decline after 
peak emissions were reached.  
4151442 
233 
The conflicting economics could be seen in disputes between both the EPA and 
Congressional Budget Office as opposed to what the UNFCCC recommended for 
targets. Here, the agencies recommended that the estimates of the cost of carbon 
reductions would range from approximately $70 to $80 billion in 2015 to $90 to 
$120 billion in 2030 (Waxman and Markey, 2009). Approximately 80 per cent of 
allowances were to be given away as free until 2025, after which an increasing 
amount would be allocated until about 70 per cent of allowances were finally 
auctioned in 2031 (Waxman and Markey, 2009).  A percentage of the revenue 
generated from the sale of these allowances would “be used to protect consumers 
from increases in energy prices; assist vulnerable industries transition to a clean 
energy economy; support investments in clean energy and energy efficiency; aid 
domestic and international adaptation to climate change, worker assistance and 
training, and prevention of deforestation; and to ensure that the bill remains budget-
neutral,” (ACES, 2009). The international community had emphasized that the US 
would need to make allowances costly before the time period of 2030 in order for 
the policy to be effective.  
 
Uniquely, the bill also presented an option to create a system of emissions offsets, 
which would allow, “capped sources to increase their carbon emissions by up to 2 
billion tons annually, if they invest in projects that offset their target emissions 
reductions” (Waxman and Markey, 2009).  This legislative proposal showed the US 
acting in accordance with international standards and moving towards the 
construction of new policy tools, which would have indicated a shift towards using 
a strong approach to ecological modernisation.  
 
Although the bill seemed as if it would satisfy both liberals and conservatives, it 
failed to produce a clear case of economic benefits, which was mainly due to the 
lack of authority needed to enforce and interpret the statistical expertise present. 
Climate change was neither framed as an environmental nor an energy problem in 
the US, and as such, no agency held the authority to collect data on emissions. The 
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EPA, in particular, lacked the legal capacity to execute an emissions trading scheme 
as they had in previous scheme for nitrogen oxide (NOx) and sulphur oxide (SOx) 
(EPA, 2014).  This meant that statistical information was likely to come from several 
different organisations, especially when taking into account the heavy role of media 
involved in climate change discussions in the US.    
 
The lack of regulatory power at the federal level in the US also meant that states had 
significant authority to override, and ignore, federal recommendations. Some states, 
such as California, became tired of the federal partisanship and moved to create their 
own state-level policy. This also meant that state-level authority meant that 
federally, senators were responsible for taking decisions relating to carbon policy.  
“A fair amount of debate arose over the authority and power of the officials 
involved, showing the lack of coordination problem among federal viewpoints,” 
MacNaughton, interview, 2015).  “The lack of monitoring of ministers in the US at 
the state-level meant that you only had the political head, such as a senator, or maybe 
a finance person, coming with him to explain the policy problem and solution.”  This 
meant that decision-makers were likely to lack the statistical background needed for 
effective decision-making on carbon schemes, and specifically, for creating 
emissions targets.   
 
The need for further analysis on the economic impact of the proposed targets behind 
the proposal resulted in significant delay of an emissions trading scheme, which 
further contributed to the detriment of American policy strength (Forrister, 
interview, 2015). When the bill finally reached the committee floors for debate late 
in August, it was right before summer session was about to commence (Forrister, 
interview, 2015). As a result, senators were fatigued and focused on only passing 
key legislative proposals.  When the bill failed to reach the momentum necessary to 
pass, due to financial service bills dominating policy discussions, the bill was 
changed to be an additional item on the ARRA, rather than being a stand-alone piece 
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of legislation.  When ARRA entered floor discussion for debate in September, many 
of the proposals were struck down, including the Waxman-Markey Bill.  “Delbeke 
saw an opportunity, and he was able to address it in the EU; he saw a window of 
time open and he took it. Unfortunately, that window was not opened when the 
debates on the Waxman Markey Bill took place. We almost had it, but because of 
the change of sponsors, and the confusion over the content, we missed the window,” 
(Forrister, interview, 2015).  Timing here affected the success of the bill hugely, as 
did again, the partisan connection to carbon policy.  
 
As previous recommendations had also failed to cause incremental changes, US 
institutions were thus left with a limited range of policy options, and with proposals 
that were not ambitious. The administration was only able to use stimulus money to 
promote green technologies, and to again, promote higher automobile standards 
(EPA, 2015). Still, the EPA began developing guidelines for record-keeping and 
reporting measures to form a future base for an agreement on CO2 reductions. The 
EPA was to become “a partner for providing information and research for excellence 
and leadership” (Clinton and Gore, 1995, p.3).  However, the agency lacked the 
legal authority for enforcing any penalties. CO2   was not a pollutant the US had 
committed to reducing under all of the previous Clean Air Act, and thus, lacked the 
power to enforce industry compliance with information sharing (Topping, 
interview, 2015).  The US policy-makers were unable to use informational or 
regulatory tools and could only choose between market-based or voluntary 
measures, such as performance standards.  
 
8.3 Conclusion: analysing the impact of ideas on institutional change in 
the EU and US from 2001-2012  
The junctions analysed above give insights on the obstacles that climate mitigation 
policy tools face during times of economic recession or during periods of conflict. 
Climate mitigation policy, without being emphasized as a priority policy area, 
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consistently fails to display a convincing case which is needed for policy attention 
and support. These junctures also further emphasize the problems that come without 
having a centralised agency to coordinate statistical information and create a clear 
cost-benefit for addressing CO2 reductions. However, these junctures further 
emphasize the need for understanding the role of actors and policy-choices more 
intricately. This chapter shows that a lack of change in policy tools and goals is 
perhaps due to organisational problems in the US; actors who are responsible for 
approving climate mitigation policy seem to find the area complex. 
 
Instead, the critical junctures here highlight how a strong approach to ecological 
modernisation has resulted in positive institutional adjustments in the EU.  In 
particular, one can see in this period how the focus on open participation and on the 
international dimensions of development helped European institutions to develop in 
a robust manner.  Whilst US institutions struggled to collect the economic data 
needed to show a convincing case for climate change, the EU’s emphasis on having 
a science-based approach to climate change, one informed by ecological dimensions 
(such as in the case of Jacqueline McGlade) were able to influence immediate 
institutional reform. Recognising climate change as a new policy issue meant that 
the EU was able to create new institutions to collect a vast amount of statistical 
information. This information was useful when the EU ETS’s pricing floor dropped. 
Although the democratic participation of industry members was useful in helping 
garner support for an emissions trading scheme initially, the industry 
encouragement to move towards more voluntary measures meant that the EU 
accommodated weaker standards than were needed to ensure a value for carbon was 
maintained. Here, one can see how actually moving towards a stronger degree of 
centralisation has been increasingly beneficial for the EU’s climate mitigation goals.  
It was only when the EU moved industry compliance power away from member 





Overall, when looking at these last two specific process tracing chapters, it seems 
that the EU has indeed made several more robust institutional changes that the US 
has. The changes shown in the empirical data chapters show that the EU has used a 
more diverse range of policy tools for adding policy. They also show that the EU’s 
ambitions in policy have grown more consistently than the US’s.  When moving to 
conclude on the two process-tracing chapters then, one is able to see how a strong 
approach to ecological modernisation has been impactful in driving the adaptive 
capacity of the EU. Specifically, when looking at the impact that ideas had in 
spurring changes in the role of the state and in the hierarchy of goals related to 
climate, we can clearly conclude that the DG Environment has definitively grown 
more robust, as has the EU’s overall attention to climate mitigation goals. Now, this 
thesis moves to conclude more concretely on the overall differences in institutional 




Chapter 9. Conclusion: comparing the impact of ideas on the 
institutional adaptation of the EU and US from 1992-2012 
The success of the recent COP21 agreement centres largely on the further inclusion 
of key emitters within global emissions reductions. As such, understanding the 
institutional capacities of the EU and the US in delivering upon their climate 
ambitions provides useful insights as to the authenticity of current global carbon 
reductions commitments. This thesis therefore, sought to gain a more critical 
understanding of the nature of incremental changes needed for spurring an 
ecological paradigm shift. It worked to understand why the EU and the US ended 
up in such different places in regards to CO2   reductions policies today, despite both 
initially pledging climate mitigation leadership in 1992.  Rather than focusing on 
the impact of interests in the policy-process, this thesis critically assessed how ideas 
have impacted climate mitigation policy. Supporting the EU as an intellectual 
leader, this dissertation focused on understanding the institutionalisation of climate 
ideas, and the correlation between a strong approach to ecological modernisation 
and ambitious mitigation policy.  Overall, this research sought to understand the 
nature of institutional changes needed to support society as countries transition 
towards a low-carbon economy. 
 
This thesis specifically examined the impact that both weak and strong ecological 
modernisation have had on the institutional path of development for nations seeking 
to develop a specific climate mitigation policy. By tracing twenty years of climate 
mitigation tools in both the EU and the US, this thesis examined the differences in 
type, ambition, and achievement that have resulted from ideas impacting mitigation 
policy choices. Taking a historical institutional approach emphasized examining 
how actors are influenced by ideas both externally and internally to the climate 
policy process; therefore, by tracing the specific development of the EU ETS as 
compared to the failure of emissions trading scheme proposals in the US, I was able 
to concretely analyse how ideas impact domestic policy-choices taken in regards to 
climate mitigation policy. The clarification of the relationship between ideas and 
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ecological institutional change helps to more critically assess the place of two key 
state actors within international carbon emissions reductions efforts.  
 
This concluding chapter summarises and displays the main findings of this thesis. It 
begins by examining the place of the EU and the US in global emissions reductions 
efforts. Expanding on Hall (1993) and Eckersley’s (2004) work in the area of 
ecological and paradigm changes, it summarises the research conducted to analyse 
the degree to which the EU and US have institutionalised ecological considerations.  
Focusing on the changes seen in policy tools, goals, paradigms, and roles of the 
state, this chapter specifically examines the correlation between strong ecological 
modernisation and intellectual leadership in the EU.  As this thesis has displayed the 
empirical differences that strong and weak modernisation have had on policy tools, 
it then moves to identify the key institutional barriers that are imposed through a 
weak ecological modernist approach to climate mitigation policies. By identifying 
the main structures and tools that have led the EU towards intellectual leadership, 
this chapter point to the institutional changes that are needed to support American 
climate ambitions. Finally, this chapter recognises the limitations to this research, 
and concludes with recommendations for research that may further enhance 
international climate mitigation studies.    
  
9.1 Examining the results of the hypothesis  
This thesis began with the hypothesis that the notion of strong ecological 
modernisation initially helped to create a convincing idea for addressing climate 
change policy in the EU, whereas the idea of weak ecological modernisation was 
insufficient for creating climate mitigation policy at the federal level in the US. 




1. To identify and compare the existing climate mitigation policy in the EU 
and US, and to understand the impact that divergent ideas have had on 
the type and ambition of climate mitigation tools.  
2. To understand the nature of ecological paradigm, change in the EU, and 
the institutional mechanisms that have led to the to the operation of the 
EU ETS.  
 
Overall, this research sought to understand the capacities and capabilities of the US 
and the EU in achieving climate mitigation goals.  Theoretically, this required 
focusing on the nature of change in the EU, and identifying which types of actors 
and mechanisms have contributed to the institutional adjustments of the EU. The 
theoretical lens of historical institutionalism provided a clear path for understanding 
how contradicting approaches to ecological modernisation impact the development 
of climate mitigation legislation. The focus on ideas acting as drivers allowed me to 
clearly understand how pre-existing ideas and personal bias of actors’ contributed 
towards incremental changes and institutional adaptation in both the EU and US.  
 
The most important findings in this thesis confirm the hypothesis, which is that a 
strong ecological approach to climate change policy helped lead the EU to create a 
convincing case for climate change. As a result, mitigation policy in the EU has 
produced ambitious goals in carbon policy and eventually led to the 
institutionalisation of climate mitigation considerations, which can be seen in the 
EU ETS. The institutional approach to climate mitigation policy in the EU produces 
a unified agreement that the environment should be valued amongst a range of 
stakeholders at the European-level. Communicating with member states, scientific 
organisations, and NGO’s through consistent democratic consultation processes has 
helped it retain a statistically accurate and economic approach to climate mitigation 
policies. By making continual changes that reflected a true learning process, the EU 
was able to ensure it demonstrated and created a value for CO2 reductions. Although 
at times industry is overly influential on the emissions trading scheme itself, the 
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cohesive support for CO2 reductions allows the EU to engage at the international 
level with a voice that reflects ambition in climate mitigation. If anything, the EU’s 
approach can be seen as a market-based, as many of the tools it has created are made 
to ensure a stable balance between economy and environment.  
 
Weak ecological modernisation as an overarching idea seems to create a contention 
between stakeholders including industry, citizens, NGO’s, and scientific 
organisations. In the US, legislation is constructed within the occasional but not 
mandatory inclusion of key members of the scientific community. In the EU the 
decision-making process mandates specific scientific consultation within the policy 
process. The static location of the venue for data collection in the DG Clima in the 
EU makes it easier to collect and display clear targets, ambitions, and goals for CO2 
reductions. Although carbon reduction considerations are initiated within various 
policy arenas, it is coordinated clearly though DG Clima. Agencies like Eionets 
gather information from several outlets, including industry and the public, help to 
act as a gathering point for ensuring data is scientifically correct and transparent 
(EC, 2012). They in turn report to the DG Environment, who builds on their 
assessments of broader tools that are needed to support these reductions, and consult 
with member states to clearly identify mechanism to best support change.  The DG 
Clima then collects all of this information and collaborates with industry members, 
scientific experts, and climate policy-makers, to ensure an equal institutional 
approach is taken.  This then creates a clear economic incentive for climate 
mitigation policies.  
 
The weak, or technocorporatist, approach to modernisation that the US has used in 
climate change has led to the institutionalisation of deeper obstacles that future 
climate regimes will have to overcome at the federal level. The weak ecological 
approach in the US means that no single agency can regulate climate change. 
Therefore, carbon policy is discussed within various dimensions, and the 
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coordination of statistical data needed to show a convincing case for carbon 
reductions is changed frequently.  Specifically, when executive administrations 
change, so do the policy organisations that control climate mitigation goals. These 
changes make carbon policy seem to be partisan oriented, associating climate 
change frequently as a liberal concern. It’s interesting to note that the idea of strong 
ecological modernisation in the EU has not been associated as a partisan issue as 
several conservative politicians saw carbon reductions as a moral responsibility. 
This points to the need for a better understanding of the environmental impacts of 
climate change overall in the US. However, the policy legislation examined here 
shows the strong geographical bias that exists in climate mitigation support. The 
strong division between climate supporters and climate doubters in energy-intensive 
states seems to influence the degree of support policy-makers have for the subject. 
The complexity in understanding climate mitigation policy seems to be difficult for 
policy-makers who are short on time agendas, even if they have constituent support. 
 
9.2 Understanding the incremental changes that strong ecological 
modernisation spurred in the EU 
Building on Eckersley’s (2004) theory of ecological change and Hall’s (1993) 
theories on paradigms and policy change, the research I have gathered provides 
further insights on the nature of institutional changes that are needed to support 
societies as they address ecological challenges. My thesis took two divergent 
approaches to ecological modernisation and analysed the extent to which they were 
able to drive change. As carbon policies are fundamentally an environmental 
concern, I have shown that without using a strong ecological modernisation 
approach, the change that is needed to embed climate considerations in the economy 
will fail to occur.  The section below therefore reviews the empirical and analytical 
research in this thesis to analyse the key institutional changes that have been caused 
by strong ecological modernisation including change in policy tools, policy goals, 
and paradigms. It also points to the importance of changing institutional capacity by 




9.2.1 Change in the coordination of information: moving towards shared 
responsibility in the EU  
When looking at the research it seems that a critical part of the EU’s success has 
been using accurate and consistent information is needed to effectively influence 
actors to show the true economic value of addressing climate change. Using strong 
ecological modernisation ideas seems to help the EU to reinforce a societal-wide 
support for climate change altogether. This appears to be made significantly easier 
by cooperating with the UNFCCC, who helps the EU to streamline their climate 
progress in terms of monitoring and reporting.  
This US clearly has not been able to develop a convincing case for climate 
mitigation goals, and instead, it seems as though actors in the US are in danger of 
further weakening the case for climate mitigation policies. Taking a domestic, 
technocorporatist approach seems to have negated the interaction, and integration, 
of non-governmental organisations and epistemic community members into the 
policy-process. As such, climate change considerations remain a solely 
environmental topic, and have failed to be integrated into the overall economic 
considerations of the US.  However, this failure may be attributed to the difficulty 
in presenting a convincing case for climate mitigation targets. With so much 
information coming from a variety of sources, it seems that it is difficult to create 
consensus. Climate change policy seems to be an issue that policy-makers are 
anxious to support, yet cautious to implement the tools that are needed for imposing 
emissions reductions.  
 
The overall economic construction of climate change that often exists and is 
discussed in the EU through NGO’s like the IEA, UNFCCC, and the World Energy 
Council, seems to have not yet made it into credible policy discussions in the US. 
Instead, Greenpeace acts as the main international voice, whilst domestic 
organizations such as the Sierra Club and the National Resource Defence Council 
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often take the lead on constructing climate as an environmental concern. 
Furthermore, these associations often may increase the partisan association of 
climate change due to the lack of clear voice that they present on carbon reductions. 
These agencies often argue on the appropriate base-line reduction and overall carbon 
targets as they are often seen as “environmentally aggressive”. Here, again, the lack 
of authority for carbon data collection at the federal-level in the US means that 
NGO’s are given conflicting ideas of what carbon targets should be, depending on 
the international data they gather statistically information from.  This makes 
informing and supporting mitigation legislative standards difficult for those in the 
NGO community, and appears to very much reduce the credibility of environmental 
groups, and climate change advocates, in the US entirely.  
 
Media also seems to play an increasing influential role in the policy-process, one 
that becomes less regulated in the US. The fear of isolating voters seems to have 
increased dramatically with regards to the increasing role of television and media in 
the election process. It seems important to ensure media messages are in line with 
the institutions recommendations during critical climate conventions, like the 
UNFCCC meetings where media interactions helped to attract citizen support for 
climate goals.  With the increasing “celebrity-factor” in the US, and the ability of 
non-climate groups to negatively influence press campaigns, it indeed seems as 
though decision-makers themselves often are presented with biased and inaccurate 
ideas as to why climate change should be addressed.  In Europe, both conservatives 
and liberals seem to agree on the moral case for climate change, which has been 
communicated effectively to broader European stakeholders. In the US, there has 
been no convincing case for climate change, and instead, there are oftentimes 
conflicting messages sent to the public, which indeed may impact the importance 




Although Americans may be able to create a convincing case for addressing climate 
change, it seems certain that the EPA will not be an effective institution for doing 
so, simply due to the pre-existing notion of the EPA as an overly regulatory body. 
Instead, the DOE seems to pass legislation related to mitigation much more easily.  
Specifically, when taking into account Obama’s praise of energy policies in the US, 
it does seem that the DOE will be better placed to handle climate change. However, 
without having an overarching goal between environment, energy, and economy, it 
will be difficult to measure and assess the US’s emissions progress.   Instead, the 
US needs to better understand and communicate how climate change will fit into the 
American policy portfolio.  
9.2.2 Change in organisational structures: centralising the responsibilities of 
carbon management  
Ideas in the EU change in accordance with administration yet are continually built 
upon the notion of strong ecological modernisation. Commissioners often come 
from member states reflecting the best of European capabilities, yet the actors 
involved are constantly changing to ensure those with the most suited backgrounds 
on working on specific agenda items. This shows the effectiveness in the 
coordination of administrative duties behind policy tasks in the EU. Contrarily, I 
can see no change in policy coordination in the US when compared to how climate 
policy responsibilities have changed in the EU. In the EU, the strong ecological 
approach means that international norms and citizens preferences are able to 
penetrate and influence the structuring of European institutions. The effectiveness 
of the EU’s institutions depends very much on the structures, coordination, decision-
making, and management mechanisms that come from international negotiations.  
These international institutions now act as learning structures that help to ensure that 
continual adaptation occurs, which directly helps the Europeans achieve their goals.  
 
Organisational changes seem to happen with much less contention in the EU when 
compared to the US. The EU’s unique targets actually require the revision of 
administrative duties to ensure capacity is being addressed. Organisational changes 
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in the US, and specifically administrative duties relating to carbon the collection of 
data, is a significant problem.  With each change in administration comes a different 
unit that is tasked with collecting information relating to emissions data. Under 
Bush, this was transport, under Clinton it was the EPA Atmospheric team, and under 
Obama it has returned to the EPA. 
 
Approaching climate policy today seems to require an increasingly centralised 
approach to climate mitigation policies. The DG Clima has a much more direct focus 
on climate change than the Enviro DG does. Increasing the statistical and 
mathematical knowledge needed for better understanding the complexity of climate 
mitigation policies seems to be an impressive feature in European policy.  Deploying 
a strictly statistical organisation for targets shows commitment in addressing the 
factual demands of the policy field, but also, in contributing to the understanding of 
the continual changes needed to support new ambitions and goals. The informational 
centres and scientific backgrounds of researchers within these organisations meant 
that climate policy retained a strong connection to science in the EU.  
 
In the EU, information from scientific organisations enters the policy institutions 
where it is handled by specific administrations. Mainly, the EU gathers statistical 
emissions information7 used for developing its carbon policy from two places: the 
UNFCCC ,and the DG Clima (one international organization and one domestic 
organization).  Although the DG Energy and DG Environment also collect 
information in regards to emissions data, DG Clima remains the single organisation 
that informs and aggregates the statistical data that is used for developing the EU’s 
carbon policy.  The UNFCCC provides early recommendations on targets and 
                                               
7 This data is normally related to meteorological information (including 




reductions, but then it is left to the EU to take those estimates and verify and develop 
its internal reductions targets. Therefore, as soon as information relating to 
emissions reductions targets enters the EU each individual agency is required to 
identify and verify its own place within emissions reduction.  For instance, the DG 
Energy is required to develop and propose actions that are related to energy 
consumption and production; the DG Environment is responsible for identifying 
what the state of the current environment is, and what actions are needed to protect 
the environment from further atmospheric damage. However, DG Clima is the only 
organisation that coordinates the viewpoints of energy, environment and economy 
to form a single emissions target for the EU. This process ensures that targets are 
kept in line international standards, but are also directly informed and verified 
through the EU’s own processes.  
 
This is not the case in the US. Statistical information (specifically CO2 reductions 
targets imposed from the UNFCCC) enters the policy arena where it is quickly met 
with opposing standards. However, this may be due to the long-standing trust issues 
between American politicians and the UN (Stowe, interview, 2015). As such, the 
UNFCCC is not the officially recognised body in regards to statistical data for the 
UN; instead, the US has its own data collection agency, the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) which shares data responsibilities with the DOE, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Therefore, statistical information comes 
from defence (DOE), energy (DOE), and commerce (NOAA), yet no agency 
currently has the authority to aggregate and assimilate data.   In addition, since the 
EPA has gained the authority to begin collecting environmental-related data in the 
Massachusetts v. EPA lawsuit, there are now even more conflicting viewpoints on 
the needed emissions reductions for the US. Although the UNFCCC may prescribe 
targets to the US, different agencies may project a different viewpoint of what is 
actually needed. Therefore, without a centralised agency to collect information and 
form an accurate baseline targets, it’s difficult for agencies, and the actors within 
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them, to accurately estimate what the cost-benefit of emissions reductions truly are 
in the US.  This was seen in the 2009 passing of the Waxman-Markey bill for 
instance, where the deciding authority on the bill was unable to decipher and 
understand the differences in the various economic models that were used between 
agencies to forecast the cost-benefit of emissions reductions.  
 
The lack of a unified approach shows that climate mitigation goals will be difficult 
to achieve at the federal-level, regardless of the political affiliation of the executive 
branch.  State-level responsibilities in mitigation policies do allow states like 
California to display climate leadership, but at the same time, also allows states to 
use anti-climate rhetoric that fail to diffuse notions that climate change is a threat to 
American competitiveness. The notions of environmental standards are fragmented 
amongst internal organisations, and thus evidence produced in the policy-process 
often meets opposition. Still, the emphasis on technology-driven results shows that 
increasing the strength of research and development programmes, and introducing 
different types of economic tools may be likely to succeed in the US.  
 
The organisation and coordination of the House of Representatives seems to be an 
additional obstacle for policy-makers attempting to promote federal-level mitigation 
policy.  The various committees involved in discussion seem to allow non-climate 
advocates considerable room for influence on the policy process. Despite the 
continual changing of committees responsible for climate policy, this has positive 
influence on policy formation, such as the addition of amendments by 
environmental advocates. However, this also has negative effects as it opens the 
door for those wanting to negatively impact the policy process.  Again, the lack of 
clear information that outlines the economic impacts of climate change, and gives 
recommendations on avoiding those impacts, fails to produce a convincing notion 
for modernising the economy with ecological considerations. Nancy Pelosi’s 
introduction of a new committee in 2007 shows how the House is definitely 
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responsible for at least a portion of the weak policy proposed in the US.  When 
creating a new committee that combined both House Republican and Democratic 
experts, the committee effectively helped to create several ambitious items of carbon 
legislation. However, these were stopped by specific actors and through the 
distortion of information that has become uniquely linked to the George W. Bush 
administration.  
 
Without maximum term limits, Republican members are often elected without 
opposition because they are able to retain seats due to familiarity with their district. 
Although this would not matter as representatives are directly elected, the change of 
committee assignments seems to have greatly affected climate issues. House 
members with seniority have typically chosen main committees of importance, and 
specifically energy.  It seems that these members vote according to their long-
standing traditions on environmental legislation, as opposed to what the policy 
demands of carbon actually entail. As such, many proposals die within the House, 
ranging from outright dismissals but also from failing to act within the appropriate 
time required for changing bills into legislation. 
 
Without a centralised agency coordinating information, the US seems unable to 
form a clear viewpoint as to what its emissions targets should be and instead, target 
opinions remain divided by venues, partisan-interests, and changes in 
administration. Without having clear statistical data, the economic foundation 
needed to show the long-term benefits behind emissions targets is impossible to 
formulate or defend. Without such a centralised statistical agency, the benefits 
shown to stakeholders will remain inconsistent. As such, the US will be unlikely to 
create an emissions trading scheme, and perhaps, may be in danger of not reaching 
mitigation goals as they fail to track progress.  When considering the consistent 
instances in which climate change information was distorted within this twenty-year 
period, it seems increasingly unlikely that the US will be able to address climate 
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change without making institutional adjustments that have a direct mandate to 
coordinate carbon policies.   
9.2.3 Change in actors: shifting responsibilities towards topical experts 
Change in actors who participate in the policy-process seems to have been a critical 
factor in the EU’s institutional progress. There is a significant difference between 
the actors that push climate policy forward in the EU as compared to those in the 
US.  Rational choice decision-making implies that humans are able to make rational 
cost benefit assessments (Ostrom, 1998, p. 1-22). However, within carbon policy, 
the correct data needed to economically calculate the opportunities within long-term 
decision-making must be matched by sophisticated statistical comprehension. The 
correct information and the correct calculations give actors the capability of being 
rational decision-makers. Making the institutional adjustments to reflect these 
capabilities has been central to the European success.  
 
Both economists and energy experts helped the EU to ensure that the institutional 
capabilities within its organizations matched the rate of incoming knowledge. 
Environmental experts first brought in the idea of sustainable development which 
was an economic, institutional approach to environmental policy. The EU then 
adjusted its institutional responsibilities to reflect increased intellectual capabilities 
that matched the growing complexity of carbon policy. Environmental experts were 
joined by economists and scientists, and as such, a variety of tools continued to be 
proposed.  The ideas centralised by economists like Jos Delbeke, ensured that equal 
support was given to broader European stakeholders.   
 
Failure of policy innovation, and therefore, innovative ideas, may be due to the 
limitation of actors themselves in climate policy circles. In the US, the same actors 
remain situated within the policy arena for significant amounts of time. Vice-
President Al Gore has acted as a senate member, a Vice-President, and now as an 
expert witness. John McCain has also been involved in the process for a 
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considerable amount of time; Hilary Clinton was Secretary of State under Obama 
who himself, also served on the committees affecting climate change. Now, Hilary 
Clinton is running for President, against Senator Sanders, who was also located in 
the climate policy discussions during this investigation.  The same key actors have 
remained within the arena for almost the duration of the policy time indicating that 
life-long politicians may be greater in number and authority than new actors. 
However, this is of increasing concern when considering the introduction of the 
celebrity factor within politics. 
 
9.2.4 Change in policy tool options: increasing the diversity of choices  
The ideas of ecological modernisation seem to heavily affect the policy tool options 
that are available to policy-makers.  The US seems to thus, only allow their policy-
makers to deploy market-based or voluntary tools. These are the only tools that are 
likely to not harm the economy, nor be met with stakeholder criticism. Despite an 
emphasis on an economic approach to climate change the US does not push forward 
on developing its own approach to climate change. Economic tools are limited, and 
the use of finance, which is often seen as the crux of technical efficacy, does not 
play a big role, at least during this time period. Although private sector financing in 
clean energy has significantly increased in the US in more recent years, the 
government support of RandD seems limited for the emphasis put on the 
technological and private sector driven approach in the US’s mitigation policies.   
 
Information plays a strong role in initially affecting the tools in carbon policy, yet 
informational tools do not seem to take place frequently in the US. Information 
affects the outcomes of climate policy in three key ways; in targets, in baseline 
information, and the degree of ambition that is set within the policy itself. When 
viewing the tools collected, we can see how informational tools played a direct role 
in contributing to the leading and lagging climate policies in the US and the EU. 
Through the EU’s static location of DG Clima, and through the collaboration with 
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industry members, the EU is able to ensure that their targets and ambition are set 
accurately to create a unified idea of how carbon policy should develop. Thus far, 
the targets on how industries need to meet targets have not been able to be enforced 
with trust without a centralised authority to collect and aggregate greenhouse gas 
data. However, this may be affected more greatly after the Supreme Court case 
Massachusetts v. the EPA. The regulatory authority maybe the initial organisational 
change needed to spur further changes within the US.  
 
In the EU, climate actors are able to use a variety of tools; regulations are clearly 
laid down and enforced, in addition to a variety of other complex arrangements. 
Economic tools are consistently deployed alongside informational tools to collect 
and observe data. The informational tools help industry members and the public to 
understand the complexity of the tools deployed. Voluntary agreements are made 
similarly to the US with the automobile industry acting as a key player.  
 
The EU ETS overall, helped to enforce the consistent need for change and evolution 
in the EU by providing a clear cost for carbon compliance. The tool allows 
decisions-makers to monitor and update progress on emissions reductions, and also 
provides an economic incentive for doing so.  The ECCP however acts as a strong 
collective framework for achieving carbon goals. The programme itself is largely 
reflective of the European climate policy. The programme works with epistemic 
community members to provide clear targets, timelines, and baseline years for 
achievement.  These include leading industry members, key economists, and also 
members of the scientific community. These targets are then unanimously decided 
and later enforced. The organisation, or programme, helped to act as an tool itself 
by crossing different administrations to provide timelines for completion. Through 
these types of unique action programmes, the EU removed party association from 




9.2.5 Change in policy-paradigms: moving away from environmental policy 
towards an institutional approach  
This study defends the notion that strong ecological modernisation provided a better 
approach to climate mitigation goals than the weak ecological modernist approach.  
Taking an institutional approach means that changes in administrative capacities 
occur in the EU constantly, thereby ensuring that European climate institutions 
continuously evolve in response to new information. The US tries to do this but does 
not succeed. Instead, and perhaps because of the heavy influence of corporations in 
the decision-making process, institutional adjustments are difficult. At times, even 
policy-makers themselves frown upon the changes due to the jurisdictional territory 
attached to certain policy areas in the US.  
 
The strong ecological modernist viewpoint, which serves as the basis for the 
European approach to sustainable development, has continuously evolved, 
displaying that true innovation is in fact spurred by changes in ideas themselves. In 
the EU, political players push climate concerns forward with strong backgrounds in 
economics and environmental economics. The EU produced the necessary 
intellectual capital needed to influence and coordinate the variety of stakeholders in 
the policy process to convince them to respond to a new policy demand. This shows 
how the EU institutionally adjusted to support increasing complex policy demands. 
 
The US has consistently addressed carbon policy considerations with a weak 
ecological modernist approach, but has been unable to implement any lasting 
legislation. This is most likely due to the fact that climate mitigation policies are 
rarely considered by anyone other than the environmental agency or the executive 
branch in the US.  In the US, these political players tend to be lawyers and 
politicians, whose skills in legal measures do not match the construction of market-
based tools that the US prefers. Instead, these qualities are more suited towards 




Still, the understanding of the long-term benefits associated with CO2 reductions 
seem to be misconstrued in various notions of competitive damages in the US, that 
heavily impacts the economic validity of legislation. Without strong support from a 
variety of stakeholders, the evolution of institutions does not seem to occur. Instead, 
mitigation techniques are likely to be proposed but, without the institutional changes 
needed to increase intellectual capabilities, policy choices are likely to result in 
weaker ambition and goals in carbon policy, if they can be implemented at all.  
 
In the US, specifically, ecological ideas often enter the policy-process and encounter 
divided opinions as to how climate will affect the economy. On one side are those 
who see the benefits of carbon reductions and, on the other side, are those who still 
view see addressing climate change as a threat to American competitiveness.  Rather 
than the organisational strength in climate policies being increased in line with 
policy-demands, executive administrations create new agencies under their own 
leadership, which makes climate mitigation policy associated with individuals. This 
then makes climate policy a major obstacle that each new President has to address. 
Instead of continual smaller changes, the US only seems to attempt to take major 
changes in regards to implementing climate policy. 
 
In addition, the overall approach to ecological modernisation in the US remains 
stagnant on the construction between environment and growth, and shows an 
uncertain approach that centres on economic growth leading to increased 
technological innovation. However, this viewpoint seems to have become 
increasingly conservative in the US, which leads one to question.  What is the 
American definition of success in climate policy, and how does the country hope to 
achieve this?  
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9.3.  The need for new ideas to spur incremental changes in the US   
The thesis shows how many dimensions climate policy truly impacts. It also shows 
how complex and partisan-associated climate change policy has truly become in the 
US. Looking at the history of climate change policy shows a great deal of obstacles 
that future policy proposals are likely to encounter. The increasing partisanship of 
climate change issues seems to indicate a low chance of carbon policy 
implementation without an economic demonstration of the opportunities and risks 
associated with climate change in the US. However, without addressing the role of 
media sensationalism it seems unlikely that such a study would create noticeable 
impact in the US, especially when considering the history of misinformation 
campaigns attacking climate change science in the US. 
 
When taking into account the US’s recent decision to pull out from the Paris 
Agreement, it seems that pro-climate actors in the US will need to work to ensure 
that institutions change to support the overarching goals as needed to achieve 
ambitious climate legislation. It seems important to consider how to engage the US 
in a meaningful manner that lacks precedence, and therefore the risk of inherited 
bias that seems to be a constant connection in the US. This could require using a 
different type of policy tool, such as a carbon tax. It also seems that industry exerts 
a large influence on American institutional structures which indicates the need for 
increasing incentives in RandD and also regulatory targets to ensure compliance.  
Without developing an indicator for technological development, or investment in 
renewable energy, this thesis questions how the US will be able to make a 
meaningful contribution to the efforts needed for global emissions reductions.  
 
In the US ideas and policy currently related to climate change now enter the system 
and create divided opinions as to how climate change will impact both the economy 
and broader society. This leads to a clear division between those who see the benefits 
of carbon reductions, and those who see reductions as limiting to economic growth. 
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Rather than the organisational strength being increased in line with policy-demands, 
executive administrations create a new agency, which poses a shock to the system.  
Instead of continual smaller changes, the US only seems to attempt to take major 
changes.  It may be helpful for the US instead, to create a centralised agency that 
coordinates climate data and is separate from historical connotations to climate 
change.  
 
At the same time, this thesis recognises that when considering the US’s emphasis 
on technology being used to achieve CO2 reductions, it has excluded the quantitative 
tracking of investment considerations in the private sector towards carbon-capturing 
technologies. Although it is important for institutions to support communities as 
they move to address climate change, it may in fact be premature to assume that all 
American efforts were captured in this study- specifically, those investments made 
in renewable energy technologies and in carbon utilisation.   
 
The most interesting, and perhaps impactful, area for future research would be the 
theoretical construction of an ecological idea in the US; one that aligns better with 
the American economic mentality of short-term results and security. Since this study 
has begun, the concept of resilience and adaptation measures has become further 
emphasized as a critical part of the low-carbon transition. With an emphasis on 
short-term goals and infrastructures, this area may in fact be one that helps America 
to begin addressing its climate goals. However, like sustainable development, this 
area can be somewhat vague; in order for America to truly progress in climate 
adaptation as part of a mitigation strategy specific goals and measures for progress 
would need to be developed.  Again considering the emphasis on technology and 
the need for clean coal in countries like China and India, this could be an area where 




Overall, this research supports the notion that ideas are the key catalysts to change: 
not interests (Blyth 2001; R Lieberman, 2002; Levi, 1997; Weingast, 1996). Change 
itself seems to only occur in reaction from capable actors who are able understand 
the complexity of carbon policy, due to their previous understanding that carbon 
policy requires a change in environment and the economy. Even with the creation 
of new structures to implement carbon policy, actors that support these structures 
must receive information and know how to address it, in order to cause a change. 
Information in carbon policy seems to help forms the basis of actor’s ideas, which 
in turn affects their policy choices. Information helps to generate new ideas in this 
area, which leads to innovation in policy tools.   
 
This thesis also sought to assess empirical evidence relating to incremental change, 
or the category of change that has been most recently described as evolutionary 
(Steinmo, 2014). This study suggests that incremental change is necessary for 
organisations to address climate change, and the US’s current system lacks 
evolution in environmental policy due to the lack of smaller organisational changes 
that need to spur further institutional adjustments.  As evolution can be described as 
institutional adaptation, it seems as if the US system is unresponsive to policy 
innovation. As evolution can be described as institutional adaptation, it seems as if 
the US system is unresponsive to policy innovation. 
 
Updating the American economy with ecological considerations will require the 
adjustment of time, which seems to be a considerable obstacle in policy.   
Sustainable development infers long-term decision-making whereas development in 
the American neo-liberal sense has to do with immediate returns. In the EU, climate 
mitigation programmes often span over years, and at times, decades to allow time 
for the transition of environment within the economy. However, the environment is 
valued overall because it has been understood that within economic growth can 
cause detrimental environmental effects. The US will need to create a stronger 
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emphasis and policy-framework to convince stakeholders of the long-term benefits 
of avoiding climate change and its effects.  
 
Considering the political instability that has occurred in Europe in 2015, this thesis 
also recognises the need to understand member states, and other individual nations, 
commitments to climate mitigation ambitions in order to understand how times of 
strain may inhibit climate mitigation. Specifically considering the economic impact 
that a social cost for carbon has, it becomes necessary to understand to what degree 
individual countries have institutionalised climate mitigation policies. The pressure 
to address short-term decisions, such as jobs and unemployment, may conflict with 
the idea and operation of strong ecological modernisation. Yet the evolution of 
European structures alongside the demands of international climate change 
legislation shows the EU itself growing increasingly effective. In the EU, 
implementing carbon policy has resulted in a shift for long-term thinking of 
economic success for firms. As environmental policy has grown with European 
competence, it is easy to see how its continued success may depend very much on 
the success of the EU itself, as increasing centralisation seems connected to carbon 
policy success. Without a strong EU focus in climate change, one can question the 
likelihood of member states to individually contribute in such a meaningful manner 
towards international carbon abatement. The study of carbon policy presents a 








Appendix 1: Table of European carbon policy tools 1992-2001 




Informational  SAVE program 
Focused on buildings and transport. 
Aimed at providing consumers with 
information about the energy 





Cooperative Thermie programme 
Demonstration and promotion of new 




















Economic  The Fifth Environmental Action 
Programme  
The first program that set out clear 
objectives, targets, and time frames for 
the European environment policy. 
Focused on reducing pollution levels 
and implementing legislation that 





Promote the market for renewable 
energy source and their integration into 






The Cost of Prospective Initiative 
Focused on evolving normal accounting 
measure from standard financial 
considerations into including all factors 






To help cushion the losses of industries 
and member states against the new 
objectives of the EU, or provide 
funding for member states and 
industries that needed safeguarding 
from carbon penalties  
Council of the 
EU  
Implemented 
Cost-Benefit Analysis Mechanism  
Used to determine the utility of policy 
choices by ingraining environmental 
considerations into traditional economic 
analysis methods  
Commission 
Environment   
Implemented 
The Community's Eco-Management 
and Audit Scheme 
Encouraged private companies and 
public bodies to improve their 
environmental performance within 
areas of economic activity by outlining 





The Cost of Prospective Initiative 
Evolving traditional accounting 
methods to include factors related to 








Appendix 2: European carbon policy tools from 2001-2002 




Regulatory  The Sixth Environmental Action 
Programme  
While the targets of the 5EAP were 
seen as regulatory, the 6EAP focused 
on supplying information to industry 






Motor Vehicle Reduction Rates 
Reduction target rates set for industries 
producing outside the EU, with a focus 
on motor vehicles. CO2 emissions of 
vehicles produced in 2012 to be no more 





Emissions reductions targets  
Limiting the amount of carbon 
produced by six main industries; 
Energy, steel, cement, glass, brick 
making and paper/cardboard 
production: these industries were noted 




Informational Energy labels 
Helps consumers and businesses to 
identify products and services that have 
a reduced environmental impact 




Cooperative The European Electricity Grid 
initiative 
Focused on the whole system 
requirements necessary to prove the 
likelihood of zero emission fossil fuel 




 The European Wind Initiative  
Launched to deploy large-scale wind 






offshore development for the renewable 
energy sector. 
 The Solar Europe Initiative 
Focused on developing a research, 
development, and demonstration 





 The Bioenergy Europe Initiative 
Focused on deploying the next 





 The Sustainable Nuclear Fission 
Initiative 
Aimed at increasing funding behind 
technology related to nuclear energy 
production by focusing on the future 




 European Electricity Grid Initiative  
Focused on the system requirements 
necessary to transition the European 




Economic Green tariffs 
Aimed at increasing the incentives for 





The European Emission Trading 
System 
Commission 






Appendix 3: Tables of American carbon policy tools 1992-2001 
Type of policy 
tool 




Regulatory The National Environmental Policy 
Act 
Focused on air particulate and global 
warming, the EPA formed the first 
environmental policies to regulate 
industries impact on the environment 
including environmental impact 
assessment and streamlined risk 




The Presidential Directive on Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions  
Focused on promoting retail competition 
in the electric power industry, delivering 
efficiency increases in order to reduce 




Informational The North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation 
This treaty consisted of a declaration of 
principles and objectives concerning 
conservation and the protection of the 
environment in the face of increasing 
economic activity. 
Foreign 
policy treaty  
Implemented 
Cooperative Automobile fuel efficiency standards  
Mileages standards were introduced as a 
way of reducing CO2 
EPA  Implemented  
The Climate Change Action Plan  
Launched several tools to reduce 
domestic greenhouse gas emissions in a 
number of sectors across the economy 




Department of Energy (DOE) Climate 
Change Programme 
Formed in cooperation with the 
electricity sector, this tool sought to 




to voluntarily reduce their carbon 
footprint. 
The Energy STAR Programme 
Jointly deployed by the EPA and DOE, 
this program was put in place to reduce 
energy consumption in homes and office 
buildings across the Nation. 
DOE/EPA Implemented 
The Energy Star Building and Green 
Lights Partnership  
Launched to encourage increase 
efficiency within the built environment, 
this program worked to provide funding 
for buildings to undergo efficiency 
upgrades. 
EPA Implemented 
Economic The Comprehensive Electricity 
Competition (CECA) bill  
Restructured the US electric industry and 
increase competition to drive down 









Appendix 4: American carbon policy tools 2001-2012 
Type of policy 
tool 





Regulatory Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 
Establishes Federal climate change 
research and related activities, enhancing 
measurements, standards, and 
technologies that enable the reduction of 
greenhouse gasses. 
Directs the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
to establish and maintain the National 
Greenhouse Gas Database, including the 
development of measurement and 







 Keep American Competitive Global 
Warming Policy Act of 2006 
To establish a market-based system to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions and to 
promote advanced energy research and 
technology development and 






















 Climate Stewardship Act of 2004 
Expands Federal climate change research 
initiatives.  
Establishes a program for the market-
driven reduction of GHGs by covered 
entities through the use of tradable 
emissions allowances. Allows tradable 
allowances to be sold, exchanged, 
purchased, retired, or otherwise used as 









 The Climate Stewardship Act of 2004  
This act proposed to reduce emissions 
levels to the 2004 levels by 2012, 1990 
emissions levels by 2020, and 60% 











A resolution recognizing the need for 
the Environmental Protection Agency 
to end decades of delay and utilize 
existing authority under the Resource 















The Global Warming Pollution 
Reduction Act of 2006 
This act attempted to integrate CO2 











The Global Warming Pollution 
Reduction Act of 2007 
This act attempted to integrate CO2 










on Finance  
The Global Warming Pollution 
Reduction Act of 2008 
This act attempted to integrate CO2 











The Federal Leadership in 
Environmental, Energy, and Economic 
Performance 
Issued targets and emissions 
requirements for all federal agencies as 







The Climate and Clean Air Coalition 
Launched to make immediate and rapid 
progress on climate change, mainly in 
improving air quality by targeting black 









The Programmatic Environment 
Impact Statement (PEIS) 
Tool analyses potential environmental, 
social, and economic impacts associated 
with the proposed 2012-2017 Outer 
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing 
Program (the Program). This PEIS 
evaluates the potential impacts from oil 
and gas exploration and development on 
six planning areas of the Outer 






Informational  An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario 
and its Implications for United States 
National Security 
DOE Implemented 
Cooperative The Advanced Research Project 
Agency-Energy  
Focused on 'out of the box' 
transformational energy research that 
brings together scientists, engineers, and 
entrepreneurs to develop innovation 
within cleaner technologies. 
DOE Implemented 
The Operational Energy Strategy 
Implementation Plan 
Department of Defence and Department 
of Energy Cooperative project that 
sought to address energy security.  Used 
an annual budget of $240,000 to focus on 
renewable energy projects, incorporating 
energy efficiency standards, and 
reducing fuel usage in the US military  
DOE Implemented  
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The Major Economies Forum on 
Energy and Climate 
Launched to facilitate a dialogue among 
major developed and developing 
economies to make progress in meeting 





The Clean Energy Ministerial  
Intergovernmental organisational project 
created specifically to drive the 





Economic  The Climate Leaders Offset 
Methodologies 
Developed a standardized approach to 
determine the eligibility of projects 
proposed for carbon reductions. 
EPA Implemented 
Climate Change Technology Tax 













The Climate Stewardship and 
Innovation Act 
The bill was proposed to encourage 
leadership within climate measures, 












Competition Bill  
Bill designed to restructure the electricity 
market in a direction that included 







The Climate Change Credit 
Corporation 
Focused on providing funding for 
industry and consumers who complied 


















The McCain and Lieberman Climate 
Stewardship Act  
Called on the government to fund 
researching and commercializing efforts 
















The Green Climate Fund  
A joint project between global nations 





The New Energy for America Act 
This plan would use indirect and direct 
economic tools to help America 
transition away from an oil-dependent 





The New Energy Plan for America  
Seeks to create five million jobs by 
investing $150 billion over the next ten 










The American Clean Energy and 
Security Act  
The bill would have established an 
emissions trading plan similar to the EU 
ETS and proposed the first coverage 




























Appendix 5: List Interviewees 
 
Anonymous, governmental source who has been involved in climate mitigation 
policy for over ten years, but could not officially comment due to governmental 
restrictions, Paris, 10 November, 2015.  
Bernstead, Björn, Head of EU project “World Views on Climate Change”, 
London, 8 July 2015.  
Boersma, Tim, Senior Fellow for Climate Policy at the Brookings Institute, 
London, 20 June 2015.    
Costa, Alessandro, Head of Strategic Affairs, Enel Industry Group, Manila, 
17 June 2015.  
Evans, Peter, Co-founder Centre for American Progress, previous policy advisor in 
the US, London, 1 June 2015.  
Forrister, Dirk, CEO of International Emissions Trading Scheme, US delegate to 
COP 1992- 2007, COP Participant 1992-2015, 20 July 2015.  
Helm, Dieter, Economist, Oxford University, Special Advisor to the European 
Commission, London, 1 August 2015.  
Joubert, Phillippe, CEO, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
Chair of the Prince of Wale’s Trust, Manila, 18 June 2015.  
King, Ian, Head of Policy and EU ETS at the Department of Climate Change 
(UK), London, 20 July 2015.  
Lee, Caroline. IEA economist, climate change policy analyst, COP participant 
2013 and 2015, Paris, 15 July 2015.  
Levina, Ellina, IEA economist, climate change policy analyst, COP 
participant 2001-2015, London, 30 June 2015.  
MacNaughton, Joan, Former DG Energy UK, original representative of the 
UK at the 1992 UNFCCC conference, London, 17 June 2015.  
Mills, Simon, Head of Sustainability, City of London, London Accords, London, 
14 June 2015. 
Neil, Stuart, Head of Communications for the World Energy Council, COP 
participant 2009-2015, London, 2 July 2015. 
Nekhaev, Elena, Director and Senior Advisor, Technical Programmes, World 




Rowan, Peter, UN Economist working on ETS in 2009, 2011, and 2015, London, 
8 May 2015.   
Stowe, Robert, Dean of Harvard Environmental Economics, leading author on 
carbon policy in the US, and EU ETS, 11 May 2015.  
Topping, John, Former EPA administrator, Taskforce on Air and Pollutions, 
London, 10 May 2015.  
Tudway, Richard, Economist, Oxford University, Previous employee of 
British National Economic Development Office, Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. Principal Economist for Centre for 
International Economics. London, 15 May 2015.  
Ulrecht, Stephan, Head of Governmental Liaison, E.On, German Policy 
Adviser on Industry Emissions, Manila, 17 June 2015. 
Williams, Leslie, lawyer and former legal representative for the state of California, 
14 July 2015.   
Winkler, Sandra, Director, Energy Policies and Sustainability, World Energy 
Council, COP Participant 2009, London, 3 July 2015.     
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Appendix 6: Letter of request for the interview process 
University of Nottingham   
School of Politics and International Relations 
Nottingham 
UK NG7 2RD 
Email: ldxkk7@nottinghama.c.uk 
Dear xyz,  
 I hope you don’t mind my contact, but I wanted to get in touch with you in regards to 
completing an interview for my doctoral dissertation.  I believe that your extensive 
experience in the climate policy process would help me to better understand the 
coordination between information, ideas, and individuals when attempting to pass carbon 
policy.  
My dissertation examines the achievements of both governing areas in regards to climate 
change mitigation policy and discusses key obstacles and success stories of the two areas 
on the path to a low-carbon economy. Using a typology of tools, I investigate the utility of 
regulatory, informational, economic, and voluntary types of tools on CO2 reductions. By 
using an institutional approach, I then trace the impact of ideas within policy-discussions. 
As such, the interview process will seek to examine the differences in the framing of climate 
change within the EU and the US, and to compare the impact of sustainable development 
in the EU to the more limited approach as seen in the US.  
I do realise that this is rather limited information, but the interview process takes an 
exploratory approach. The interview itself would only take up to 45-60 minutes, and would 
mainly seek to use your extensive experience in climate legislation to give original opinions 
on the differences in perception and framing of climate change. I’d be happy to have an 
initial call to explain further, but would happily arrange the interview via skype if possible. 
I very much look forward to hearing from you, and I do hope we can engage further. 
 Kind Regards, 
Katrina Kelly  
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Appendix 7: Sample questions for the interview process 
 
Katrina Kelly 
Interview Guide for Process-Tracing     
Questions 
General introduction  
1. First, are you aware that the information collected in this interview will be 
recorded and will be officially used for a research study?  If so, do you give 
consent for information gathered here to be used in my written dissertation, 
and specifically, to be used for quotes? If not, do you prefer to proceed 
with anonymity?  
2. Can you just tell me a bit about your background and how it relates to this 
study?   
How is climate change framed in the EU as compared to the US?  
3. What is the primary policy sphere that drives EU climate change policy? 
US?  
4. To what extent has ecological modernisation acted as a practical policy 
driver in the EU? In the US? Sustainable development?  
5. To what extent has citizen participation or civil society driven the policy-
process? 
6. To what extent and why has policy-making interacted with science as it 
comes to fruition?  
7. Can you give an example of where input from the scientific community 
made an impact on the policy trajectory in the EU or US?  
8. Do you feel that policy-makers are comfortable and knowledgeable on the 
topic of climate change? Why or why not?  
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9. Can you identify specific junctures or changes as to when you saw the EU 
climate policy becoming stronger?  
10. Can you identify specific legislative or institutional barriers to climate 
success in the EU or US? 
General wrapping up questions 
11. Why do you think the US still has not imposed climate mitigation targets? 
12. How has the EU been able to implement emissions trading scheme but the 
US has unable to?  
13. If the US had proposed a different type of carbon tool, such as a tax, do 
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